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PREFACE
Epidemiology, the science of the determinants of illness in populations, lacks a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for the metaphysics and epistemology of 
causation. In this book, support is o!ered for the argument that it is possible, and 
perhaps even useful, to move from causal inference to etiological explanation in 
epidemiology. In particular, a proposal is made that etiological pluralism is pluralism 
of causes and of causation, and that it requires the consideration of di!erent kinds 
of causal and mechanistic evidence. Further, it is argued that a process perspective 
will be helpful when looking at the combined contribution of etiological factors. 
Finally, it is argued that explanatory coherentism might be a viable framework for 
comprehensive etiological explanations.
"is book has been many years in the making. "e #rst versions of the idea date 
back to 1994, when I visited the Chapel Hill campus of the University of North 
Carolina. My wife and pediatrician colleague Christiane participated in a workshop 
there, which gave me 2 days in the campus library. It was there that I developed 
the nested bicone model of illness causation (see Section 2.4.2 in this book). "e 
manuscript I wrote about it was never published, so the idea sees the light of day only 
now, more than 25 years later.
I have read philosophical texts, in particular philosophy of science, since my high 
school days. Many years later, with formal degrees in medicine and epidemiology, 
I$ still read anything I can lay my hands on in the area of causation and causal 
inference. In 2014, I discovered to my great excitement Alex Broadbent’s book 
Philosophy of Epidemiology and submitted a book review about it to the journal 
Philosophy of Science. I contacted Alex, he graciously listened to my amateurish 
questions, and he helped me a lot to grasp the nuances of his book. I found out that 
his academic home, the University of Johannesburg in South Africa, o!ers a master’s 
degree track in philosophy that builds on a research project, and I asked Alex if he 
would accept me as a student with a project about etiological explanations. I was 
thrilled when he agreed and suggested to wrap my thesis around a series of published 
articles. Two years and 80,000 words into the project, we decided to transition from 
a master’s to a doctoral thesis, which I submitted in October 2018. "is book is an 
updated, considerably modi#ed, and expanded version of that thesis. "anks once 
more for all your help and guidance, Alex.
I work in an academic #eld that does not encourage the publication of books 
but almost exclusively values publications of articles in scholarly journals. Perhaps 
as a consequence of this fact, and of my di%culty producing longer, coherent 
texts, I began writing articles about the theory of etiology in epidemiology. One 
of the earliest was coauthored with Alan Leviton; I will always be grateful for his 
mentorship and collegial guidance, and for his unlimited enthusiasm for the good 






cause of preventing brain damage among the most vulnerable newborns. Some of the 
more recent articles form the backbone of individual chapters in this book. I would 
like to thank Carmina Erdei and Alex Fiorentino for allowing me to recycle some of 
the material we coauthored, and James Marcum, Martha Montello, Alfredo Morabia, 
and Gregory Radick for chaperoning some of these pieces toward publication. Special 
thanks to my editor at CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group, Jo Koster, for guidance 
and patience. I am grateful to all others who o!ered helpful direct or indirect 
input for those papers, my thesis, and this book: Alex Broadbent, Ryan Flanagan, 
Jeremy Howick, Ted Poston, Federica Russo, David Spurrett, Paul "agard, Jan 
Vandenbroucke, Jon Williamson, and multiple anonymous reviewers. My apologies 
to those I am omitting here inadvertently.
Most importantly, I thank my wife Christiane and our daughters Lina and Laura. 
Neither this book nor I would be without them.
For Christiane




Sitting appears to be the new smoking. According to the CNN health news website,
a growing amount of research suggests that just standing – even if you don’t walk 
around – can have health bene!ts.1
"e research that triggers such news is brought to you by epidemiologists. In this !eld 
of health research, scientists collect information on a large number of individuals 
from well-de!ned populations. "en, they attempt to identify patterns of risk factors 
for health outcomes, based on the observation of processes that begin with the 
exposure to a putative cause of illness (e.g., smoking) and end with the outcome, 
the occurrence of disease (e.g., lung disease). "eir stated goal is to identify causes 
of illness. By doing so, they contribute to a narrative that details the#story of illness 
occurrence. "ey help generate etiological explanations.
1.1  WHAT THIS BOOK IS AND 
IS!NOT!ABOUT
A close look at what epidemiologists do day in, day out suggests that their primary 
goal is to identify modi!able risk factors with the intention to intervene in ways 
that help prevent, or at least reduce, the occurrence of adverse health events in 
populations (Tulchinsky and Varavikova 2009:41–3). "is goal has led to the notion 
that in order to be able to talk about an observed statistical association between risk 
factors (exposures) and health outcomes as a causal association, some kind of tool is 
needed to help with causal inference based on observed data.
Current epidemiology employs two very di$erent tools to do just that. "e !rst is 
a quantitative tool called the potential outcomes approach (POA). It postulates that 
(a) “in ideal randomized experiments, association is causation” (Hernan and Robins 
2006a:578) because (b) “the randomized experiment [is] the only scienti!cally 
proven method of testing causal relations from data” (Pearl 2000). "e POA is 
based on three main assumptions. First, it is rooted in counterfactual reasoning 
(as in “had the exposure not occurred, the outcome had not occurred”). Second, 
it holds that randomization is the closest we can get to a scenario that allows us 
to formally test counterfactual causal hypotheses. Obviously, a direct observation 
of counterfactuals is impossible because we cannot directly observe, for example, 
what would have happened if the patient who took the drug and got better had not 










taken#it.2 "ird, the POA holds that in situations where randomization is impossible, 
quasi-randomization can emulate it, and results from such observational studies can 
be interpreted as indicative of a causal relationship (Imbens and Rubin 2015).
"e POA is not discussed in this book, but instead the focus is on the second, 
qualitative tool available to epidemiologists. In 1965, Sir Austin Bradford Hill 
published the speech he gave on January 14 that year before the Section of 
Occupational Medicine of the Royal Society of Medicine in the United Kingdom. 
In this paper, Hill listed nine points that he thought would be helpful to ponder 
when looking at the results of an observational (nonrandomized) study (Hill 1965). 
Among these are, for example, the strength of the association, whether or not there 
is a dose-response relationship between exposure and outcome, and how well the 
observed result !ts with the rest of the available knowledge. Taken together, these 
nine viewpoints can be thought of as a sca$olding for comprehensive explanations of 
why certain illnesses occur. "is is what I call an etiological explanation, the concept 
at the core of this book. Part of my discussion explicates my observation that the 
way Hill’s heuristics are used in epidemiology is well-aligned with the philosophical 
concepts of explanatory coherentism (Poston 2014) and evidential error independence 
(Claveau 2012).
"us, my overarching goal is to o$er an account of etiology of illness and of 
etiological explanation. "e question I want to tackle is, “What is etiology and what 
do health scientists get out of it?” "is book o$ers a descriptive account of the schism 
between epidemiological and basic science accounts of how illness comes about. 
It is also an account of how the textbook goal of epidemiology, that is, identifying 
causes of illness by describing exposure-outcome relationships, can morph into its 
“de facto” goal, that is, providing useful etiological explanations.
At !rst approach, etiology is depicted as “the cause, set of causes, or manner of 
causation of a disease or condition” (Google) or even simpler, “the cause of a disease 
or abnormal condition” (Merriam-Webster). Epidemiologists state, in accordance 
with these commonsensical de!nitions, that they intend to !nd causes. What 
they are actually doing, however, looks more like an e$ort to !nd more holistic 
explanations of disease occurrence that go beyond the identi!cation of mere causes. 
Such explanations go beyond listing the causes in a disease’s natural history. It is 
the attempt to tell etiological stories that include the why (causes) and the how 
(pathogenesis) of illness, bringing the presence or absence of causes together with 
their functional consequences, their pathogenetic e$ects. When adequately satisfying 
something like these conditions, a story about how a case of illness comes about is 
an etiological explanation of that case. I hold that while the POA restricts one to 
making causal inferences based on observational data, etiological explanations o$er 
far more.
Epidemiologists can more or less ignore the contents of the black box between 
exposure and outcome, because successful prevention does not rely on pathogenetic 
knowledge. All it takes is knowledge about risk factors that are candidate causes, the 
modi!cation of which is likely to result in changes in illness occurrence. In contrast, 
basic science explanations zoom in on that black box, which contains the pathogenetic 
process that connects exposure and outcome, the biological process that is initiated 
by the exposure and results in disease occurrence. Both are ways to explain illness 
occurrence, that is, causal and pathogenetic explanations.3 I suggest unifying causal 








and pathogenetic explanations under the heading etiological explanations. "e reason 
why etiological explanations work for us is because they are holistic descriptions of 
the natural history of illness, provided in a single narrative that integrates new data 
with background knowledge, either by linking causes to pathogenetic processes, or 
vice versa, depending on the time frame and sequence of discovery. "is suggestion 
resonates with Salmon’s account of etiological explanation and with Lewis’ theory of 
causal explanation as providing information about causal histories. It also resonates 
with uni!cationist accounts of scienti!c explanation (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1981, 
1989). However, neither of these accounts features prominently in views of causation 
already implemented in epidemiology, which mainly derive from Mill (re%ected in 
Hill) and Mackie (re%ected in Rothman).4
1.2 ROAD MAP
"is book is based on a series of papers published between 2014 and 2018 for which I 
was either a sole author (Dammann 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018) or the coauthor of one of 
my trainees (Erdei and Dammann 2014). Each chapter following the second is based 
on one of these papers. Although each chapter stands on its own and can be read 
without much background needed from reading the previous ones, they all speak 
to particular aspects of the overarching question of how etiological explanations are 
constructed. One of these papers is published in a philosophy journal (Philosophy 
of Science), one in an epidemiological journal (American Journal of Epidemiology), 
and three in interdisciplinary journals (!eoretical Medicine and Bioethics and 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine). "is variety of journals underlines the notion 
that this is an interdisciplinary book in the philosophy of epidemiology. My task is 
not an entirely philosophical one but one that requires me to reach across the divide 
between philosophy and the sciences. It is not !rst philosophy, but it employs an 
interdisciplinary approach that allows me to draw on both the epidemiological and 
philosophical literature and to o$er arguments based on techniques of reasoning 
from both !elds. "is represents a continuous challenge, a constant risk that I am 
running from the perspective of readers who come from only one of the disciplines 
involved. Similarly, the mark of success for this book is not de!ned by one discipline 
alone. Instead, the hope is that both philosophers and epidemiologists will consider 
this book a valuable contribution to their interdisciplinary discourse.
Chapter 2: A Multidisciplinary Problem. "e next chapter introduces some crucial 
concepts and approaches. First o$ered is a brief introduction to epidemiology, the 
science that helps explain the occurrence of illness. Next, the concept of etiology is 
introduced as the telling of the story of illness occurrence, and some terminology 
is clari!ed. "e topics of epidemiological metaphysics and epistemology round o$ 
this chapter.
Chapter 3: Etiological Explanations. Epidemiological Explanations is an essay 
review (Dammann 2015) of Alex Broadbent’s book Philosophy of Epidemiology 
(Broadbent 2013). In it, I !rst review the text from the epidemiological perspective 
and accept Broadbent’s invitation to move from causation and causal inference to 
explanation. I o$er thoughts on a possible extension of Broadbent’s proposal for what 
is a good causal inference. In essence, inference and con!rmation by intervention 










are conceptualized as one possible way to make etiological explanations even better 
by making them more useful. In the postscript, I contrast epidemiologists’ textbook 
goals (what they say they do, i.e., !nd causes of illness) and their de facto goals (what 
they are actually doing quite well, i.e., contribute to useful etiological explanations). 
"at suggestion is then expanded to consider explanation by intervention as one way 
to improve etiological explanations.
Chapter 4: Etiological Pluralism. "is chapter is based on an essay review 
(Dammann 2016) of Phyllis Illari and Federica Russo’s text on causality in the 
health sciences, in which they provide an overview of causal inference techniques 
(Illari and Russo 2014). I discuss their claim that a mosaic of such techniques should 
allow for good causal explanations and suggest that this does not seem particularly 
useful unless we agree on a schema of how to integrate evidence gathered in multiple 
ways from multiple sources. I also propose that etiological pluralism is pluralism 
about the real-world phenomenon of the illness causation process, not about various 
concepts of it.
Chapter 5: Di"erence-making and Mechanism. "e theme of useful etiological 
explanations from Chapter 3 is picked up here. Federica Russo and Jon Williamson 
have suggested that causal claims in the health sciences need support from both 
di$erence-making and mechanistic evidence. "is proposal has come to be known as 
the Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT). I summarize and discuss the arguments from 
four papers by Russo and Williamson that support the RWT and o$er a review of 
previous critiques, including my own.
Chapter 6: Process Perspective. Causation and causal inference are of utmost 
importance in my !eld of expertise, developmental neuroepidemiology. One 
prominent example is autism causation. A uni!ed model of autism causation 
remains elusive. "erefore, well-designed explanatory models are needed to develop 
appropriate therapeutic and preventive interventions. In the paper that forms the 
basis of this chapter, Carmina Erdei and I have argued that autism is not a static 
disorder but rather an ongoing process (Erdei and Dammann 2014). I#discuss the 
link between preterm birth and autism and brie%y review the evidence supporting 
the link between immune system characteristics and both prematurity and autism. 
I# then propose a causation process model of autism etiology and pathogenesis, 
in which both neurodevelopment and ongoing/prolonged neuro-in%ammation 
are necessary pathogenetic component mechanisms. I suggest that the Mackie-
Rothman su&cient component cause model discussed earlier can be interpreted as 
a mechanistic view of etiology and pathogenesis and can serve as an explanatory 
model for autism causal pathways. Finally, I compare mechanist and process views 
of etiological explanations.
Chapter 7: Combined Contribution. "is chapter revolves around my paper 
“"e etiological stance: Explaining illness occurrence” (Dammann 2017), which 
responds to a piece by Kelly, Kelly, and Russo, who argue “for an integration of 
social, behavioral, and biological factors in the explanation of pathogenesis” (Kelly, 
Kelly, and Russo 2014). I think that theirs is a small but important step in the right 
direction. I think that terminological discrepancies need to be resolved, that the 
pathogenetic perspective should be replaced with an etiological one, that we need 
to reconsider whether the concept of a “lifeworld” is necessary (because it does not 
provide information on how biological, behavioral, and social mechanisms can be 
Q1
Q2








linked mechanistically), and that we should move from “mixed mechanisms” to the 
“combined contributions” of factors in etiological explanations of illness. Moreover, 
I o$er a more detailed explication of what I consider contributors (inducers, 
modi!ers, and mediators) and show how etiological explanations could become 
more comprehensive and perhaps even more useful when enhanced by the notion of 
combined contribution.
Chapter 8: Etiological Coherence. "e last chapter is based on a paper on Hill’s 
viewpoints (i.e., heuristics for causal reasoning in epidemiology) (Dammann 2018). 
It suggests that explanatory coherentist theories, such as that o$ered by Ted Poston 
(Poston 2014), would provide an excellent starting point for formal epistemology 
projects designed to support causal decision-making in the health sciences. I added 
more detail as to why I think that Hill’s heuristics are an explanatory coherentist 
view of causal explanation in epidemiology. I also propose examples of how future 
research could build on my analysis and discussion in this book.
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More than two decades’ worth of dinner party conversations have taught me that 
most consumers of health information tend to think that epidemiology is all about 
epidemics. While this is indeed what some epidemiologists do, most specialize in 
the collection and analysis of data about the occurrence of health phenomena that 
are not related to infections. Some are interested in descriptive information about 
occurrence patterns of illness. Others are analytical epidemiologists, with the goal 
to !nd causes by !nding risk factors1 via group comparisons.2 "ey compare groups 
with certain risk factors to groups without those same risk factors. If the groups di#er 
by just one risk factor ceteris paribus, it is assumed that outcome di#erences in these 
two groups are due to the risk factor.
Despite their success over the past century or so, epidemiologists still ruminate 
the question of what kind of evidence they need to be fully justi!ed in moving 
from mere observed association to causal claim. I began thinking about the link 
between illness occurrence research in epidemiology and philosophical aspects of 
causation in the 1990s. Almost two decades later, the paper “Perinatal brain damage 
causation” was published. In that paper, my colleague Alan Leviton and I took the 
position that
the more of the following criteria are ful!lled, the stronger the support for the 
contention that some risk factor for PBD (perinatal brain damage) might be a “causal” 
factor:
• "e factor precedes PBD;
• "e factor can produce PBD in the experimental setting;
• It is (statistically) associated with PBD in (well-powered) observational 
studies;$and
• Its absence from populations reduces the prevalence of PBD compared to 
populations with the factor present, for example in clinical trials. (Dammann 
and Leviton 2007:286)
Since the publication of this paper, I have come to see that those four bullet points 
are by no means hard-and-fast criteria for causation. Instead, they are what 
epidemiologist Sir Austin Bradford Hill (1897–1991) called “viewpoints” in his 
classic paper on causal inference in epidemiology.3 In this book, Hill’s proposal 
will play a major role in an explanatory coherentist framework for etiological 
explanations.
A MULTIDISCI PLI NA RY 
PROBLEM












2.1  EPIDEMIOLOGY: FINDING CAUSES 
OF ILLNESS
Modern epidemiology is “the study of the distribution and determinants of disease 
frequency in human populations” (Rothman et$ al. 2008b:32). It is one of the 
foundations of the health sciences in that it provides the methods to gather knowledge 
about constellations of candidate causes of illness, based on detailed observations 
in populations.4 Since the 1940s and 1950s, “modern” epidemiology has developed 
from mainly infectious disease-oriented research into health risk research, broadly 
construed. Today, epidemiological research encompasses both population-based and 
clinical research, designed to elucidate occurrence patterns of health phenomena in 
so-called observational studies, as well as information about intervention e#ectiveness 
in so-called clinical trials. "e intention is to help us understand the etiology of disease, 
improve treatment strategies, and predict the outcome of disease. Epidemiology 
includes multiple subspecialties de!ned by exposure (environmental, occupational, 
nutritional epidemiology, among others), by outcome (e.g., cancer epidemiology and 
neuroepidemiology), by population (e.g., pediatric and perinatal epidemiology), or by 
scienti!c perspective (e.g., molecular, genetic, and genomic epidemiology).
"e major variables in epidemiology are time, space, and people characteristics. 
"e !rst issue here is estimation of disease frequency to estimate the disease burden 
in populations. Are there disease occurrence patterns in time (e.g., seasonal peaks) 
or space (e.g., outbreaks) that help us understand the occurrence of the disease under 
investigation? What does it tell us if a disease occurs mainly in the spring but not so 
o%en in the fall? What can we learn from the frequent claim that multiple sclerosis 
occurs more o%en at a distance from the equator, rather than closer to it? How about 
the people involved? Are distinct groups of individuals at particularly high risk? "e 
overarching principle in this area of investigation is to learn from disease occurrence 
patterns about etiology, the natural history of illness, so that targeted medical and 
public health interventions can be designed.
"e two main causal questions in epidemiology are “What is a cause and how 
do we know one?” (Susser 1991). Finding an answer to these two questions is at 
the epicenter of epidemiological theory, simply because !nding causes of illness 
is the declared goal of epidemiological research. Here are a few examples of how 
epidemiologists put it, although I see a caveat in each one:
Epidemiology, therefore, is about measuring health, identifying the causes of ill-health 
and intervening to improve health. (Webb and Bain 2011:2)
"e caveat here is that intervention is the job of nurses, physicians, public health 
o&cials, inter alia, not of epidemiologists.
Its scope covers the description of disease patterns, the search for causes of disease, and 
practical applications related to disease surveillance, prevention, and control. (Oleckno 
2008:1)
I would agree with this de!nition if “applications covered” does not include intervention 
itself. Suggestions for targets for interventions indeed come from epidemiology, but 
the interventions themselves come from health-care providers.









What are the speci!c objectives of epidemiology? First, to identify the etiology or cause 
of a disease and the relevant risk factors. (Gordis 2014:2)
"is de!nition confuses the concepts mentioned. In my view, risk factors are 
candidate causes, and etiology consists of two things: causes and pathogenesis.
2.2 TERMINOLOGY
What follows are preliminary de!nitions of terms I will use frequently in this 
book. Illness is any disease, disorder, or defect that a#ects an individual’s well-
being and requires or receives medical attention. Etiology is the natural history of 
illness occurrence, including initial causes and subsequent pathogenetic and disease 
mechanisms. Pathogenesis is the biological process that connects causes with the 
onset of illness. Exposures are external risk factors, such as sunlight, cigarette smoke, 
or pesticides, that are capable of initiating the pathogenetic mechanism (represented 
by the black box in Figure 2.1). Multiple exposures can co-occur, or occur in sequence, 
and interact in initiating and maintaining pathogenesis. Outcomes are clinical signs 
or symptoms that qualify as markers of disease. As with exposures, patterns of 
characteristics de!ne the outcome. "e etiological process includes exposure and 
outcome as beginning and endpoint, as well as the pathogenetic mechanism(s) in 
between.5
"e distinction between causes and pathogenesis of illness is marked by an 
important feature: their elucidation requires two very di#erent approaches that are 
provided by two scienti!c !elds, epidemiology and basic science. Epidemiologists 
study the occurrence of health phenomena by gathering data in populations and 
report their results as aggregate data, trying to single out risk factors they can suggest 
to their colleagues in public health as targets for intervention. Laboratory-based 
health scientists gain their knowledge by using experimental tools, their focus being 





Figure 2.1 Etiology is the relationship between risk factor and disease. It includes the pathogenesis of 
illness, the biological mechanism that links risk factor and disease.












knowledge about the etiology of illness can be generated only if results from both 
!elds are integrated.
"e terms etiology and pathogenesis thus denote two very di#erent but related 
notions. In their classic 1970 textbook Epidemiology: Principles and Methods, 
MacMahon and Pugh describe the notion of disease etiology as a two-part sequence. 
"e !rst part is characterized by causal events prior to the initial somatic response that 
can be seen as the onset of disease in the individual. "e second part is represented by 
“mechanisms within the body leading from the initial response to the characteristic 
manifestations of the disease.”6
In this book, the disease is included as part of the pathogenesis, and thus of 
etiology, because some “characteristic manifestations of the disease” may occur long 
a%er the disease has become clinically manifest. Consider, for example, progressive 
disorders such as Parkinson’s disease, a slowly progressing neurological condition 
with loss of muscle control and impaired movement. In many patients, the earliest 
signs of Parkinson’s disease include tremor, a rhythmic shaking of the !ngers, then 
hands, then arms. However, the pathogenetic process, a lack of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine that results from the destruction of dopamine-producing nerve cells in 
the brain, continues, and signs and symptoms o%en become worse, including more 
severe movement di&culties, sleep problems, cognitive and sensory di&culties, and 
depression. "is changing clinical picture of Parkinson’s disease a%er !rst clinical 
onset is relevant to its causal story and, therefore, the entire disease process should 
be considered part of its pathogenesis.
"is pathogenetic process consists of a series of intra-individual biological changes, 
sometimes described as four stages between exposure and clinical disease (internal 
dose, biologically e#ective dose, early biological e#ect, and altered structure/
function) that provide the biological link between exposure and outcome (Schulte 
and Perera 1993). Although MacMahon and Pugh did not use the term pathogenesis, 
Khoury probably does not misquote them when they state that “disease is viewed 
as the result of a chain of events that comprise an intricate ‘web’ of external causal 
events and internal pathogenetic mechanisms” (Khoury 1993:12). In an ideal world, 
interventions on causal events will help prevent illness, while interventions on 
pathogenetic mechanisms will help treat illness once it has begun.
2.3  ETIOLOGY: TELLING THE STORY OF 
ILLNESS OCCURRENCE
Decades of successful epidemiological contributions to public health support 
these notions. Contributions come in the form of etiological stories, like the one 
on sitting as the new smoking. For example, regular exercise is associated with a 
reduced risk for a whole host of chronic diseases including heart disease, cancer, 
depression, and others. Many of these diseases are also associated with obesity 
and in'ammation. An active lifestyle leads to both reduction in body fat and a less 
vigorous in'ammatory response. "us, both fat reduction and anti-in'ammation are 
candidate mechanisms7 for how exercise reduces the risk for those chronic diseases. 
"e preventive intervention (exercise) is widely promoted with known success, 
although the mechanisms are still under investigation (Gleeson et$al. 2011).




















"e causal role of smoking in lung cancer is still a matter of debate, although 
we have very strong evidence that smoking cessation reduces the incidence of lung 
disease. At least in part, the success of causation deniers is rooted in the fact that the 
pathogenetic mechanism is not yet fully understood and, perhaps, never will be. In 
a recent review article on the topic, the author states that
It is the complexity of tobacco carcinogenesis due to the presence of multiple carcinogens 
and toxicants however which continues to challenge investigators to identify speci!c 
mechanisms that fully explain the ways in which smoking causes lung cancer. (Hecht 
2012:2724)
"e successes of epidemiology-based intervention programs in public health and 
health promotion are evidence in support of the notion that, at least sometimes, we 
do not need mechanistic inference. Instead, we need useful causal information that 
helps us tell useful etiological stories. Perhaps the epidemiologists’ textbook goal, to 
identify the causes of illness, is only part of a more comprehensive de facto goal, that 
is, to help explain illness occurrence by contributing to etiological explanations. To 
do this, epidemiologists need to explicate the two-phase etiological process, which 
includes the initiation of the disease process by exposure to risk factors (a.k.a., 
candidate causes) and the propagation of the disease process via pathogenetic 
pathways.
Identifying the causes of illness (i.e., causal risk factors) is of interest for public 
health interventionists, because the assumption is that illness can be prevented 
by eliminating such factors from populations. In this context, causes of illness 
are all factors that – if blocked from acting on individuals – are associated with a 
robust reduction in illness occurrence. In order to intervene medically, however, 
knowledge about the biological process from causation (initiation) to clinical disease 
is needed. "is is the pathomechanism of disease, which is in the purview of medical 
bioscientists. Causal and pathogenetic stories of illness occurrence are sometimes 
told separately as the stories of illness causation and pathogenesis, respectively. In 
this view, etiology is the causal story plus the pathogenetic story that tells us about 
biological mechanisms in the body that occur in response to the$causes.
In a di#erent view, both are not considered separately but as two parts of the same 
concept:
"e etiology of a disease may be thought of as having a sequence consisting of two parts: 
(1) causal events occurring prior to some initial bodily response, and (2) mechanisms 
within the body leading from the initial response to the characteristic manifestations 
of the disease. (MacMahon and Pugh 1970:26)
"is is what I have called the etiological stance.8 I think that fast and successful 
progress in combating illness is more likely if epidemiologists are lumpers, not 
splitters, of causal and pathogenetic aspects of illness. However, telling overarching 
etiological stories requires taking an interdisciplinary perspective. "is, in turn, 
requires epidemiologists to think deeply about how the causes they identify make 
sense as initiators of pathogenetic processes, and laboratory scientists to think 
deeply about whether the pathogenetic processes they study in the lab actually 
re'ect the link between exposure-outcome constellations “out there.” In essence, 












comprehensive etiological explanations require mutual interest and dialogue between 
epidemiologists and basic scientists, while isolated work may lead to situations in 
which successful development of helpful interventions becomes unlikely.
One prominent example from my own work is the etiology of what is sometimes 
called hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy in preterm newborns. "e attribute of 
“hypoxic-ischemic” (i.e., lack of oxygen and blood 'ow in the baby’s brain) is based 
solely on experimental evidence that shows that hypoxia-ischemia can create brain 
damage in experimental animals, while we have no epidemiological evidence that 
hypoxia-ischemia actually is the (or at least one) cause of this kind of encephalopathy 
(Gilles et$al. 2017).
"is book has evolved from my recognition that questions about causation and 
causal inference asked by epidemiologists are closely linked to the kind of questions 
asked by classic philosophers of causation, including Hume, Mill, and Mackie; by 
philosophers of explanation, including Lewis, Salmon, Hempel, and Lipton; and by 
philosophers of medicine, such as Broadbent and Solomon. "e current philosophy 
of science can be aligned in interesting ways with both the textbook goals of 
epidemiology, that is, identi!cation and quanti!cation of causal relationships, and 
also with its de facto goals, that is, contributing to useful etiological explanations 
for illness occurrence.
In what follows, I dig a bit deeper into the two main causal questions in 
epidemiology as mentioned earlier: what is a cause, and how do we know one? 
Philosophically speaking, the !rst is a metaphysical question (Section 2.4), and the 
second is an epistemological one (Section 2.5).
2.4  EPIDEMIOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS: 
WHAT IS A CAUSE?
"e search for causes for illness has a long history.9 Until today, the discussion of 
causation and causal inference has been one of the most intriguing and long-standing 
in epidemiology. It is also one of the most vibrant topics debated in philosophy of 
science. However, some epidemiologists think that the !eld lacks a solid theoretical 
foundation. For example, the promotional text for Nancy Krieger’s book includes 
the following statement:
Epidemiology is o%en referred to as the science of public health. However, unlike other 
major sciences, its theoretical foundations are rarely articulated. While the idea of 
epidemiologic theory may seem dry and arcane, it is at its core about explaining the 
people’s health. (Krieger 2011)
One main assumption in this book is that philosophy of science has a lot to o#er to 
epidemiologists who struggle with metaphysical and epistemic aspects of causation. 
As such, my project is situated at the interdisciplinary intersection between 
epidemiology and philosophy in a new !eld called “philosophy of epidemiology” 
(Broadbent 2013).
A few courageous philosophers and epidemiologists have an ongoing discussion 
about causality and causal inference in epidemiology.10 Still, we are far from having 




















agreement on what constitutes a cause of illness. For the purpose of the present 
discussion, I adhere to the epidemiological de!nition of cause as
an antecedent event, condition, or characteristic that was necessary for the occurrence 
of the disease at the moment it occurred, given that other conditions are !xed. 
(Rothman et$al. 2008c:6)
Moreover, no attempt to identify “the” core meaning of illness causation has led to an 
agreed-upon method for causal inference based on epidemiological data. Who says 
there is only one kind of cause, hence only one way to de!ne causation (Cartwright 
2004)? Perhaps there are many kinds, too many to be uni!ed into one reasonable 
framework for illness causation research. MacMahon and Pugh support the notion 
that the term causation appears to have “di#erent meanings in di#erent contexts” 
(MacMahon and Pugh 1970:17).
A look at the current literature con!rms that epidemiologists have neither a 
comprehensive metaphysical account of illness causation nor a clear epistemological 
concept of causal inference. For example, Parascandola and Weed begin their o%-
cited essay on epidemiological de!nitions of causation with the statement that it 
is unclear that epidemiologists have one “single shared concept” of causation 
(Parascandola and Weed 2001). "eir literature review identi!es no less than !ve 
di#erent de!nitions of causation in epidemiology: production, necessity, su&cient-
component causes, probabilistic cause, and counterfactual causes. It is obvious that 
these de!nitions are closely related to philosophical accounts of causation.11
Here is what Parascandola and Weed found in a nutshell. "e production de!nition 
of causation in epidemiology is simply the notion that causes produce, a#ect, or 
alter their e#ects. "e necessary or su&cient de!nition of causation in epidemiology 
is the same as in philosophy: an e#ect cannot occur without the necessary cause 
and will occur with the su&cient cause. "e su&cient-component cause model 
is Rothman’s model in which multiple di#erent constellations of (necessary or 
unnecessary) component causes represent su&cient causal complexes.12 Finally, the 
counterfactual de!nition is that a cause makes a di#erence in the outcome when 
it is present compared to the situation when it is absent.13 Parascandola and Weed 
suggest that it is likely that some combination of these de!nitions might be the 
“best !t” for epidemiology. For example, they point out that Nancy Cartwright’s 
de!nition (C causes E i# P[E |C.Kj] > P[E |Kj] for all Kj) employs both probabilistic 
and counterfactual elements (Cartwright 2004). "ey conclude that
a counterfactually-based probabilistic de!nition is more amenable to the quantitative 
tools of epidemiology, is consistent with both deterministic and probabilistic 
phenomena, and serves equally well for the acquisition and the application of scienti!c 
knowledge. (Parascandola and Weed 2001:905)
As cogent as this may sound to epidemiologists, this statement does not provide 
any insight beyond why certain philosophical concepts seem to be the “best !t” for 
what epidemiology actually does while others do not. : "e authors admit that “a 
de!nition is not itself a theory of causation.”14 Part of my motivation for this book 
is that providing a theory for etiological explanations might be more fruitful than 
providing a theory of causation, because epidemiology is not simply a method to !nd 












causes of illness. Instead, epidemiology is a comprehensive explanatory framework 
to elucidate the story of illness occurrence.
2.4.1 The Mackie-Rothman model
Echoing John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Ken Rothman suggested in 1976 in his seminal 
paper “Causes” that it always takes multiple causes for disease occurrence, and that 
necessary and su&cient causes should not be considered at the same explanatory 
level.15 Each of the three “pies” in Figure 2.1 represents one possible constellation 
of causal factors that, together, are su&cient to cause the illness of interest. Each 
wedge or piece of pie represents a component cause, which is necessary only if it is a 
component of all possible su&cient causal constellations (wedge A in pies I, II, and 
III).16 If a component cause is present only in some but not all su&cient causes, it is 
unnecessary. Only if all component causes of each possible su&cient causal complex 
are present does illness occur. Based on these speci!cations, Rothman o#ers the 
following de!nition:
A cause is an act or event or a state of nature which initiates or permits, alone or in 
conjunction with other causes, a sequence of events resulting in an e#ect […] all kinds 
of causal factors form a “causal complex”, “causal web” or “web of causation” that 
contributes to the development of illness. Each single factor is neither necessary nor 
su&cient, for producing the disease state, but their combination and potentiation lead 
to the e#ect. (Rothman 1976:588)
Rothman speci!es three di#erent categories of causes: (1) su&cient causes 
represented by pies I, II, and III in Figure 2.1; (2) necessary component causes that 
are part of all known possible su&cient causes of a disease of interest (i.e., piece 
A in all pies); and (3) non-necessary component causes that are neither su&cient 
nor necessary (pieces B – U). Note that Rothman uses the term cause in two very 
di#erent ways. "e !rst (su&cient cause = whole pie) means a causal complex that 
consists of multiple components. "e second (component cause = piece of pie) 
means just one such member of the su&cient causal complex. "us, Rothman’s 
su&cient pies can be thought of as determining the occurrence of illness. "ose who 
wish to !x this problem (of determinism) can “simply think of the components as 
contributing together to the probability of the e#ect, rather than being su&cient for 
it” (Parascandola and Weed 2001:280).
Let me propose a di#erent perspective. Let’s consider each pie a comprehensive 
etiological explanation. Each of these includes the initiator (cause) of the pathogenetic 
process and the pathogenetic mechanism. In Figure 2.2, for example, B and O could 
represent two such causes, which alone or together can initiate the etiological process, 
which consists of the cause itself (B, O, or both), one or more pathomechanisms 
(C, D, E, …), and other contributors,17 depicted by combinations of all pieces C–U, 
except B and O. "e necessary component A could represent a necessary background 
condition, such as neurodevelopment in the explanatory model of autism causation 
I proposed with Carmina Erdei (Erdei and Dammann 2014).18
"e su&cient-component cause model stands in the tradition of the work 
of philosophers J.S. Mill (1806–73) and J.L. Mackie (1917–81), who had written 




















extensively about aspects of multicausality. Mill had discussed the idea that it is 
rarely one but o%en the joint e#ect of several antecedents that leads to an e#ect.19 
A few years before Rothman published his pies, South African epidemiologist 
Mervyn Susser (1921–2014) had also promoted “the logic of multiple causes” in the 
fourth chapter in his book Causal !inking in the Health Sciences (Susser 1973). "e 
multifactorial concept of illness causation holds that
all kinds of causal factors form a “causal complex”, “causal web” or “web of causation” 
that contributes to the development of illness. Each single factor is neither necessary 
nor su&cient, for producing the disease state,20 but their combination and potentiation 
lead to the e#ect. (Dekkers and Rikkert 2006:280)
Perhaps Rothman was also inspired by J.L. Mackie (1917–81), who published his idea 
of insu"cient but necessary part of an unnecessary but su"cient (INUS) condition 
in book form (Mackie 1974). In pie lingo, the insu&cient but necessary thing would 
be a piece of a pie, and the unnecessary but su&cient thing would be one of multiple 
possible whole pies.
"e Mackie-Rothman INUS-Pie framework is the basis for a top-down multilevel 
explanatory model of illness occurrence for the biomedical sciences. "e standard 
interpretation of the Mackie-Rothman model is that each complete pie depicts 
one of multiple su"cient causes. Another way is to let the complete pie represent a 
su"cient etiological mechanism, the instantiation of which is the etiological process 
that leads to the disease at hand. Granting the exposure of interest a spot among the 
pieces of the pie enables us to view the whole pie not just as an indicator of the fact 
that the causal complex is complete and the outcome occurs. It also enables us to 
view the complete pie as a causally su&cient constellation of risk factors (exposures, 
initiators) and (a sequence of) pathogenetic mechanisms that are jointly instantiated 
as an etiological process, which is responsible for illness occurrence. In this etiological 
interpretation of the model, what can be observed by epidemiologists is the exposure 
(the initiator of the pathogenetic mechanism) and the outcome (disease occurrence). 
In this sense, epidemiological observations are, technically speaking, macro-
etiological observations.
At the pathogenetic level, the development of a disease is characterized by 
intrapersonal molecular and biochemical processes that lead to atypical body 



















Figure 2.2 The suf!cient-component cause model of illness causation. (Based on Rothman, K. J. 1976. 
Am J Epidemiol 104:87–92.)












structure, function, or both. Each pathogenetic mechanism, depicted as one 
piece of the pie, is a blueprint for the instantiation as a pathogenetic process that 
contributes to the etiology of the disease under investigation. Since pathogenetic 
mechanisms, at least at the biological (cellular, molecular) level, cannot be observed 
in epidemiological studies, observations of pathogenetic processes are, technically 
speaking, micro-etiological observations.
For example, the initiating risk factor “prolonged exposure to ionizing radiation” 
is one pathogenetic process that, together with the background condition “aberrant 
DNA-breakage repair gene,” leads to the pathogenetic process “DNA double-strand 
breakage,” which in turn leads to the pathogenetic process “aberrant cell generation.” 
Together with the necessary background condition “tissue growth,” these factors 
form a su&cient etiological process that leads to skin cancer. Epidemiologists can 
observe the exposure to radiation as well as the presence of modi!ers such as the 
DNA repair gene, and the occurrence of skin cancer. "ey cannot, however, elucidate 
details of the DNA breakage and abnormal cell growth processes; this work is le% to 
wet bench scientists.
2.4.2 From pies to bicones
In the previous section, I have outlined the possibility of viewing each complete 
Mackie-Rothman pie as one distinct su"cient etiological process (SEP) that is 
su&cient to result in a certain illness. "e pieces of each pie represent a combination of 
causes and pathogenetic mechanisms, such as causes, contributors, and background 
conditions identi!ed by epidemiologists at the population level and biochemical 
pathophysiological processes studied by basic scientists in the wet lab. In this view, 
every SEP requires causal and pathogenetic components, some necessary, others 
unnecessary, to be complete and, thereby, to be su&cient.
In order to prevent illness, epidemiological work is geared toward !nding 
preventable risk factors. In the INUS-Pie model, eliminating a necessary piece 
from a pie would eradicate the illness from the face of the earth (if there is only 
one possible pie/SEP for this disease). In medical history, infection with smallpox 
is the necessary component whose elimination made smallpox eradication possible. 
However, eliminating any unnecessary component would only reduce the likelihood 
of disease occurrence, because unnecessary components are (by de!nition) found in 
some but not all SEPs. "us, knowledge of the components of the etiological process 
can help reduce the burden of illness in a variety of ways that are important in both 
medicine and public health.
During my early training as an epidemiologist, the Mackie-Rothman model always 
struck me as somewhat static, despite the fact that etiology is, of course, a process that 
develops along a timeline. What also struck me was the absence of the outcome in the 
visual depiction of the model’s content. It seemed to me as if the model kept exposure 
and contributing factors and the outcome they contribute to somewhat arti!cially 
separate. Around that same time, I was reading Searle’s 1984 Reith lectures, in which 
he describes the relationship between mind and brain as follows:
Mental phenomena (…) are caused by processes going on in the brain (and) just are 
features of the brain. (Searle 1984:18,19)




















My immediate intuition was that illness causation could be described similarly: 
diseases are caused by the exposure variables and at the same time are features of 
the system of exposure variables.21 My way to depict this process idea of disease 
causation was to add a time dimension to the Mackie-Rothman su&cient-component 
model of illness causation (Figure 2.2), expanding the “pie” to be “nested bicones” 
(Figure 2.3). "e exposure to a combination of risk factors (translucent outer bicone) 
starts at the beginning of the induction time22 on the far le% and leads to illness (in 
this !gure, a particular disease; dark inner bicone). "e dark ellipse in the center 
represents one of Rothman’s pies, viewed from an angle.23
In the bicone model, a risk factor is conceptualized as both the cause of a 
disease and one of its characteristics, for example, smoking as both a cause and a 
characteristic of lung cancer. At the same time, a disease can be seen as both the 
e#ect of an exposure and as one of its characteristics, for example, lung cancer as an 
outcome and as a characteristic of smoking. According to this view, risk factors and 
disease are two characteristics of the same process, that of illness etiology.
"is notion resonates with Mumford and Anjum’s dispositionalist account of 
causation,24 according to which “causes dispose towards their e#ects” (Mumford and 
Anjum 2011a:19) and “e#ects are brought about by powers manifesting themselves” 
(p. 7). Mumford and Anjum use the terms powers and dispositions exchangeably and 
mean “something that has possible manifestations, though it may nevertheless still 
exist unmanifested” (pp. 4–5).
My proposal that illness causation is an etiological process is accommodated by 
the dispositionalist view of causation as “a single unfolding process” (Mumford and 
Anjum 2011b:ix). Dispositionalist theories of causation are process theories, in which 
properties are gradually replaced: “causation is process-like in that one property 
(being solid, being cold) is gradually replaced by another (being dissolved, being 























Figure 2.3 Extended Mackie-Rothman model of illness causation.












dissolved, being mild)” (Mumford and Anjum 2011b:124). Etiological explanations 
also take a process perspective, as outlined in Chapter 6. One way to put it would be 
to say that an etiological process occurs when an individual gradually transitions 
from being healthy to being clinically sick via a preclinical pathogenetic process.
Power philosophers also suggest that background conditions count as causes. 
"ey write that “[t]he distinction between causes and background conditions is 
not an ontologically grounded one, but rather a pragmatic or epistemological one. 
If all contribute to an e#ect, then they are causes of it” (Mumford and Anjum 
2011a:33). "is view, in turn, resonates well with my proposal in Chapter 6 to 
consider the combined e#ects of contributors to illness etiology. It also aligns well 
with the Mackie-Rothman model,25 where each su&cient constellation of mutually 
accountable causal partners is depicted as one complete pie I, II, or III (Figure 2.2). 
Only when all components that belong to such su&cient cause are present is disease 
likely to occur. "is notion of su&cient causal constellations (I would rather call 
them su&cient etiological constellations) as being less than deterministic has been 
proposed by Parascandola and Weed (2001). "e view accommodates probabilistic 
views of causation as well as the dispositionalist view that a su&cient cause does not 
necessitate its e#ect but rather tends toward it.
In the remainder of this book, I take the following view of “illness causation,” 
as broadly construed: Illness causation is a two-phase process that begins with (a) 
external initial triggers (risk factors, exposures) that initiate and/or maintain (b) 
internal pathogenetic processes (functions or dysfunctions) in the individual that 
(c) culminate in illness phenotypes (diseases). "e etiological process is the entire 
process (a, b, c), from initial trigger to clinical disease. "e causation process includes 
causes and pathogenesis (a, b), while the disease process includes pathogenesis and 
clinical disease (b, c).
2.5  EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY: 
CAUSAL INFERENCE
Epidemiologists approach the issue of causal inference by searching for risk factors 
that can be considered candidate causes. "ey conduct large-scale studies with human 
participants, measure exposures (such as smoking) and outcomes (such as cancer), 
and create multivariable mathematical models that yield an estimate of the relative 
risk (RR) for developing the outcome, which tells us, for example, how much more 
likely smokers are to develop cancer compared to nonsmokers.26 Epidemiological 
theoreticians have developed an impressive methodological toolbox that includes 
methods for multivariable risk estimation, strategies to minimize bias, and techniques 
to adjust for confounding (Rothman, Greenland, and Lash 2008a). "is research 
strategy has been tremendously successful. Across the globe, in rich as well as in 
developing countries, epidemiologists have helped prevent illness in populations. 
Control of infectious disease and vaccination programs, decline of cardiovascular 
death due to heart attack and stroke, 'uoridation of drinking water, and recognition 
of tobacco smoke as a health hazard are only a few of the great achievements of public 
health in the twentieth century that can be attributed to successful epidemiological 
research (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999, 2011).






















2.5.1 Risk factors as candidate causes
In medicine, causal attribution has a long and colorful history. Vandenbroucke27 refers 
to Anne Fagot-Largeault’s thesis on causes of death, in which the author discusses 
the phenomenon that in medicine, causal inference is frequently performed by some 
kind of “detective-like-back-reasoning” from e#ects back to their putative causes.28 
Based only on case series, with no controls or confounder adjustments, causal 
powers are attributed to individual antecedents based on repeated observations and 
are then generalized without further ado. For some reason, Vandenbroucke writes, 
“modern medicine seems to escape at least in part – from today’s dogmas that all our 
investigations and reasoning should be ‘hypothetico-deductive.’”( SII 16)29
Epidemiologists take such a hypothetico-deductive approach. "eir goal is to 
discover factors that are associated with changes in disease occurrence. "ese factors 
are called risk factors, which may be risk reducers or risk increasers. In a second step, 
they distinguish statistical from causal association.
"e concept is not novel. Consider this lengthy but illuminating quote from 
On#Airs, Waters, and Places, in which Hippocrates o#ered a description of factors 
one should consider when looking at di#erences in health outcomes:
Whoever wishes to investigate medicine properly, should proceed thus: in the !rst 
place to consider the seasons of the year, and what e#ects each of them produces for 
they are not at all alike, but di#er much from themselves in regard to their changes. 
"en the winds, the hot and the cold, especially such as are common to all countries, 
and then such as are peculiar to each locality. We must also consider the qualities of 
the waters, for as they di#er from one another in taste and weight, so also do they 
di#er much in their qualities. In the same manner, when one comes into a city to 
which he is a stranger, he ought to consider its situation, how it lies as to the winds 
and the rising of the sun; for its in'uence is not the same whether it lies to the north or 
the south, to the rising or to the setting sun. "ese things one ought to consider most 
attentively, and concerning the waters which the inhabitants use, whether they be 
marshy and so%, or hard, and running from elevated and rocky situations, and then 
if saltish and un!t for cooking; and the ground, whether it be naked and de!cient in 
water, or wooded and well watered, and whether it lies in a hollow, con!ned situation, 
or is elevated and cold; and the mode in which the inhabitants live, and what are 
their pursuits, whether they are fond of drinking and eating to excess, and given to 
indolence, or are fond of exercise and labor, and not given to excess in eating and 
drinking.30
"is is a description of what modern epidemiologists call risk factors, although it 
is unlikely that Hippocrates had this concept in mind when he wrote this passage 
centuries before the Common Era. He suggested that the health status of a person 
or population is a#ected by winds and waters, nutrition, and exercise, long before 
modern epidemiology con!rmed the notion.
Risk factors are what most of those who discuss illness causation mean when they 
talk about causes of illness. In a perfect world, one without error, bias, confounding, 
and residual mischief, risk factors are chance-of-outcome-changing causes. "us, 
one way to tell the story of disease occurrence, the etiological story of the disease, 
is to give a list of its causes, to describe the natural history of illness in the language 
of risk, risk factors, and RR. Another way is to give a detailed description of the 












biochemical process, the pathogenetic mechanism that unfolds subsequent to its 
causal initiation.
"e risk factor concept has been vigorously debated. "e late Petr Skrabanek 
(1940–1994) considered risk factor epidemiology to be equivalent to a “black box” 
approach, where “an association (between exposure and disease), by itself a fortuitous 
!nding, is thus converted, by logical sleight-of-hand, into a causal link” (Skrabanek 
1994:553). He postulated that “the aim of science is to !nd universal laws governing 
the world around us and within us; it is about dismantling the ‘black box’” and 
went on to suggest that “black box epidemiology is not science.”31 According to one 
reader’s interpretation of Skrabanek’s commentary, one of the weaknesses of black 
box epidemiology is that the causal model under investigation is not only unknown 
but “may even be considered irrelevant” (Smith 2001:327). "e reader goes on to 
suggest that epidemiology and basic science are “feeding o# each other [and] can 
contribute in a fundamental way to our understanding of disease.” "is is my point 
exactly, because both epidemiology and basic science contribute to the generation of 
comprehensive etiological explanations.
"is is not a new idea. Less radical visions have been published as early as in 
1959, when Yerushalmy and Palmer proposed to move from etiology concepts in 
infectious diseases to etiology in chronic diseases (Yerushalmy and Palmer 1959:39). 
"ey suggested three points they hoped might serve “as a !rst approach toward the 
development of acceptable guideposts for the implication of a characteristic as an 
etiologic factor in chronic disease”: (1) increased presence of the characteristic in 
cases compared to controls, (2) increased incidence of disease in persons with the 
characteristic than in those without, and (3) absence (or at least small likelihood) 
of third factors that explain the association between the characteristic and the 
disease (exclusion of confounding factors). Lilienfeld suggested additional ways to 
“increase the likelihood of the causal hypothesis,” that is, experiments in humans 
and laboratory animals and further epidemiologic research into the consistency of 
the !ndings (Lilienfeld 1959:46). Lilienfeld mentions further that problems with 
inferences from the animal to the human system “may be a minor problem if all types 
of data … !t together in a consistent pattern.” My view that multiple di#erent studies 
o#ered by independent research groups are needed to support a causal hypothesis32 
stands in the Lilienfeldian tradition. Until we give up our dualist hope that we will at 
some point be able to extract causation from data, we should continue the scienti!c 
discourse based on results from experiments and observations, conducted in the 
laboratory and in epidemiologic studies.
Risk research needs to integrate benchwork and epidemiology, molecular biology 
and social science. "e endeavor is a social project.33 Causal inference is a social 
activity being advanced by epidemiologists, philosophers and bench scientists. 
However, the platforms of scienti!c discourse, conferences and journals, are very 
rarely interdisciplinary. To the contrary, they are o%en very specialized with regard 
to the scienti!c topic and methods applied. Although interdisciplinarity is generally 
considered helpful, it is not practiced widely or e#ectively. To replace “we cannot 
identify causation from data” with “we have agreed on an etiological explanation 
based on observation, experiment, and discourse” would provide us with a more 
hopeful and interesting outlook for future research.






















If we can identify preventable risk factors, and if targeting these risk factors with 
interventions actually helps reduce the population burden of illness, isn’t one justi!ed 
to conclude that epidemiologists are capable of identifying causes of illness? Don’t 
we all know intuitively how to draw correct causal inferences from observed data? 
Epidemiologists Miguel Hernán and Jamie Robins think that
as a human being, you have already mastered the fundamental concepts of causal 
inference. You certainly know what a causal e#ect is; you clearly understand the 
di#erence between association and causation; and you have used this knowledge 
constantly throughout your life. In fact, had you not understood these causal concepts, 
you would have not survived long enough to read this chapter – or even to learn to read. 
As a toddler you would have jumped right into the swimming pool a%er observing that 
those who did so were later able to reach the jam jar. As a teenager, you would have 
skied down the most dangerous slopes a%er observing that those who did so were more 
likely to win the next ski race. As a parent, you would have refused to give antibiotics 
to your sick child a%er observing that those children who took their medicines were 
less likely to be playing in the park the next day.34
Such commonsensical concepts of causal knowledge acquisition may explain how we 
learn that 'ipping a light switch is a great strategy to illuminate the room at night. 
However, I think that this “electrical-circuit-view” of causation and causal learning is 
not a good metaphor for etiological reasoning in the health sciences. First, the scenario 
depends on learning by intervention (switching the switch). In the health sciences, 
only wet-bench experiments and randomized clinical trials rely on intervention as 
a contributor to the generation of evidence in support of causal notions. "e vast 
majority of epidemiological research is, however, observational in nature, where 
intervention and manipulation play no role whatsoever. Second, the human body is 
not a simple electric circuit, and it does not function that way. Instead, it is a highly 
complex biological organism. "is complexity, the sheer number of biochemical 
reactions and physical-mechanical processes, and their biological interactions 
preclude simplistic deterministic causal inference. "ird, the biochemical processes 
include elements that explain the transmission of information from one level (e.g., 
antigens as molecular structures) to another (e.g., cell-surface receptor activation).35 
"e transmission of information across levels of biological systems is a ubiquitous 
characteristic of biological causation and, therefore, our understanding of etiological 
processes. Fourth, feedback loops are an important feature of biological phenomena 
in the human body; they are so important that at least one philosopher suggests to 
amend current de!nitions of “mechanism” to re'ect this circular feature of biological 
mechanistic explanations (Bechtel 2011). Finally, the functions of all those causal and 
pathogenetic processes are extremely diverse. For example, signal transmission in 
the brain, in the muscular system, or in the liver is custom-tailored to the respective 
cellular and tissue environment. While some of these processes may share functional 
similarities, explaining their di#erences will require qualitatively di#erent ways to 
provide causal, pathogenetic, and eventually etiological explanations.
"e current literature on causation and causal inference in epidemiology comprises 
two clusters of publications: one written by epidemiologists and one by philosophers. 
I provide brief introductions to both in the next two sections.












2.5.2 The epidemiological perspective
Over the past decades, a large number of publications in epidemiological journals 
have addressed the following questions: what are causes (in epidemiology), and how 
can we !nd them (using epidemiological methods)?36 "e consensus seems to be that 
criteria cannot be used to establish causal claims with certainty.37 Some hold that it is 
impossible to assert the presence of a causal relationship with certainty, because it is 
an inference about an exposure-outcome (i.e., risk factor–illness) relation and cannot 
be observed.38 Cancer epidemiologist Douglas Weed o#ered a concise summary of 
three fundamental problems that, taken together, explain why causal hypotheses 
can never be established with certainty.39 First, the “fundamental problem of causal 
inference” is that we cannot observe in the same individual both the e#ect of a 
cause and the none#ect in its absence. Second, the “fundamental problem of causal 
logic” is that scienti!c evidence can never determine whether the causal hypothesis, 
alternative hypotheses, or chance determined the particular situation. "ird, the 
“fundamental problem of causation” is that causation is not observable; we see only 
our evidence, not causation itself. In sum, Weed thinks that causation exists, but that
causation cannot be seen. Causation cannot be proven … Nor can causation be made 
certain. It is, at best, an expert’s judgment, at worst, an expert’s guess.40
If it is true that causation can never be established from association (Pearson 1900; 
Skrabanek 1994), how can we ever identify it? It seems that we are stuck in something 
like the Plato-Cartesian dualism of surface data associations versus underlying 
causal structure. In fact, how much of our shying away from causal statements is 
because we de$ne association and causation as being indistinguishable by simple 
observation? If we de$ne observed data as insu&cient for causal inference, we cannot 
identify causation from observed data by de!nition.
2.5.2.1 Bradford Hill’s viewpoints
One main technique for causal inference described in epidemiology textbooks is 
based on a paper published in the mid-1960s (Hill 1965). "e author, Sir Austin 
Bradford Hill, was an epidemiologist who was deeply involved, together with his 
colleague Sir Richard Doll, in the research that led to the now widely accepted notion 
that tobacco smoking causes lung cancer.41 Hill’s paper is the written version of the 
president’s address he gave in 1964, shortly a%er the founding of a new Section of 
Occupational Medicine of the Royal Society of Medicine. "e paper is a summary 
of views about causation published by the Surgeon General’s advisory committee 
on smoking and lung cancer (U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on 
Smoking and Health 1964), generated over multiple years of discussion and a “series 
of formative events and exchanges among U.S. experts who created the guidelines 
used by the U.S. advisory committee” (Blackburn and Labarthe 2012:1071). Hill 
outlined his perspective on characteristics of observational epidemiological research 
results (which he called “viewpoints”) that may help in making the decision whether 
an observed association between exposure and outcome is causal. "ese aspects of 
associations are






















 1. Strength: How strong is the association?
 2. Consistency: Does the association !t with !ndings by others under di#erent 
circumstances?
 3. Speci$city: Is the association present between speci!c risk factors and speci!c 
outcomes?
 4. Temporality: What is the cause, and what is the e#ect?
 5. Biological gradient: Does the outcome risk increase with increasing exposure levels?
 6. Plausibility: Is the association biologically plausible?
 7. Coherence: Is the association in keeping with known biological facts and 
characteristics of the disease’s natural history?
 8. Experiment: Does intervention reduce disease occurrence?
 9. Analogy: Do we have evidence from associations between similar risk factors and 
similar outcomes?
Hill was extremely careful to avoid deterministic notions, always making sure the 
reader understands that these characteristics are not necessary for causal inference, 
just aspects to consider before jumping from observed association to inferred 
causation. In epidemiology and the health sciences, Hill’s viewpoints serve as one 
standard model for causal inference. Ironically, the scienti!c and philosophical 
consensus is that they cannot be used as criteria for illness causation.42
What is the value of Hill’s viewpoints if they cannot serve as criteria? While some 
degrade Hill’s viewpoints to the level of a “traditional” method in contrast to their 
“modern” approach,43 others think of Hill’s approach as the sui generis method for 
causal inference in epidemiology (Morabia 2013). In this book, Hill’s viewpoints 
(and, by extension, mine) are taken to be explanatory virtues in a coherentist 
framework of causal explanation (Dammann 2018). I refer mainly to Poston’s recent 
defense of explanatory coherentism (Poston 2014). According to his theory,
explanationism is a general view about epistemic justi!cation. "e justi!catory status 
of one’s beliefs is determined by the explanatory merits of one’s system of beliefs (…) an 
epistemological defense of explanationism should indicate which virtues are relevant 
for epistemic justi!cation. (Poston 2014:80)
"e bottom line of my proposal is that each one of Hill’s characteristics can be viewed 
as an explanatory virtue on an explanatory coherentist framework for etiological 
explanation.44 My intention is to get to a more rigorous understanding of what we 
mean when we talk about Hill’s viewpoints, so we can place them within a theoretical 
framework about the nature of evidence for causation, and about the nature of causal 
inference.
Bradford Hill came from the environmental/occupational epidemiology 
perspective; he was interested in relationships between exposures (work conditions 
that represent risk factors) and outcomes (illness). "erefore, he o#ered an informal 
framework to “detect relationships between sickness, injury and conditions of work” 
(Hill 1965:295).
2.5.2.2 Potential outcomes
Perhaps the most proli!c epidemiologist with a primary interest in causation and 
causal inference is Miguel Hernán (Hernán 2004; Hernan and Robins 2006a; Hernan 












et$al. 2002), whose de!nition of a causal e#ect (for an individual) is that treatment T 
has a causal e#ect on outcome O (in that individual) if O looks di#erent depending 
on whether treatment T is administered to that same individual or not (Hernan and 
Robins forthcoming).
"is counterfactual concept of “potential outcomes” is currently gaining traction 
in the public health literature (Glass et$al. 2013). "e main philosophical problem 
with the potential outcomes approach is that it is epistemologically empty. We 
cannot observe all potential outcomes, only the one that occurs. ("is is Weed’s 
“fundamental problem of causal inference.”) "us, potential outcomers are stuck 
where we all are between a rock and the problem of induction. It is not my goal 
to criticize the potential outcomes approach in this book. I do not think that such 
a critique would improve my general argument, because the potential outcomes 
approach is mainly a quantitative one that presupposes causal knowledge instead of 
generating it. In his book, Explanation in Causal Inference, Tyler VanderWeele writes 
that the potential outcomes framework
provides formal criteria concerning when we can draw such conclusions about 
causation from empirical data; in other words for the assumptions that need to be 
made, or are su&cient, to move from conclusions about association to conclusions 
about causation. (VanderWeele 2015:5)
However, it is di&cult to identify any such set of criteria anywhere in the potential 
outcomes literature. Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the POA’s 
problems so far was sparked by a paper by Vandenbroucke, Broadbent, and Pearce 
in the International Journal of Epidemiology (Vandenbroucke, Broadbent, and Pearce 
2016). In that paper, and in their response to subsequent commentaries, the authors 
o#er a comprehensive analysis of the POA and a restricted version of it (RPOA). 
"ey specify four characteristics of what they call the “standard version” of the POA 
as follows:
i. Counterfactual dependence of E on C is not necessary for C to cause E, but it is 
su&cient (POA’s Basic Metaphysical Stance).
ii. Su&cient evidential conditions currently exist for attributing the counterfactual 
dependence of E on C, but necessary conditions currently do not; the POA identi!es 
some (but not all) of these su&cient conditions (POA’s Basic Epistemological Stance).
iii. Causal inference includes two distinct aspects: causal identi!cation, in which the 
truth value of a claim of the form “C causes E” is determined; and quantitative causal 
estimation, in which a numerical value n is estimated for a claim of the form “C has n 
e#ect on E” (the Identi!cation/Estimation Distinction).
iv. Adequately well-de!ned counterfactual contrasts are necessary for giving meaning 
to quantitative estimates of causal e#ect (POA’s Semantic Stance on Estimation).
(Broadbent, Vandenbroucke, and Pearce 2016:1841)
"e RPOA, according to Broadbent and colleagues, is characterized by one additional 
feature:












v. Counterfactual contrasts are adequately well-de!ned if and only if we can specify a 
corresponding adequately well-de!ned intervention on the putative cause, by which 
the counterfactual contrast would be (or would have been) brought about (RPOA’s 
Restriction to Interventions). (Broadbent, Vandenbroucke, and Pearce 2016:1842)
I will not o#er a comprehensive critique of the POA/RPOA in this book but refer to 
it and its explanatory weaknesses at multiple points in my discussion.
2.6 THE PHILOSOPHERS’ PERSPECTIVE
"e !rst book on Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine came from 
Scandinavia (Nordenfelt and Lindahl 1984) and contained a collection of papers 
presented at a meeting in 1982. Among these, two45 explicitly address criteria 
(Ahlbom 1984) and models of causation in epidemiology (Norell 1984).46 Paul 
"agard’s How Scientists Explain Disease (1999) recounts the discovery process of 
Helicobacter pylori as an infectious agent that contributes to peptic ulcer causation. 
"e book focuses on causal explanation, not inference. "agard concludes that 
“science is a complex psychological, social and physical system” and is characterized 
by “distributed computation,” of which the scienti!c community is the underlying 
system ("agard 1999:220). In 2003, K. Codell Carter published his case studies in the 
history of disease causation (Carter 2003). "e book provides a collection of accounts 
of several theories of disease, including bacterial, viral, protozoal, ideational, and 
nutritional theories, mainly based on historical descriptions of discovery processes 
in the nineteenth century. In his “!nal thoughts,” Carter asks “what, if anything, 
can we expect of future causal thinking in medicine?” (Carter 2003:200) and 
quotes Stehbens (Stehbens 1992), who, according to Carter, !nds contemporary 
epidemiological concepts of causation imprecise and suggests paying attention to 
Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, and Russell. As opposed to Stehbens, however, Carter 
thinks that “dead philosophers are in no position to advise epidemiologists about 
how to talk” (Carter 2003:202).
Two recent collections of papers on causality in the sciences contain chapters 
on causation in the health sciences. One was edited by Federica Russo and Jon 
Williamson (2007a) with Phyllis Illari joining them on the other (Illari, Russo, 
and Williamson 2011). In volume 16 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 
devoted to “Philosophy of Medicine” (Gi#ord 2011), Daniel Steel has a chapter on 
“Causal inference and medical experiments” that is at least partially relevant for this 
book in the context of experimental, but not observational, studies. Other chapters 
in that volume, for example, on theories and models in medicine and on patterns 
on medical discovery, bear on my discussion as well. "e !rst monograph devoting 
sustained attention to this topic is Alex Broadbent’s Philosophy of Epidemiology 
(Broadbent 2013).
Phyllis Illari and Federica Russo advocate for a causal mosaicism, of integration 
across the sciences and philosophy; across types of causing, concepts of causation, 
types of inferences, sources of evidence; and across methods for causal inference 
(Illari and Russo 2014). "ey take a decidedly pragmatist approach in that they are 
action oriented and write that “causal notions have a role for di#erent tasks” (Illari 












and Russo 2014:256) and that “di#erent concepts help in building causal knowledge, 
in virtue of their usefulness for speci!c tasks.”47 In their last chapter, the authors 
describe how the scienti!c approach to the mosaic of lifetime exposures and their 
individual and joint health e#ects can be enriched by using their proposed causal 
mosaic. I share the authors’ hope that many will use this approach to “think better 
about science.”48
"e philosophy of epidemiology is a rather young !eld, and the two main clusters 
of publications from epidemiology and philosophy reviewed in this and the previous 
section are waiting to be integrated. My goal in this book is to take a !rst step toward 
such integration.
2.7  “CAUSES OF EFFECTS” VERSUS 
“EFFECTS OF CAUSES”
Dawid, Faigman, and Fienberg discuss what they perceive as a disconnect in the 
context of scienti!c reasoning in legal contexts (Dawid, Faigman, and Fienberg 2014). 
"eir discussion bears directly on the ways etiological explanation can be used in 
practice. "e authors begin their discussion by pointing out that
science studies individuals in order to make statements about populations, while the 
law considers populations in order to make statements about individuals.49
Let us call this the population/person dyad. In defense of the legal system, Dawid and 
coauthors acknowledge that
courts are generally acquainted with the di&culties inherent in employing general 
scienti!c data to reach conclusions about speci!c cases.50
Let us call this the type/token contrast. "e authors further stipulate that while judges 
and juries are looking for evidence in support of the retrospective conjecture that 
a certain e#ect was produced by certain causes (CoE), the science they rely on is 
primarily concerned with some kind of prospective conjecture that certain causes 
will yield certain e#ects (EoC). "is is a bit like looking for the unknown parents of 
known children (CoE) versus looking for the unknown children of known parents 
(EoC). Let’s call this the EoC/CoE contrast. Dawid et$al. bring all three contrasts 
together, implying a parallel structure of sorts, by aligning science with population/
type/EoC and legal with person/token/CoE (p. 361):
[T]his produces a conundrum for the law and science connection. Science typically 
wishes to infer “the e#ects of causes (EoC), through experiments and observational 
studies, but legal fact !nders need to infer “the causes of e#ects” (CoE). Legal fact !nders 
cannot reasonably infer from general data alone that a particular e#ect is attributable 
to a known cause, yet they are ultimately charged with exactly this responsibility – of 
determining at some level of certainty what caused a particular e#ect. "is question of 
how best to reason from group data to an individual case is pervasive in the courtroom 
use of science.


















Dawid et$al. conclude that “scientists could do much more in studying the matter 
of reasoning about the CoE.”51 I think that etiological explanation is one potential 
solution here. First, etiology is what connects causes and e#ects and can, thus, help 
in both EoC and CoE situations. Second, etiological explanations can explain both 
type and token events. "ird, they work at both the population and person levels.
Before I o#er support for these three related arguments (in Sections 2.7.2–2.7.4), 
I need to clarify (in Section 2.7.1) a common misunderstanding regarding the 
relationship between the population/person and type/token contrasts. In Section 
2.7.5, I suggest that the cause-e#ect component of etiological explanation estimates 
the causal vigor by reference to the strength of the association between putative 
causes and their e#ects. "e pathogenesis part of etiological explanation clari!es 
biologically what determines the causal vigor of a certain cause-e#ect relationship.
2.7.1 The population/type–person/token error
Dawid and coauthors write that
courts are generally acquainted with the di&culties inherent in employing general 
scienti!c data to reach conclusions about speci!c cases
and
… in medical causation cases, … they distinguish between “general causation” and 
“speci!c causation.”52
Here, Dawid et$al.’s distinctions become a bit murky. While the former quote (“courts 
are generally…”) still seems to be about population data versus their application to a 
single person or event, the second quote (“in medical causation …”) seems to refer 
to what is known in philosophy as type versus token contrast, which distinguishes 
between general law-like statements such as “smoking causes lung cancer” and 
particular situation-speci!c statements as in “his lung cancer was caused by his 
smoking.” "e type/token contrast is not identical to the contrast between causes of 
sickness in individuals and causes of the incidence rate of disease in populations.53 
Both type and token statements can be made with regard to both populations and 
persons. Consider the following statements: “the in'uenza virus causes epidemics 
in populations”; “the in'uenza virus causes a sickness with high fever in an infected 
person”; “in 1918, the in'uenza virus caused the deadliest pandemic in history”; 
and “last month, the in'uenza virus caused my brother to have a sickness with 
high fever.”
Dawid and coauthors do not make it clear whether they think of the population/
person contrast and the general/speci!c causation contrast as parallel but distinct 
contrasts, or as the same contrast. In other words, they are not entirely clear whether 
they think that the distinctions simply coexist or relate to each other, as in “science 
uses population approaches to generate knowledge about general causation” and “legal 
decisions require knowledge about speci!c causation in individuals.” If the latter is 
the case, Dawid and coauthors commit what may be called the population!type/
person!token error. "is error arises when it is assumed that talk about population 
data is the same as talk about a type-situation, and that talk about an individual 












is talk about a token situation. I do not think this is accurate, because “types are 
generally said to be abstract and unique; tokens are concrete particulars.”54 "e 
distinction goes back to Peirce, who wrote that
(In a manuscript or book) there will ordinarily be about twenty thes on a page, and of 
course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word “word,” however, there 
is but one word “the” in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should 
lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or 
Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a de!nitely 
signi!cant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and 
whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in 
some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being signi!cant only 
as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a 
single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token.55
"us de!ned, both type and token situations can apply to both populations and 
persons. Take, for example, the measles in persons and in populations. If I refuse to 
have my child vaccinated, she is likely to get the measles upon exposure to the virus. 
My child is clearly a person, not a population. Should she really get the measles, 
this would be a single case in the sense of a token event. Now, the type-token dyad 
can play out in single individuals as follows. In the sense of a token event being the 
instantiation of type dispositions, any nonimmunized person is at risk of contracting 
the measles in general. If she does indeed develop the disease, however, her illness 
would qualify as a token event, an instantiation of the measles as a general disease 
concept. Along the same lines, a person is not an instantiation of a population but 
of the general concept of a person. Similarly, a population can be considered the 
instantiation of the concept of population, however de!ned.
Parallel to the occurrence of the measles in persons, measles occur in populations, 
not just in individual members of populations, but sometimes as what is called 
an “outbreak.”56 Any individual measles outbreak quali!es as a token event, an 
instantiation of the general concept of measles outbreaks. For example, we had six 
individual measles outbreaks in the United States in early 2019.57 Each outbreak was 
monitored separately, and di#erent actions to curb the epidemic were taken at local 
and regional levels. "ese six outbreaks are not the measles type; they are a group of 
instantiations of the concept of measles outbreaks. Instead, just as a group of persons 
can be de!ned as a population, a group of measles outbreaks can be de!ned (a bit 
awkwardly, I have to admit) as a population or group of measles outbreaks.
In sum, my sick child is an example of a token situation concerning a person, and 
one particular outbreak is a token situation concerning a population. Similarly, the 
concept of measles in individuals is a type situation that concerns persons, while the 
concept of measles outbreaks is a type situation that concerns populations.
2.7.2  Etiological explanation and the  
EoC/CoE Dyad
Giving an etiological explanation is explaining illness occurrence by reference to its 
causes and pathomechanisms. In this section, I outline how etiological explanation 


















can help in both EoC and CoE contexts. "e di#erence between EoC and CoE 
incorporates at least three main contrasts related to (1) what they are about, (2) what 
kind of perspective they o#er, and (3) what goal we would like to achieve with them.
2.7.2.1 Subject
"e !rst contrast is related to what EoC and CoE are about. Both EoC and CoE are 
ways of asking a question, but they obviously di#er in what these questions are about. 
A search for EoC requires knowing the cause, so one can explore its potential e#ects. 
In contrast, a search for CoE requires knowing the e#ect, so one can explore its 
candidate causes. Clearly, the two perspectives are about two di#erent things, causes 
versus e#ects, analyzed in relation to the respective other. If cause and e#ect are 
viewed as two aspects of the same thing, as in Mumford and Anjum’s dispositionalist 
account of causal simultaneity, in which “the cause will be depicted as merging into 
and becoming the e#ect through a natural process,”58 then the two perspectives are 
about one of the two aspects in light of the other. "is brings us to the next contrast, 
that of time order of events in the causal process.
2.7.2.2 Process
One of the few aspects of causation that scientists, judges and jury members, as well 
as philosophers agree on is that causation is about a sequence of events that proceed 
forward in time: causes !rst, e#ects later.59 CoE questions require an assessment of 
evidence from past events, and they require taking a backward-looking perspective. 
"e goal is to explain why some e#ect occurred given the cause did occur. In contrast, 
answering EoC questions requires the assessment of future events, taking a forward-
looking perspective. It can be argued that the forward/backward contrast is inherent 
in the EoC and CoE concepts by de!nition, because both refer to the time order of 
events in a causal process.60
2.7.2.3 Goal
"e third di#erence between EoC and CoE also pertains to their time order, but this 
time in relation to what EoC and CoE data are needed for. While EoC looks forward 
from cause to e#ect, CoE looks backward from e#ect to cause. In a sense, giving 
an EoC account is making a prediction, while giving a CoE account is giving an 
explanation. "is view is captured in Miettinens’61 analysis of “genera of causality in 
medicine.” Miettinen (and his coauthor Karp) postulate the existence of “two genera 
of causality in medicine,” that is, “etiogenetic and interventive”62:
Ad-hoc knowing about etiogenetic causality – etiognosis, that is (cf. above) – is 
tantamount to having a causal explanation of an existent outcome (level of a morbidity, 
or presence of an illness); it thus inherently is retrospective from the vantage of an 
existent outcome. By contrast, ad-hoc knowing about interventive causality is a 
decision-relevant input into prognosis; it is knowing about the causal change in a 
future outcome resulting from an intervention, the adoption of which (notionally or 
actually) is a given; it is prospective from the vantage of the decision about adoption 
(or continuation) of the intervention.63
Behind the veil of stilted lingo Pearce calls “Miettinese” (Pearce 2012), one can 
see CoE being aligned with Miettinen and Karp’s etiogenetic causality, and EoC 












aligned with their interventive causality. Although they entitle the pertinent section 
of their book “"e two genera of causality in medicine,” Miettinen and Karp do not 
write about etiogenetic and interventive causality as two di#erent kinds of causality. 
Instead, they talk about “two types of causal concern in medicine,”64 thereby opening 
the door for an interpretation of etiogenetic and interventive causality as two 
di#erent ways of thinking about causality in medicine. "ese two foci of interest are 
clearly goal de!ned. In medicine as an intervention-focused profession, the former 
way of thinking is the focus for those who want to learn about the etiology of health 
phenomena and probably act on such knowledge, while the latter is the focus for 
those who are interested in the potential health outcomes of interventions.
2.7.3  Etiological explanation in populations 
and in persons
Etiological explanation is telling the story of illness occurrence at either the 
personal or the population level. At the personal level, the story is about the 
sequence of events, a detailed list of causal and pathomechanistic facts or events 
that occurred in a speci!c order and that culminated in the onset of illness. One 
example of such a sequence is the “chain of events” listed on death certi!cates; for 
example, death is the “onset of illness” to be explained, atherosclerotic coronary 
artery disease is the “underlying cause of death” that led to the “immediate cause of 
death” (rupture of myocardium) via inducing a thrombosis in the coronary artery 
with subsequent acute myocardial infarction. Taken as an etiological explanation, 
the sequence from thrombosis to myocardial rupture can be thought of as the 
pathomechanism that connects the underlying cause (atherosclerosis) with the 
death of the individual.
In populations, the “onset of illness” is marked as a change in the incidence65 or 
prevalence66 of a certain disease. "ese epidemiological measures give an estimate of 
the disease burden in a population, and they are, obviously, very di#erent from the one 
we use in individuals. In explanatory terms, illness occurrence at the population level 
may have multiple possible etiological constellations, while there is usually only one 
in a person. "us, etiological explanation at the population level is a meta-story, the 
story of all known stories of how a certain illness can occur and, thereby, contribute 
to an increasing incidence or prevalence of the disease in this population.67
2.7.4 Type and token etiology
Just as etiological explanation can refer to either an individual or to a population, 
it can be a token or a type explanation. If we explain why my aunt developed lung 
cancer, we can refer to her smoking behavior over decades as a cause, and to smoke-
induced uptake of carcinogens with subsequent loss of normal lung cell growth in 
her lung as the pathomechanism. "e type version of this explanation is when we 
refer to the same cause and mechanism for cancer development in anyone, as a 
general rule. In essence, both type and token etiological explanations refer to the 
same process depicted in Figure 2.4 but with reference to either the general concept 
or to one instance of it.































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.7.5  Etiological explanations in science and 
the courtroom
Dawid and coauthors seem to view the EoC/forward and CoE/backward coupling as 
tied exclusively to the scienti!c and legal realms, respectively. "ey seem to propose 
that scientists produce data by looking forward, and juries apply those data backward. 
In other words, they hold something like “science produces evidence that justi!es 
inference to EoC explanations that reason forward in time,” while “judges and juries 
need evidence that justi!es inference to CoE explanations that reason backward 
in time.” Let’s call this the direction-of-perspective contrast, which distinguishes 
between the perspective that takes a purported cause as the point of departure and 
observes its subsequent e#ects, and the perspective that takes a speci!c disease as 
the point of departure and observes its antecedent causes. Asking an EoC question is 
asking for a prediction, as in “What e#ect E will happen if cause C happens?” Asking 
a CoE question is probing the past: “What cause C might have been responsible for 
e#ect E to occur?”
"e basic idea is that EoC and CoE are two very di#erent things, because the 
questions asked have opposite directions in time. However, it is not the case that 
the EoC and CoE perspectives are taken exclusively in science and legal contexts, 
respectively. Nor do scientists and, for example, judges employ only EoC and CoE 
reasoning, respectively. In medicine, an EoC question is, “Will this pharmacological 
therapy help my patient?” An epidemiological EoC question is, “What is the long-
term outcome a%er cerebral stent implantation?” Judges ask expert witnesses EoC 
questions when they ask, “Would the child have sustained brain injury had the 
obstetrician performed the cesarean section 20 minutes earlier?” A CoE question in 
medicine is, “What caused this patient’s lung disease?” "e epidemiologist wants to 
know “What are the causes of neonatal brain damage?” Similarly, the courtroom jury 
tries to answer the CoE question, “What caused this child’s disability?”
Both scienti!c endeavor and legal procedures rely on a kind of discourse in their 
respective settings. For example, infectious disease scientists employ EoC reasoning 
when they set up experiments in which experimental animals are infected with 
a certain virus, and subsequent clinical e#ects are observed. Infectious disease 
epidemiologists employ CoE reasoning when they take serum samples from infected 
individuals and healthy controls, looking at the presence of viral antigen. Similarly, 
grand juries employ CoE reasoning when they want to identify what led to the 
murder, but they also employ EoC reasoning when they are considering how a known 
motive of the defendant may have led to the multiple possible cascades of events that 
ended with the death of the victim. In essence, both forward and backward reasoning 
is employed both in science and in legal cases.
In epidemiology, the direction-of-perspective contrast is of importance when 
considered in light of two fundamentally di#erent types of epidemiological study, 
cohort and case-control studies. "e former starts with study subjects sorted by 
exposure. ("ey either have the purportedly causal characteristic or they do not.). "en 
a wait ensues for a prede!ned study period (o%en years) to see whether the e#ect occurs 
or not. "e latter starts with individuals classi!ed by whether they have the disease 
(e#ect) under study or not, then looks back into the individuals’ medical history, 


















searching for evidence that they were exposed to the purported cause or not. However, 
it would be a mistake to consider only cohort studies as “EoC studies,” and case-control 
studies only as “CoE studies,” because there is yet another di#erence to consider. First, 
the terms prospective and retrospective can be used as descriptors of how the study was 
conducted in real time. When used in this sense, prospective means that while exposure 
status is already known when the study begins (the cause has occurred), the outcome 
(e#ect) has not yet occurred. Similarly, retrospective means that both exposure and 
outcome (cause and e#ect) have already occurred when the investigator launched the 
study. In this sense, both cohort and case-control studies can be either prospective 
or retrospective. Second, prospective and retrospective can be descriptors of which 
direction-of-perspective we obtain when looking at the data, either from exposure to 
outcome (from cause to e#ect) or from outcome back to exposure (from e#ect to cause).
2.7.6  Etiological explanation refers to 
causal!vigor
Etiological explanations give a detailed account of the natural history of illness 
occurrence by reference to both causal and pathogenetic factors. Etiological 
explanation captures all three contrasts listed earlier.
First, etiological explanation is a narrative that covers causes, pathomechanisms, 
and clinical disease, how they relate to each other (Figures 3.1 and 6.1), as well as 
their relations to other explanatory factors (Figure 6.3). In the same etiological 
explanation, we cover both which e#ects “belong to” which causes (EoC) and which 
causes “belong to” which e#ects (CoE).
Second, etiological explanations describe the process that leads from initial causes 
via pathomechanisms to illness. Although this is an explanation that describes the 
etiology in a prospective fashion, the sequential relationship of events in this process 
is to a large part a sequence of regularities of the if-then kind.
"ird, whether science is mainly about EoC and courtroom arguments mainly 
about CoE remains to be discussed in more detail. If we view the search for EoC 
as a desire to predict what will happen if the cause occurs, and the search for causes 
as an expression of a desire to be able to explain why the e%ect occurred, we are 
basically doing the same thing: we want to estimate the risk for an e#ect associated 
with a cause. Risk is, conceptually, a relationship between certain causes and certain 
diseases. Epidemiologists use a direction-neutral measure, the odds ratio (OR), to 
quantify the strength of the association between risk factor and disease. Viewed from 
the EoC perspective, the OREoC is estimated by dividing the outcome odds among the 
exposed by the outcome odds among the nonexposed. From the CoE perspective, the 
ORCoE is estimated by dividing the exposure odds among those with the disease by 
the exposure odds among those without the disease (Figure 2.5).
Under certain conditions, either OR can be interpreted as quantifying the strength 
of the disease risk associated with a certain risk factor. More importantly, if data 
are tabulated in a fourfold table as the one in Figure 2.5, the values for OREoC and 
ORCoE are numerically the same. Because ORs are unit-free and without direction in 
time or argument, and because they are being used as quanti!ers of the strength of 
the association between potential causes (risk factors) on the one hand and e#ects 












(diseases) on the other, they may also be indicators of the strength of the etiological 
explanation they are part of. In essence, I suggest that we have reason to assume 
that something like a causal vigor ties causes and e#ects together with a certain 
strength. In this view, ORs are quanti!ers of the causal vigor that connects causes 
with e#ects.68
"is point invalidates Dawid and coauthors’ notion that “it is the relative risk 
RR, and not the OR, that is required for assessing CoE.”69 According to traditional 
epidemiological teaching, the RR can be calculated only in cohort studies, not 
in case-control studies, because the RR is calculated as the incidence rate of the 
outcome among the exposed divided by the incidence rate among the unexposed. 
"e RR cannot be calculated in traditional case-control studies, because there is no 
such thing as incidence in a case-control setting, because the outcome has already 
occurred (in the cases) or not (in the controls), and nobody is waiting for further 
outcomes to occur. In traditional case-control studies, one can only estimate the 
RR by means of calculating the OR, which is derived from a fourfold table de!ned 
by exposure (+/!) and outcome (+/!) and is calculated as the cross-product ratio 
(number of exposed with outcome " number of nonexposed without outcome)/
(number of exposed without outcome " number of nonexposed with outcome). 
"erefore, the RR is a directed measure of RR, going from exposure to outcome, 
while the OR is direction free. For this reason, Dawid and coauthors consider the RR 
capable of supporting CoE claims apparently only because it is looking forward in 
time, while the OR’s lack of direction disquali!es it from providing such support. 
However, this is not necessarily so, because in case-control studies that employ 
incident (not prevalent) cases, the case group builds up over time, and whoever 
does not develop the disease under investigation serves as a control. Such studies 
provide true risk estimates (considering relative exposure time), and the OR really 















Figure 2.5 Fourfold table listing the possible combinations of putative cause (risk factor) and effect 
(disease).
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3.1 PHILOSOPHY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
Alex Broadbent’s Philosophy of Epidemiology is the !rst book-length treatment of 
epidemiological issues written by a philosopher. Among the many important points 
Broadbent raises, the following is particularly intriguing. In the synopsis of his book, 
he writes “causation is really only part of what we seek to measure and infer […] 
what epidemiologists really seek to do is explain, and their practices are seen much 
more clearly when described as such” (Broadbent 2013:8). Along these lines, his main 
claim is that explanation is a more useful concept than causal inference if our goal is 
to understand measures of causal association and the nature of causal inference. In 
this chapter, the groundwork is laid for shi"ing the focus ever so slightly from causal 
inference to etiological explanation (EE).
What does Broadbent mean when he talks about explanation as a concept in 
this context? In order to explicate his position, Broadbent discusses the causal 
interpretation problem (CIP) (pp. 26–55) In a nutshell, the CIP is the problem that 
arises when epidemiological measures of association are also interpreted as measures 
of causal strength. Broadbent de!nes this as “a measure of the net di#erence in 
outcome explained by an exposure” (p. 50).
$e term explanation is hard to !nd in the epidemiological literature, but the 
concept plays an important role in the context of discussions of confounding. 
Mervyn Susser used the term “explanatory antecedent variable” for a confounder%C 
(Figure 3.1), a common cause that explains the association between a putative cause 
(exposure E) and its putative e#ect (outcome O). In such a situation, a common 
antecedent is a cause of both E and O, thereby explaining why E and%O appear to be 
causally related even if this is not true. In such a case, the net di#erence in outcome 
is better explained as a consequence of variable C rather than of variable E.1
Epidemiologists concerned with questions about causation and causal inference 
seem to use the term explanation in a slightly di#erent way. For example, Galea, 
Riddle, and Kaplan come from the complex systems perspective and suggest that
[i]t would be one small step to move methodologists’ thinking from one concerned 
with !ne-tuning methods in the hunt for causes, to incorporating methods that study 


















Although it is not likely that moving methodologists’ thinking anywhere can be 
achieved in “one small step,” Galea and colleagues have a point when they suggest that 
providing EEs requires network thinking at the population level by incorporating a 
multitude of possible exposures and explanatory variables.
Similarly, epidemiologists Mark Parascandola and Douglas Weed think 
that%explanation is a more general, overarching characteristic of epidemiological 
research:
Unfortunately, philosophical thinking about causation has been largely driven by 
the%physical sciences, focusing on simple chains of events rather than the complex 
multi-level relations that make up biology. $us, this is an area that needs further 
research. How are explanations at di#erent levels, from the molecular to the social, 
related? (Parascandola and Weed 2001:911)
Parascandola and Weed are not interested in merely providing a de!nition of 
causation for epidemiologists, although they clearly consider this important for 
everyday epidemiological practice. Instead, they suggest we should !nd one that 
“best meets the goals of the discipline of epidemiology.”2
Brie&y outlined in the next two sections are the textbook goals of epidemiology, to 
identify causes of illness (Section 3.1.1, and its de facto goal, that is, to provide useful 
etiological explanations (Section 3.1.2). $e notions of macro- and micro-etiological 
levels of explanation and a sequence of de!nitions for what is considered to be plain, 
good, and useful EEs are introduced.3 Broadbent proposes two characteristics that 
causal inferences should have in order to serve the needs of epidemiology, stability, 
and prediction. $ese are also characteristics of useful EEs. In Section 3.2, a third 
characteristic is added to the list, successful intervention.
3.1.1 Textbook goals of epidemiology
What exactly are the stated goals of epidemiology? Some textbooks state that 
the goal of epidemiology is to identify the causes of disease.4 In order to do this, 
epidemiological research needs to provide evidence in support of the conclusion that 
an observed association between a certain exposure (say, usage of a mobile phone) 




Figure 3.1 Spurious causal inference (dashed arrow) in a situation where an antecedent confounder (C) 
causes both the putative cause (exposure E) and the putative effect (outcome O).













Epidemiologist Dimitrios Trichopoulos (1938–2014) expressed his belief that 
epidemiological results can indeed speak to the issue of causation when he wrote 
that
Epidemiology should be evaluated in comparison to other disciplines that serve the 
same objective, that is, to identify the causes of human disease and facilitate their 
prevention. Among these disciplines, only epidemiology can document causation 
without concern about dose-extrapolation or species vabiability [sic] and with built-in 
accounting for potential modi!ers. (Trichopoulos 1995)
Epidemiologist Miguel Hernán, a champion of the potential outcomes approach5 
(POA), agrees: “Population causal e#ects can sometimes be computed – or, more 
rigorously, consistently estimated” (Hernán 2004:266). $e POA is an approach 
to causal inference that was cultivated by scholars with backgrounds in statistics6 
and engineering.7 Its main thrust is based on counterfactual reasoning and goes 
somewhat like this. A cause makes a di#erence to its e#ect. $e only way to establish 
this would be to have a comparison between two scenarios, one in which we observe 
the occurrence of the e#ect in the presence of the putative cause versus its absence. 
Since the same event cannot occur twice, we need to resort to similar events, and 
currently the best way to design such similar events (with and without the cause 
present) devoid of all extraneous in&uence is randomization. $e POA is based on 
the assumption that “the randomized experiment [is] the only scienti!cally proven 
method of testing causal relations from data, and to this day, the one and only causal 
concept permitted in mainstream statistics” (Pearl 2000:340). Even more explicit is 
Hernán’s statement that “in ideal randomized experiments, association is causation” 
(Hernán 2004:267; emphasis mine). $e question is, however, how can we identify a 
cause when we see one?
Epidemiologists have already achieved their textbook goal, to identify causes 
of illness. However, this is not because of any epistemological technique to 
extract causal information from observational data. Instead, this is due to their 
contribution to a larger-scale research process that involves more than one study, 
multiple kinds of study designs, bench science, sociological research, and so forth. 
All that epidemiologists can do is look at the beginning and end of the etiological 
process, while their ability to look into what has been called the black box, that is, 
the pathomechanism, is limited.8 $is point is revisited in Section 3.2 in a discussion 
of data manipulation in the service of EEs.
Epidemiologists create explanatory models of disease occurrence in populations 
that are built on data from epidemiological studies viewed as quasi-real-life scenarios of 
natural illness occurrence in populations (observational, noninterventional studies). 
$ese models, in turn, supplement laboratory data in providing the justi!cation for 
randomized interventional trials, which are simulations (seeking e'cacy) of real-
life interventions (yielding e#ectiveness). In medicine, such interventional studies 
are considered the “proof of the pudding.” However, they are o"en not perceived 
as part of the initial discovery process but as playing a more con!rmatory role9 in 
the overarching scienti!c process that justi!es the approval of drugs by regulatory 
authorities and the implementation of health policies.














Adding a quantitative twist, it has been suggested that epidemiology’s goal is to 
move beyond identi!cation of causation toward providing a “quanti!cation of the 
causal relation between exposure and disease” (Savitz 2003:9). For example, Hernán 
suggests that “the causal risk di#erence, risk ratio, and odds ratio (and other causal 
parameters) can also be used to quantify the strength of the causal e#ect when it 
exists” (Hernán 2004:267). $is statement is problematic in general. In order to 
quantify something, it has to be measurable, at least in principle. Measurement is 
the comparison of an observed entity to a reference value. We count our blessings, 
compare the result to zero, and re&ect on what the di#erence might mean. We 
measure our body weight and height, calculate our body mass index, compare the 
result to standard values, and wonder how this could have happened. $is may not 
be possible in the context of illness causation, and perhaps not for any causal context 
in general. For a cause to be quanti!able, there would need to be a more or less or 
something like a weak or strong. $is, however, is not really what the concept of 
cause is all about; something is usually taken to be a cause or it is not, which makes 
it a categorical concept. In statistical terms, the scale for causation is nominal (as in 
dead or alive), not ordinal (as in stages of breast cancer) or discrete (as in number of 
joints with arthritis), or even continuous (as in cholesterol level). We do not say that 
“smoking is a strong cause of lung cancer.” We do not compare causes quantitatively, 
as in “airplane crashes are a weaker cause of death than car accidents.” What we 
talk about is the strength of an association, which in epidemiology increases with 
an increasing di#erence between the two scenarios mentioned earlier, between the 
percentage of individuals with a certain risk factor who develop a particular illness 
and the percentage of individuals without that same risk factor who develop it. $is 
so-called risk ratio (when one is divided by the other) or risk di!erence (if one is 
subtracted from the other) may be a quanti!able entity, but the causal relationship 
between risk factor and illness is not.
3.1.2  De facto goal: Useful etiological 
explanations
Although epidemiologists say that they are searching for causes of illness, they have 
yet to o#er a uni!ed de!nition of what they mean by causation and what a causation 
detector might look like. Some hope to !nd causes while admitting that this might 
be impossible. Broadbent states that uncertainties among epidemiologists about what 
causation is and what criteria they need to identify causes are irrelevant with regard 
to their work, because what epidemiologists actually do is generate evidence that 
helps provide useful EEs of illness occurrence.
As mentioned earlier, the arguably most helpful de!nition of etiology is MacMahon 
and Pugh’s, which covers causal events that occur before any bodily response and 
mechanisms that lead from the initial bodily response to the !rst manifestations of 
illness (MacMahon and Pugh 1970:26). Illness causation is the process that leads 
from causal events to the biological pathogenetic mechanism. $e disease process 
then develops from pathogenesis to clinical disease. Providing an EE is to explain 
illness occurrence by o#ering a detailed description of the overarching two-phase 













etiological process. Giving an EE is more than describing the co-occurrence of 
an exposure (e.g., asbestos) and outcome (e.g., mesothelioma), which are just the 
beginning and end of the etiological process. Nobody would consider that o#ering 
two photos of the same person, say, as a baby and as a grandmother, is a good way to 
explain this person’s life course. $e two snapshots just do not provide any insight 
of how the individual got from there to here. Similarly, one would not consider 
the observed association between an increase in the stork population around the 
city of Berlin and the concurrent increase in deliveries outside city hospitals a 
valid explanation of the process of human reproduction (Hofer, Przyrembel, and 
Verleger 2004). Ecological data of this sort remain silent about the process between 
its beginning and end.
Nevertheless, in order to explain the etiology of illness, epidemiological information 
is needed to establish a potential link between candidate causes (exposures) and 
illness (outcome), while biological information is needed to explain how humans get 
from there to here. Data about the entire process have to be collected that provide 
information about both the etiological macrolevel (observed risk factors–outcome 
associations in populations) and the etiological microlevel (pathomechanistic 
observations in the wet lab).10 $is requires collaboration, or at least some knowledge 
integration, between macrolevel epidemiologists and microlevel scientists. While the 
former help explain the why of illness occurrence by pinpointing candidate causes, 
the latter help explain the how of illness occurrence by pinpointing the pathogenetic 
mechanism.11 Only both explanations together, but neither one alone, can provide a 
su'cient account of the etiological process of illness occurrence.
EE integrates causal, causal-mechanical, and mechanistic explanations as recently 
reviewed by D. Benjamin Barros:
[T]he recent literature thus includes three types of accounts of explanation that 
incorporate causal concepts. Causal explanation generally seeks to explain a 
phenomenon by providing information about its causal history. […] Causal-mechanical 
explanation focuses on explaining the physical connections between causes and 
e#ects. Mechanistic explanation adds an additional explanatory layer by seeking to 
characterize the mechanism that caused the phenomenon.  (Barros 2013:456–7)
Barros’ explanatory trinity is based on work by Lewis and van Fraassen (causal), 
Salmon (causal-mechanical), and Bechtel/Abrahamsen, Glennan, Machamer/
Darden/Craver, and Woodward (mechanistic explanations). In the health 
sciences, causal explanations are provided by interpretations of observational 
epidemiological study results, where risk factors are considered candidate causes 
(macro-etiology). Mechanistic explanations come from empirical laboratory 
experiments that specify the pathogenetic component of the etiological process 
(micro-etiology). Causal-mechanical explanations integrate information from both 
kinds of explanation.12
Some time ago, my suggestion was that causal inference in public health needs 
(1) evidence of exposure primacy in humans, (2) evidence of an association between 
risk factor and illness,13 (3) experimental biomechanistic evidence, and (4) evidence 
of public health intervention e#ectiveness (Dammann and Leviton 2007). In what 














follows, how these requirements might also !t EEs is outlined. Taking the etiological 
explanatory stance releases epidemiologists from their perceived responsibility to 
provide causal certainty, but it also requires them to accept my de!nition of EEs (at 
least as a point of departure), and to help de!ne what it means for an EE to be good 
or, even better, useful.
In 1957, Abraham Lilienfeld wrote that, in epidemiology and public health,
a factor may be de!ned as a cause of a disease, if the incidence of the disease is 
diminished when exposure to this factor is likewise diminished. (Lilienfeld 1957)
Although Lilienfeld does not explicitly talk about intervention, his de!nition hints 
at the practical goal of public health to reduce disease incidence. $e upshot of 
Lilienfeld’s position is the assumption that one can reduce disease incidence by 
reducing exposure to causal risk factors. Standing in the epidemiological tradition 
that gave rise to this view, the following proposed de!nitions of what constitutes EEs, 
in their good and useful forms, are o#ered:
A proposed de!nition of etiological explanation (EE) is
EE: A plausible description of a set of causes and pathogenetic mechanisms in 
whose%presence illness occurs consistently more frequently than in their 
absence.
As an example, let’s take maternal infection in pregnancy, in&ammatory responses 
in the placenta and the fetal brain, and long-term adverse neurodevelopmental 
outcomes.14 In the 1990s, the main explanation of what causes brain damage in many 
preterm infants was hypoxia-ischemia, that is, lack of oxygen and blood &ow to the 
brain. $e major problem was the absence of measurements of oxygen in and blood 
&ow to the brain of preterm infants that may have supported this explanation. In 
1997, the author published with Alan Leviton the hypothesis that infection of the 
mother during pregnancy might lead to neonatal brain damage (macro-etiological 
observation) via in&ammatory responses in placenta and fetal brain (micro-
etiological observation). $e explanation was plausible because maternal infection 
can lead to in&ammation in the placenta and the fetal brain, which in turn can 
lead to brain damage, via a cascade of in&ammatory proteins called cytokines that 
are produced in abundance by body cells in response to infection, are capable of 
interfering with brain development, and can lead to frank brain tissue damage. 
$e intrauterine infection and brain damage link is further supported by the fact 
that both are strongly associated with preterm delivery, explaining the clustering 
of this high-risk constellation in this population. Finally, both in&ammation and 
brain damage occur much more frequently in the presence of maternal intrauterine 
infection than in its absence.
$is EE needs to be supplemented with additional characteristics if it is to be 
granted the status of good EE. In epidemiology and medicine, the goal is to do 
something about illness occurrence in order to reduce the illness-associated burden 
to individuals and populations, respectively. $us, an EE should be plausibly !t for 
this purpose, and this is proposed as a preliminary de!nition of a good etiological 
explanation (GEE):













GEE: Any EE that includes modifiable conditions, whose modification is 
plausibly% likely to be associated with a consistent reduction in illness 
occurrence.
GEEs are perfectly actionable, and that is indeed what is being done when a 
proposed intervention is tried for the !rst time in clinical or community-based 
populations. Once a candidate intervention has been successfully tested and the 
results indicate that it yields a health bene!t, the associated GEE can be promoted 
from good to useful etiological explanation (UEE), and can be de!ned as
UEE: Any EE or GEE whose actual implementation is associated with a consistent 
reduction of illness occurrence in populations.
Although none of these proposed de!nitions refers explicitly to causation or 
mechanisms, both are implicitly involved in the concept of set of conditions.
$e earlier proposed de!nitions hinge on the interpretation of terms such as 
likelihood, plausibility, and consistency. In the health sciences, such interpretations 
are provided by the community of researchers who work on related aspects of 
the etiological story to be told. In the biomedical sciences, this view features 
prominently in the work of Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), who conceptualized 
scienti!c knowledge generation as “the result of social activity, because the given 
body of knowledge goes beyond the individual’s limitations.”15 It also resonates 
with the concept of explanatory coherentism, which is the topic of the !nal chapter 
of this book.
In light of this proposal, it is time to amend my earlier suggestion that causal 
inference in public health needs requirements 1–4 presented earlier. $e phrase 
“causal inference in public health needs” should be replaced with something like 
“useful etiological explanation integrates.” It remains to be fully explored whether 
each single kind of evidence is necessary and only all four of them together are 
su'cient to constitute a UEE.16
Once again, my proposal is that, instead of dreaming up de!nitions of illness 
causation and inventing tools for causal inference, epidemiologists should zoom in 
on helping to !nd UEEs. I consider this a direct response to Broadbent’s suggestion to 
transition from causation and causal inference in epidemiology to causal explanation. 
By accepting his
simple criterion for the causal interpretation of a measure of strength of association: A 
measure of causal strength is a measure of the net di#erence in outcome explained by 
an exposure (Broadbent 2013:50)
we can return to my earlier proposed de!nition of UEE and substitute “reduction of” 
with “net di#erence in,” so that a UEE can now be de!ned as
UEE: Any EE or GEE whose implementation is associated with a robust net 
di#erence%in illness occurrence in populations that is explained by the 
exposure.17














Explanation features prominently in Illari and Russo’s book, Causality: 
Philosophical "eory Meets Scienti#c Process, as one of !ve kinds of problems that 
“link philosophical theory and scienti!c practice” (Illari and Russo 2014:5), the other 
four being inference, prediction, control, and reasoning. Illari and Russo apparently 
see the term causal explanation as including all three explanatory categories in 
Barros’ classi!cation when they state that
[W]e o"en want to know not just what happened or will happen, but how it happened, 
and why. $is is causal explanation. (Illari and Russo 2014:262)
$ey refer to correlations between exposures and outcomes observed in big datasets 
when they refer to the what happened (“exposure to radiation is statistically associated 
with the occurrence of cancer”). $e explanation how happened what happened could 
be either causal-mechanical (“the tumor grew because the exposure to radiation led 
to DNA double-strand breakage and subsequent proliferation of cancerous cells”) or 
mechanistic (“because of DNA double-strand breakage and subsequent proliferation 
of cancerous cells”). $e%explanation why happened what happened could be causal 
(“the tumor grew because of the exposure to radiation”) but also causal-mechanical 
or mechanistic as exempli!ed earlier. $us, if Russo and Illari think that asking the 
how and why questions is asking for a causal explanation, they implicitly include all 
three of Barros’ kinds of explanation.
In contrast, I think that EEs are helpful precisely because they distinguish between 
causal (macro-etiological) and biomechanistic (micro-etiological) explanations, 
which play separate roles in public health and medicine, respectively.18 In public 
health, the goal of primary prevention and health promotion is reached when 
a reduction of causes featuring in the causal history of the disease (e.g., less 
smoking) leads to less (lung) disease occurrence in a population, and this can be 
achieved without any reference to mechanisms; (macro) EE is all that is needed 
(Broadbent 2013:77). In secondary prevention and clinical care, however, the 
pathogenetic mechanism is the target of intervention. Here, causal-mechanical 
and mechanistic (micro-etiological) explanations of how the disease came about 
(rather than what items in its history gave rise to the circumstances for, and 
activation of, the mechanism referred to by the word “how”) are helpful when 
it comes to the targeted design of appropriate pharmacological substances that 
can modify or even interrupt biological processes that characterize speci!c 
pathogenetic mechanisms.
Prevention and other kinds of health intervention are things we do to reduce the 
individual and societal burden associated with illness. $is, in turn, motivates us to 
suggest adding explanation by intervention to Broadbent’s shortlist of explanatory 
foci, explanation by stability and prediction. $erefore, the role of interventions in 
EEs is now discussed. Described in the next section are three characteristics of the 
randomized controlled trial (RCT), the interventional study design that is considered 
the gold standard for causal inference in epidemiology, mainly due to the bias-
reducing e#ects of randomization and blinding. Beyond these two, it is argued that 
the intervention itself provides added epistemic bene!t. Further, it is proposed that 
even quasi-interventions like data analytic manipulations might carry that added 
bene!t. Objections are discussed, and responses are o#ered.












3.2 EXPLANATION BY INTERVENTION
3.2.1 The gold standard
One of Broadbent’s main proposals is to consider steering away from the traditional 
focus on causal inference in epidemiological research toward causal explanation. He 
claims that “good causal inference in epidemiology must deliver a piece of causal 
knowledge that can be used to improve population health” (Broadbent 2013:56). 
In particular, he suggests looking for stability and good prediction (SGP) as 
characteristics of epidemiological results that are capable of contributing to causal 
explanation.
Broadbent comes from the perspective of Lipton’s inference to the best explanation 
(Lipton 1991). He asks for contrastive explanations that tell us “Why this, but not 
that?” instead of simply “Why this?”. Relative risk estimates (outcome risk among 
exposed individuals divided by outcome risk among the unexposed) require 
evaluation for SGP before being used for the purpose of causal explanation, because 
there is nothing in these numbers that allows for causal interpretation. Because EEs 
consider pathomechanistic evidence, they will be more detailed, !ner grained, and 
more useful in helping us understand how one particular risk factor, but not that 
other one, explains the occurrence of a certain disease. EEs are helpful in supporting 
the design of new interventions by virtue of explaining why some outcomes are to be 
expected, while others are not.
As mentioned previously, the gold standard for causal inference in the health 
sciences is the RCT.19 In an RCT, two groups of study participants are (1)%randomized 
into two or more treatment groups and (2) exposed to (treated with) either 
an interventional drug or a placebo (sometimes a di#erent drug). Two crucial 
characteristics of RCTs are randomization and blinding. Randomization is crucial 
because it is instrumental in curbing external in&uence on the causal e#ect under 
investigation, thereby sprinkling causal “pixie dust” over an observed association, 
rendering it causal for all intents and purposes. Here is one example for how the 
argument is put forward in one of the major epidemiological textbooks:
Each unit is assigned treatment using a random assignment mechanism such as a coin 
toss. Such a mechanism is unrelated to the extraneous factors that a#ect the outcome, 
so any association between the treatment allocation it produces and those extraneous 
factors will be random. $e variation in the outcome across treatment groups that is not 
due to treatment e#ects can thus be ascribed to these random associations and hence 
can be justi!ably called chance variation. (Rothman, Greenland, and Lash 2008b:88)
$e idea is that randomization renders the exposure independent of all possible 
endogenous and exogenous confounding in&uence. Confounders are characteristics 
of study participants that are associated with both the exposure and the outcome of 
interest, for example, a common cause. Any confounder can bias the dataset toward 
or away from “the null,” the numerical measure of “no e#ect.” Randomization is 
thought of as ascertaining that all confounders are distributed equally among those 
who receive the intervention and those who do not. Philosopher John Worrall has 
argued that randomization cannot guarantee the absence of residual confounding 














(Worrall 2007) because “the unveri!able assumption of no unmeasured confounding 
of the exposure e#ect is necessary for causal inference from observational data” 
(Hernán and Robins 2006b). And despite all randomization, even RCTs yield only 
measures of association based on observations. Because “there is no logic that gets 
you from probabilities or associations alone to causal conclusions” (Kincaid 2011) 
in observational studies or in RCTs, the latter provide no epistemological impact 
beyond that provided by the former. Consequently, to consider causal inference 
based solely on the notion of randomization better than causal inference based on 
“observational” studies seems to be unjusti!ed.
Randomized studies are blinded so that study participants, investigators, and 
analysts are unaware of the interventional allocation. $is reduces bias that is 
potentially introduced by choices individuals make, especially by choices that 
could break the randomization scheme and choices that would lead to a violation 
of the requirement that the outcome should be assessed without knowledge of the 
outcome. All involved have to be blinded with regard to the exposure, especially 
those who have a vested interest in the success of the intervention: patients who 
want to get better, their doctors who want to help, and statisticians and pharmaco-
epidemiologists who hope to publish exciting data. If we le" interventional allocation 
to these stakeholders, and one or some of them let their motivation get into the 
way, the result would be “bias by self-interest.” A related bias is “confounding by 
indication,” where the causal e#ect ascribed to the intervention should better be 
ascribed to the reasons for the intervention.
Outlined in the next section are some reasons beyond randomization and blinding 
for why supplementing Broadbent’s SGP requirement with data from interventional 
studies might improve EE. $e concept of “quasi-intervention” is presented, and how 
it can help EEs via data manipulation is discussed.
3.2.2 Intervention
$e main reason to propose the concept of explanation by intervention is that the 
successful prevention of illness is the ultimate accomplishment in public health. 
Primary prevention is de!ned as a reduction of disease incidence (new cases per 
time unit) and, thereby, disease prevalence (percentage) at the population level. $is 
concept of prevention in public health includes the notion of intervention. $erefore, 
much EE in the population health sciences resonates with Woodward’s manipulability 
theory (Woodward 2003, 2009). In a nutshell, this theory holds that under idealized 
experimental conditions, X causes Y if there is a possible manipulation of some value 
of X that leads to a change in Y. $is notion is important for EEs, because this is how 
experimental (micro-etiological) benchwork and RCTs (which are micro- and/or 
macro-etiological interventions) work: we manipulate X and see if that intervention 
is associated with a change in Y.
Woodward’s rationale for taking this perspective is based on his assumption that 
“the distinctive practical payo# of causal knowledge has to do with its usefulness 
for manipulation and control” (Ibid., p. 32). $e similarity of the RCT design to that 
of wet bench experimentation is, according to Woodward, “relevant to establishing 
causal claims because those claims consist in … claims about what would happen 
to e#ects under appropriate manipulations of their putative causes” (Woodward 
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2009:35). $is re&ects exactly what medical and public health researchers are seeking: 
knowledge about what would happen to health outcomes if their putative causes were 
manipulated.20
One obvious problem for interventionist evidence as a requirement for etiologic 
explanation is that both lab experiments and RCTs allow for etiological explanation 
only in those particular manipulationist scenarios, but not in the nonmanipulated 
“real world.” Another problem is the impossibility to infer directly from laboratory 
animal to humans. Together, these two limitations are the reasons why you cannot 
go to the lab, induce cerebral damage in newborn mice by injecting a certain 
substance S into their brains, and then postulate that%S%is the cause of brain damage 
in human newborns. Experiments and RCTs%yield the information whether a certain 
manipulation of X can cause a change in Y, but they cannot answer the question of 
whether X causes Y in the real world.21
Noninterventional (a.k.a., “observational”22) epidemiological studies yield 
measures of association between exposures and outcomes. Unfortunately, the well-
worn notion that “association is not causation” suggests that it is impossible to infer 
causation from observed association without further ado. Hill’s heuristics and the 
potential outcomes approach (POA) were previously outlined as candidate “causation 
makers” in epidemiology.23 Hill’s heuristics help to put an observed association 
into perspective by probing into plausibility, consistency, coherence, and similar 
characteristics of the observed association between risk factor and outcome.24 While 
Hill’s heuristics require a comprehensive qualitative content analysis of information 
from multiple sources and scienti!c disciplines, the POA puts all its money on the 
one idea that observation of a quantitative outcome di#erence in a randomized, 
controlled experiment allows for a causal interpretation of the relationship between 
the experimental intervention and the%outcome.25
Considerable e#ort is devoted to the avoidance of chance, bias, and confounding 
during the design, implementation, and analysis phases of observational 
epidemiological studies. Still, RCTs are o"en considered superior to observational 
studies in terms of causal yield and, therefore, a more solid basis for success and 
progress in medicine and public health.26 Although causal claims based on RCTs are 
very common in biomedicine, it is di'cult to accept statements such as “given fallible 
access to knowledge of causal processes in the clinical sciences, some epistemic 
good is provided by conducting randomized interventional studies rather than 
observational studies” (La Caze 2013). What epistemic bene!t can RCTs provide 
above that provided by observational studies if all knowledge of causal processes is 
fallible? Is it less fallible when it is based on data from RCTs instead on observational 
research? Which characteristic of RCTs can be considered the truth maker in this 
context? If it is true that “causal inference is just that – an inference by the interpreter 
of the data, not a product of the study or something that is found within the evidence 
generated by the study” (Savitz 2003:20), why should data from RCTs enable the 
interpreter to draw valid causal inference while data from observational studies fail 
to do so?
One important argument against this recipe for cause-making is that, a"er all is said 
and done, experimental results are also just observations. Why should observation of 
postinterventional occurrence of health phenomena be epistemologically superior to 
observation of natural or free-&oating occurrence?














First, observation of manipulated occurrence in humans may be considered 
epistemologically superior to the observation of natural or free-&oating occurrence 
in natural experiments or in observational epidemiological studies, because it comes 
with the added bene!t of providing evidence of e$cacy, which suggests that the 
intervention would work (or not) in the real-life setting of medical or public health 
interventions. RCTs are conducted in humans; they involve the administration of 
real drugs, and they measure real outcomes. If a drug works in an RCT, it is likely 
that it will also work in a real-life setting. $is added bene!t is not provided by 
randomization or blinding alone, which are characteristics of RCTs that make them 
less like real-life interventions; the manipulation makes the observed phenomena in 
RCTs more like real-life medical or public health interventions.
Second, my suggestion to complement Broadbent’s SGP requirement with 
evidence from intervention is motivated by the recognition that even if we already 
have stable and predictive information from cohort or case-control studies, 
EE would be better if we had additional evidence from intervention. While 
observation of free-&oating occurrence yields data for basic EEs, observation of 
manipulated occurrence yields data for UEEs that may justify clinical or public 
health interventions, precisely because it is evidence from intervention, the target 
for most epidemiological knowledge generation (Dammann 2015).
$e lack of results from interventional studies can also be quite enlightening. 
For example, it is entirely conceivable that an epidemiological result is stable and 
predictive in multiple observational studies (Flanders et%al. 2011a, 2011b), but clinical 
trials fail to result in the expected change in the outcome a"er intervention on the 
exposure variable. One prominent example is the initial !nding in the Nurses’ 
Health Study that postmenopausal estrogen use is associated with a reduced risk 
for coronary heart disease over a 4-year follow-up period (Stampfer et%al. 1985). 
Half a decade later, 10-year follow-up data con!rmed these results (Stampfer et%al. 
1991). However, a subsequent randomized trial did not show a bene!t (Hulley et%al. 
1998), and this result was more recently con!rmed by meta-analytic approaches 
(Main et%al. 2013). Had the randomized estrogen trial not contradicted observational 
results, for how long would we have thought about estrogen as a means to prevent 
cardiovascular disease in postmenopausal women? $e observational result was 
rather stable over time (in that same cohort); however, we are lucky that a comparably 
large observational cohort study (the Framingham study) existed at that time, had 
the necessary data available, and did not show a protective e#ect (Wilson, Garrison, 
and Castelli 1985). $is is the kind of situation that warrants a clinical trial (i.e., a 
situation of uncertainty regarding e'cacy called equipoise) to resolve the tension 
that arises due to incongruent results from observational studies of similar quality.
Broadbent’s requirement for stability of an observational epidemiological result 
is that
(a) it is not soon contradicted by good scienti!c evidence, and (b) given best current 
scienti!c knowledge, it would probably not be soon contradicted by good scienti!c 
evidence, if good research were done on the topic. (Broadbent 2013:63)
In the context of large-scale, population-based, prospective studies, one problem 
with part (a) of this requirement is that it is highly unlikely that any result from 












any comparable study will be available soon, just because these studies are so 
expensive, time consuming, and di'cult to implement. A problem with part (b) 
is that in many cases we simply cannot tell what might happen if good research 
were%done.
If a cohort study does not yield an interesting result, only very few hardliners 
will embark on the long journey of conducting another, similar study without solid 
preliminary data. If they do, it will take years, if not decades until the results are 
in. If, on the other hand, a cohort study does yield an interesting result, it is likely 
that, for the sake of saving time and money, investigators move on to the RCT right 
away. In either case, it is quite unlikely that a comparable observational study will 
be performed just to con!rm or contradict the initial results. Con#rmation of results 
of successful observational studies by similarly successful RCTs, however, comes 
at almost no cost, because interventional design is why observational studies are 
performed in the !rst place.27
$ird, manipulation reduces the inferential margin of error induced by 
confounding factors. While the observed association between intervention and 
outcome might still be due to chance, any confounding factor (i.e., a common cause 
of intervention and outcome) would need to in&uence the manipulator’s agency and 
independently in&uence the outcome. It could be argued that candidate confounders 
would, thus, boil down factors that in&uence the manipulator’s decision:
 • At which explanatory level to intervene (macro- or micro-etiological levels by 
intervening on risk factors or pathogenetic mechanisms, respectively), thereby 
putting constraints on her inference by limiting the realm of her predictions 
about consequences to that level.
 • At what point in time to intervene and for how long, thereby putting constraints 
on her inference with regard to the time frame for expected changes in outcome.
 • How intensely to intervene (e.g., drug dosage), thereby putting constraints on 
her inference in terms of dose-response relationships between intervention and 
outcome.
Investigators can deliberately vary timing, duration, and dosage of the intervention 
and observe changes in the outcome. If changes in outcome are associated with 
changes in manipulated exposure, it seems more plausible that we “made” those 
changes in outcome by changing the treatment regimen.28 Always, however, the 
possibility remains that all such changes occur solely by chance.
Finally, it could be that investigators simply prefer to rely on what they observe 
“with their own eyes” in a system’s behavior a"er they have manipulated it “with 
their own hands” rather than rely on what they passively observe in the system’s 
behavior, because intervention appears to be a quintessential component of the 
way we learn about causation (Gopnik and Schulz 2007). In everyday situations, 
we gather causal knowledge about how the world around us works by paying 
attention to how our actions (or our avoidance thereof) modify the trajectory of 
events and, thereby, potential outcomes of situations. Perhaps we simply prefer 
evidence from intervention because we personally rely on such evidence in our 
daily lives, all the time.















$e notion of “quasi-intervention” concerns analytical data manipulation in 
observational (noninterventional) studies. It builds on the notion that an ideal 
observational study with su'cient statistical power, well-de!ned groups of 
participants, collection of high-quality data, inclusion of all known confounders, and 
exclusion of all known biases should not be considered epistemologically inferior to a 
randomized trial. $e results of a perfect observational study should come rather close 
to those of a randomized trial. For example, if taking a certain drug has a particular 
e#ect on clinical improvement in an ideal observational study, the results should be 
similar to those an RCT would provide. Obviously, it is easy to raise the objection that 
perfect studies do not exist. However, two data-manipulation techniques, propensity 
score adjustment and Mendelian randomization can bring observational study very 
close to the ideal, thereby contributing to the causal inference part of etiological 
explanations. A third technique, data strati!cation, is used to explore a phenomenon 
called e!ect modi#cation, the observation that e#ect sizes di#er in subgroups of the 
original study population, indicating that the variable that de!nes the subgroups 
must play some kind of mechanistic role in disease etiology.
In some cases, it is impossible for ethical, !nancial, or timing reasons to conduct 
a RCT. For this scenario, epidemiologists and statisticians have developed a data 
analysis tool called propensity score. Once the data are in, information on all 
confounders is used to calculate a score that allows the investigator to adjust for all 
confounders by matching or adjusting in multivariable regression models. $e idea is 
to make exposed and unexposed groups as similar as possible, and indeed as similar 
as the groups in a randomized trial. Any potential bias due to stakeholder motivation 
or confounding by indication can be minimized in this way. In some settings, such 
propensity score-adjusted observational studies are not only the best we can do, but 
the only thing we can do to emulate the design features of a randomized trial. It is 
impossible to conduct both kinds of study in the same population. However, even 
if it were possible, there is no external gold standard each study could be compared 
to. $us, any claim that RCTs are genuinely better than propensity score-adjusted 
observational studies remains unsupported. $us, retroactive propensity score 
calculation and adjustment is considered a plausible simulation of randomization 
in an RCT.
Mendelian randomization is a more recently developed technique in which 
investigators identify a genetic variant that is strongly biologically associated with 
the exposure under investigation. Study participants are then divided into groups 
de!ned by the presence or absence of that same genetic variant. Since genetic traits 
are inherited in a random fashion, the groups are now e#ectively randomized; 
confounders are distributed equally between groups, and results turn out to be very 
close to those from a randomized trial (Yarmolinsky et%al. 2018).
E!ect modi#cation is a phenomenon that is neither a bias to be avoided, nor a kind 
of confounding to be adjusted for; it is a biological characteristic that leads to di#erent 
e#ect sizes in strata of the study population de!ned by the e#ect modi!er.29 Strati!ed 
data analysis is one way to explore e#ect modi!cation. For example, the association 
between obesity and stillbirth was only modestly elevated among Black women 












(relative risk 1.1), slightly stronger in White women (1.3), and prominently stronger 
among Asian women (4.6) (Penn et%al. 2014). Although the biological inferences to be 
drawn upon post hoc e#ect modi!cation analyses may be quite limited ($ompson 
1991), there is very little support for the contention that, if all data are carefully 
collected prospectively, there is any epistemological di#erence between the results 
of e#ect modi!cation analysis a"er a priori versus a posteriori strati!cation. In my 
view, it simply does not matter whether we organize exposed and unexposed in strata 
de!ned by the e#ect modi!er variable before or a"er data collection is completed.
Now consider the question whether evidence from intervention by data 
manipulation can be considered epistemologically equivalent to evidence from real-
life intervention. Note that we are not asking the question whether conclusions based 
on observational studies are similar to those based on randomized studies,30 but 
whether conclusions based on observational studies are similar to conclusions based 
on interventional ones, the contrast being the intervention (manipulation), not the 
randomization. If yes, does this qualify only as evidence of the con!rmatory kind, 
or does it also qualify as evidence of the kind that informs etiological explanations 
from observational data by alluding to micro-etiological mechanisms?
To answer the !rst question, there is no real-life equivalent to data manipulation. 
Real-life intervention means to proactively change the life course of human 
individuals and collect data on outcomes prospectively; data manipulation is just 
playing retrospectively with numbers that are already collected, albeit in a very 
meaningful way. In fact, the data are not manipulated in the sense of being changed 
but just organized in strata de!ned by, for example, potential e#ect modi!ers or 
confounders. My point is that an observed association between E and O can be 
modi!ed and perhaps further clari!ed by comparing scenarios such as E%(%O with 
confounder adjustment versus without, or E%(%O in the entire study sample versus 
in subgroups. In this way, manipulation of observational data can contribute to the 
elucidation of etiological mechanisms31 and, thereby, contribute to the mechanistic 
component of etiological explanation from observation.32
$e opportunity to compare randomized and nonrandomized studies directly is 
obviously limited to exposure variables that have in fact been evaluated in both kinds 
of study. $is will exclude risk factors that are ethically impossible to study in an RCT 
and also potentially preventive or therapeutic interventions that cannot be studied in 
cross-sectional, cohort, or case-control studies, for whatever reason.
3.2.4 Objections
Three major objections to my explanation-by-intervention suggestion are 
(1)%a%circularity objection, (2) a temporality objection, and (3) an incompatibility 
objection.
First, if the goal is to assign explanatory value to an observed e#ect measure 
derived from a successful interventional study, it seems circular to require such a 
result in order to establish the prediction that an intervention should be successful.33 
$e circularity objection holds that interventional results cannot inform causal 
explanations based on results from observational studies because observational 














studies yield a good causal explanation only if the prediction they support (that a 
randomized trial should be successful) is con!rmed by a successful intervention 
trial. Agreement to this objection can be made to the extent that interventional 
results cannot inform a causal explanation from observations that is used to justify 
that same interventional trial. However, it can be used to inform a causal explanation 
that serves as the justi!cation for any subsequent interventional study.34 $is is part 
of the process of mounting the observational and interventional evidence in support 
of the overarching causal explanation and related prediction that “exposure E causes 
outcome O and therefore intervention on E will successfully prevent or at least 
ameliorate O.”
Second, the temporality objection holds that an intervention can only con!rm, 
not explain, because information from interventional studies becomes available 
only if causal inference from observational studies appears already robust enough 
to the scienti!c community so that an interventional trial seems justi!ed. $e 
usual etiological research work&ow has observational studies most o"en preceding 
interventional studies. Results from the latter become available only years, sometimes 
decades a"er the !rst observational results are available. $erefore, interventional 
data cannot inform an etiological explanation based on observational data simply 
because they become available only a%er the causal conclusion they are supposed to 
inform has already been drawn.
$ird, the incompatibility objection to the proposal to add evidence from 
intervention to etiological explanations is that doing so is impossible because 
interventional studies (apples) are not observational studies (oranges) and, therefore, 
cannot inform causal claims based on observational data. $e objection essentially 
maintains that interventional studies are not only epistemologically superior to 
observational studies but also epistemologically di!erent. $e randomized trial is 
methodologically similar to a controlled laboratory experiment in simple systems, 
where the exposure in randomly selected individuals is allocated by the investigators 
and does not occur freely in a population without any external manipulation (as in 
observational studies). $erefore, interventional results cannot really inform causal 
explanations from observation but can only either con!rm or contradict them.
Although not all will agree that results from interventional studies can enhance 
causal explanation based on observational studies, they can (and do) enhance the entire 
overarching research program, which is to provide useful etiological explanations. 
If “the determination that an association is causal indicates the possibility for 
intervention” (Glass et%al. 2013), that indication would be even more justi!ed if based 
on etiological explanations that include evidence from interventions. Either one 
alone can provide an etiological explanation, but observational and interventional 
epidemiology together will provide a stronger one. If interventional data cannot 
contribute to the !rst dra" of a particular etiological explanation, they can certainly 
contribute to its revision and re!nement.
Observational epidemiology, wet bench science, and interventional studies can 
form a stepwise process of generating a useful etiological explanation. $e logic of 
the research program would go like this:
E explains a net di#erence in O because (i) observational epidemiologic studies suggest 
that E and O are potentially causally associated. $erefore, bench experiments are 












justi!ed. If successful, such (ii) bench experiments will reveal a mechanism that 
explains their association. $is, in turn, justi!es testing the hypothesis that intervening 
on E, or on the mechanism between E and O, will successfully prevent or at least reduce 
the occurrence of O. If that is indeed the evidence we receive from interventional 
studies, the research program supports the UEE at hand.
$is procedure may be viewed as sidestepping the apples and oranges point, the 
point that interventional studies are inherently di#erent from observational studies 
and therefore cannot inform causal explanations from observational studies, only 
con!rm them. However, part of the motivation for this move is my perception that 
we are always likely to miss something if we do not look at all the “evidential variety” 
(Claveau 2012) summarized as the “explanatory story” (Haack 2004), characterized 
by “robustness, the state in which a hypothesis is supported by evidence from multiple 
techniques with independent background assumptions” (Stegenga 2009:651).
Etiological explanation based on results from laboratory, epidemiology, and 
interventional trials is arguably more robust than evidence based on results from 
the lab and from observational epidemiology alone. $e discussion o#ered in this 
section supports my suggestion that the statement
E explains a net di#erence in O because (i) we have an observed association between 
the two, and (ii) we have a mechanism that explains how they are related.35
is considerably weaker than this one:
E explains a net di#erence in O because (i) we have an observed association between the 
two, and (ii) we have a mechanism that explains how they are related, and intervention 
on E changes the risk of O.
In sum, I think that results from interventional studies both inform and con!rm 
etiological explanations in the context of comprehensive multidisciplinary research 
programs whose goal is to come up with new health interventions that work. 
Such projects are usually long term, multidisciplinary, and require theory plus 
epidemiological observation plus lab experiment plus clinical trial plus postmarketing 
e#ectiveness studies. Such projects never zoom in on the epidemiology-centered 
silver-bullet approaches but like a mosaic of evidence (see Chapter 4), because “the 
structure of evidence is not linear, like a mathematical proof, but rami!es like a 
crossword puzzle” (Haack 2004).
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, the idea that etiological explanations might be more helpful 
than causal inference was advocated, in part because etiological explanations are 
causal-mechanical explanations. But if mechanisms play such an important role, 
what are these mechanisms? How are they related to their causes? Are all these 
mechanisms similar or even the same? How about the notion that, particularly in 
biomedicine, not all causes and mechanisms can be the same, because we o!en talk 
about social, environmental, genetic, and psychological causes and mechanisms. Is 
it possible that all of these are the same?
In Section 4.2, the mosaicist view o"ered by Phyllis Illari and Federica Russo 
(2014) is considered. #eir book provides an excellent introduction to accounts of 
causality and arrives at the conclusion that “the idea of developing One True Causal 
#eory is not promising” (p. 247). Instead, the authors propose embracing a “cheerful 
conceptual pluralism” that employs “all the developed accounts and theories in the 
literature” (p. 256; italics in original) #ey think that taking a stab at causation in the 
sciences requires a pluralist perspective, simply because the sheer variety of causal 
concepts and methods in the sciences just cannot $t under a monist umbrella. Here 
their suggestion is taken and applied to etiological explanations (Section 4.3), and 
etiological pluralism is proposed as pluralism about the real-world phenomenon of 
the illness causation process, not about a variety of concepts about it (Section 4.4). 
Examples of how etiological pluralism may be conceptualized are o"ered from the 
author’s area of interest (perinatal neuroin%ammation) (Section 4.5).
4.2 MOSAICIST ARGUMENT
In Causality: Philosophical !eory Meets Scienti"c Practice, Illari and Russo propose 
that, perhaps, looking at many di"erent characterizations of causality, arranged 
like a mosaic1 might provide more insight than looking at each one individually. 
#ey present $ve scienti$c problems they consider important motivations to bring 
together philosophical theory and scienti$c practice: Inference (Does X cause Y?), 
prediction (What will happen?), explanation (How does X cause Y?), control (How 
to control causal systems?), and reasoning about causality. #ey discuss a whole 
host of speci$c notions of causality, for example, necessary/su&cient, probabilism, 
counterfactuals, manipulation, processes, mechanisms, information, dispositions, 
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regularity, variation, action, inference, and others. With regard to epidemiology and 
medicine, they mention the problem of criteria for illness causation, the problem of 
causes versus conditions of illness, and the problem of illness in individuals versus 
populations.
Illari and Russo illustrate how closely related the philosophical and epidemiological 
ways of thinking about causality can be. #ey show that Ken Rothman’s model 
(called the Mackie-Rothman model in Section 2.4.1) of su&cient constellations of 
insu&cient component causes2 is in fact an epidemiological adaptation of Mackie’s 
INUS conditions: insu&cient nonredundant parts of unnecessary but su&cient 
causes (Mackie 1965, 1974). #e Rothman model conceives of su&cient causes of 
illness (Csi) as constellations of component causes'(cci), for example, Cs1 ! [cc1, cc2, 
cc3, cc4], Cs2 ! [cc1, cc4, cc5, cc6], Cs3 ! [cc1, cc6, cc7, cc8]. Let us assume that Cs1, Cs2, 
and Cs3 account for equally sized proportions of all causes of the disease of interest; 
each one causes one-third (33.3%) of all cases. Note that none of the three su&cient 
causes (or better, causal constellations) is necessary for the disease to occur. Also 
note that none of the component causes alone is su&cient, and only cc1 is necessary 
because none of the su&cient causal constellations is complete without cc1. All other 
component causes are insu&cient and unnecessary. #e philosophical parallel 
here is that each one of the component causes cc1–7 quali$es as a Mackiean INUS 
condition.
In another example, Illari and Russo turn to semantic di"erences between the 
philosophical and scienti$c terminology. #ey write about levels of causation and 
the not so obvious di"erence between the type/token distinction in philosophy 
and the person/population distinction in medicine and epidemiology. While the 
former distinguishes between events that recur with some regularity (e.g., the 
phenomenon of earthquakes) and a single instant (one particular earthquake), 
the latter distinguishes between population-level occurrence (e.g., the annual 
incidence of myocardial infarcts in Germany in 1995) and person-level occurrences 
(my Godfather’s myocardial infarct there that same year). Illari and Russo suggest 
bridging the levels and the terminology (p. 41) by replacing both dyads with the 
terms “generic” and “single case.”
To promote cross-disciplinary communication, Illari and Russo introduce and 
compare two approaches to causality in philosophy and the sciences. First, they 
describe how scientists use models to tackle causation. #ey suggest that it “is not 
so much whether models allow us to establish the truth of a causal claim, but rather 
whether they are of any use for a given problem” (p. 229; italics in original). Second, 
they write about the identi$cation by philosophers of so-called truthmakers, that 
is, what it is in the world that makes causal claims true. In their comparison of the 
truthmaking and modeling approaches, Illari and Russo suggest that
[w]e’ll know whether [a] proposition is in fact true or not by checking the world out 
there. […] But prior to empirical investigation, why should we suppose that the reality 
we are interested in has a rigid constraint on what the causal relation and its relata must 
be? Indeed, the reasons for pluralism about causality we examine […] suggest that we 
have evidence that it cannot be. Allying this with the arguments in the truthmakers 
literature, we suggest the release of the “One Truth” straightjacket on the truthmakers 
approach. #e resulting picture changes enormously! (p. 233)
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It seems that the collaboration between philosophers and scientists might be much 
more fruitful if we start with allowing for as many kinds of causation as there are 
accounts of causation. Illari and Russo support the idea to integrate epistemological, 
metaphysical, methodological, semantic, and usage-related questions about causation 
and to think about the ways the answers to these questions inform each other.
#ey proceed in two steps. First, they defend their version of pluralism. #ey 
o"er what they call a “cheerful conceptual pluralism,” which draws upon “all the 
developed accounts and theories in the literature” (p. 256; italics in original). #ey call 
their form of pluralism the pluralist mosaic, borrowing the term from Carl Craver 
(2007),3 who used it to suggest that “the mosaic unity of neuroscience is achieved 
both through inter$eld integration at a given level and through integration across 
levels in a hierarchy of mechanisms” (Craver 2007:228). While Craver’s mosaic 
unity (of neuroscience) captures a scenario in which di"erent $elds of neuroscience 
contribute di"erent kinds of evidence with di"erent forms of constraints toward 
“integrated piecemeal as research progresses” (Illari and Russo 2014:231), Illari and 
Russo envision an even broader mosaicism, one of integration across the sciences 
and philosophy, across types of causing, concepts of causation, types of inferences, 
sources of evidence, and across methods for causal inference. #ey are pragmatists 
in that they are task oriented: “di"erent concepts help in building causal knowledge, 
in virtue of their usefulness for speci$c tasks” (p. 257).
As a second step in supporting their argument, Illari and Russo o"er an example 
of how causal mosaicism can be used in practice. #ey describe “exposomics” as “the 
science of exposure”4 (p. 260) performed by multiple research groups from various 
$elds, rooted in molecular epidemiology using biomarkers of exposure, internal 
responses, and outcome,5 and integrating knowledge from all biomedical, basic, and 
social sciences (p. 264). #ey demonstrate how to select accounts of causality that 
might be useful when assembled as a mosaic. #eir hope that this approach will help 
us to “think better about science” (p. 271) is shared.
At this point, the main question is what contribution their pluralist mosaic 
approach to causality will make for scientists and philosophers. It is important to 
note that the mosaic approach is just that: an approach that appreciates all available 
accounts of causality in an attempt to help clarify (identify and re$ne) scienti$c 
questions and problems (p. 270). It is not a novel account of causality that can be 
compared to currently available accounts. Instead, the proposed model might help 
scientists and philosophers to do better work by helping them to think better about 
their work.
4.3 ETIOLOGICAL PLURALISM
Illari and Russo’s emphasis is on what they call a “cheerful conceptual pluralism” of 
causal modeling. #ey state that
the idea of developing One True Causal #eory is not promising. Philosophically 
minded scientists and scienti$cally oriented philosophers ought instead to engage in 
the enterprise of $lling in the huge causal mosaic of empirical studies and theoretical 
investigations … in order to see the whole picture. (p. 247)












Illari and Russo propose a pluralism of pluralisms: of types of causing, of concepts of 
causation, of types of inferences, of sources of evidence, and of measures for causal 
inference. #ey describe each pluralism and write that all published accounts and 
theories (i.e., all pluralisms) can be resources for those who want to think about the 
sciences (p. 256). #ey do not really say why exactly they think that a pluralism of 
pluralisms is the way to go but state that
no single theory of causality currently available can meet the very varied needs of 
the sciences, and address the problems of causal reasoning, inference, explanation, 
prediction and control in all the diverse cases that we meet in the sciences. (p. 250)
#e advantage of permitting all kinds of pluralisms as pieces for their causal mosaic 
is that it maximizes the explanatory potential of any Illari-Russoian causal mosaic, 
because there is a large number of possibilities of how elements of all kinds of 
pluralisms can be combined to form an explanation. Unfortunately, its disadvantage 
is that such a liberal approach also minimizes the explanatory power for the same 
reason, because the quality of any explanation needs to be evaluated in comparison 
to other explanations. #e large number of available possible comparisons will keep 
us busy comparing explanations for a long time.6
#e notion of causal pluralism in the health sciences might require more than 
support for the contention that the roles causal factors play in the story of illness 
occurrence are fundamentally di"erent. Addressed in this section is what we mean 
by causal pluralism in the context of etiological explanations. One possibility is 
to think of causes as being not one, but multiple, fundamentally di"erent things. 
Another possibility is to think of causes as multiple, fundamentally di"erent ideas.7 
Causal pluralism in etiological contexts refers to real-life phenomena, not just 
ideas. #e discussion in this chapter makes it clear that in the context of etiological 
explanations, what we mean by causal pluralism is pluralism of causation, which 
includes both a plurality of causes and a plurality of pathomechanisms (Section 4.4). 
In Section 4.5, one example of pathomechanism is outlined from the perinatal 
in#ammatory response, and some of its components are matched to di"erent kinds of 
antecedents of illness as de$ned by Susser (Susser 1973). #is provides support for the 
notion that etiological pluralism is pluralism regarding the real-world phenomenon 
of how various causes contribute to illness occurrence via various pathomechanisms, 
not a pluralism of concepts of etiological explanation.
One way of thinking about causal pluralism is to consider di"erent kinds of 
causes. Another is to consider multiple, fundamentally di"erent kinds of causation. 
Apparently, this is what some philosophers mean when they talk about causal 
pluralism: pluralism not of causes, but of causation; pluralism not of what causes are, 
but of what they do. For example, Godfrey-Smith refers to causal pluralism as “the 
view that causation is not a single kind of relation or connection between things in 
the world [but] irreducibly plural or diverse” (Godfrey-Smith 2009:326–7). #e same 
holds true for another kind of pluralism that has been added to the mix by Julian 
Reiss8: “evidential pluralism [is] the thesis that there are more than one reliable ways 
to $nd out about causal relationships”9 (Reiss 2011:908).
#e notion that causal pluralism is about what causes do, not what they are, is 
supported by the observation that causation is rarely de$ned using nouns, rather 
by using verbs that describe the process of causation. For example, one perfectly 











circular de$nition of causation goes like this: “Causality means that one of the 
variables actually causes the other” (Waldron 2018:149). Illari and Russo list as 
examples of causation verbs such as “pulling, pushing, blocking, sticking, breaking, 
li!ing, falling.” #ey also note that all these descriptors have a richer content than 
“causing,” by indicating how the causing is achieved (p. 250). #is notion goes back 
to Anscombe’s classic proposal that perhaps “the word ‘cause’ can be added to a 
language in which are already represented many causal concepts [like] scrape, push, 
wet, carry, eat, burn …” (Anscombe 1993:93; italics in original). #is would mean 
that there are di"erent kinds of processes for which we have di"erent names that we 
unify linguistically under the term cause. Anscombe takes her view to the extreme by 
imagining a language that has no notions of these di"erent kinds of causal processes; 
in such language, she holds, “no description of the use of a word […] will be able to 
present it as meaning cause” (ibid.).
As outlined earlier and discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, etiology is the transition 
from health to illness, characterized by causes that initiate a pathomechanism (causation 
process), which in turn represents the $rst stages of the disease itself, which lead to 
clinically perceivable illness (disease process). #is view, called the etiological stance,10 
yields etiological explanations, which are explanations that refer to certain causes of 
illness on one hand, and to their pathomechanisms on the other, as two separate issues. 
One requires the identi$cation of causes (e.g., maternal infection during pregnancy), 
and the other requires the identi$cation of pathomechanisms (e.g., a fetal in%ammatory 
response). If causal pluralism is, as Godfrey-Smith and Reiss suggest, a pluralism 
regarding the ”relation or connection between things” and “causal relationships,” 
respectively, causal pluralism in etiological explanations is actually pluralism of illness 
causation. While the etiological stance separates causes from pathogenesis, it reunites 
them under the umbrella causation process (see Figure 4.1, which is identical to Figure 
7.1). #is way we can establish that causal pluralism in the context of etiological 
explanations is a pluralism of causation processes. Still, we need to clarify which part of 









... the story that explains illness occurrence
Figure 4.1 The etiological stance. (Reprinted from Dammann O. 2017. Perspect Biol Med;60(2):151–65.)












4.4  IN ETIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS, 
CAUSAL PLURALISM IS PLURALISM 
OF CAUSATION
4.4.1 Pluralism of causes
Let us begin with the causal part. #e etiological stance envisions illness occurrence 
to be the culmination of a sequence of overlapping processes, the causation process 
and the disease process. #is sequence is initiated by causes (Figure 4.1).
It is not di&cult to distinguish fundamentally di"erent kinds of causes of illness. 
Indeed, fundamental di"erences between causes of illness are readily apparent and 
perhaps even trivial. In fact, it seems obvious that car accidents, excessive exposure to 
sunlight, and inborn genetic variants are very di"erent kinds of things. For example, 
the $rst two (accidents, radiation) involve events that happen outside the human 
body, which is not true for the third (genetics).
#e following is an example of how illness occurrence is explained in epidemiology 
and medicine, provided by scienti$c sta" of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, 
who explain cancer occurrence to the public:
Cancer is caused by changes (mutations) to the DNA within cells. #e DNA inside a 
cell is packaged into a large number of individual genes, each of which contains a set 
of instructions telling the cell what functions to perform, as well as how to grow and 
divide. Errors in the instructions can cause the cell to stop its normal function and may 
allow a cell to become cancerous. […] Gene mutations can occur for several reasons, 
for instance:
• Gene mutations you’re born with. You may be born with a genetic mutation that 
you inherited from your parents. #is type of mutation accounts for a small 
percentage of cancers.
• Gene mutations that occur a!er birth. Most gene mutations occur a!er you’re 
born and aren’t inherited. A number of forces can cause gene mutations, such 
as smoking, radiation, viruses, cancer-causing chemicals (carcinogens), obesity, 
hormones, chronic in%ammation and a lack of exercise.
• Gene mutations occur frequently during normal cell growth. However, cells 
contain a mechanism that recognizes when a mistake occurs and repairs the 
mistake. Occasionally, a mistake is missed. #is could cause a cell to become 
cancerous.11
Although the Mayo Clinic’s explanation starts with “cancer is caused by,” it $rst refers 
to the pathomechanism, which includes gene mutations and abnormal cell growth, 
as early, subclinical stages of illness. Only then does it refer back to prenatal (inborn, 
inherited) and postnatal causes of gene mutations. #us, we can distinguish between 
two fundamentally di"erent kinds of cause, based on inheritance – which separates 
causes that just happen to us without further action on our part from causes that 
occur a!er birth. While the former, genetic causes, are related to who we are, the 
latter are also related to where we live, what we do, and so forth. For example, the 
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics has published a guideline for 
reproductive screening in the Ashkenazi Jewish population (Monaghan'et'al. 2008) 































based on the recognition that at least 18 diseases (including cancers of the breast, 
ovary, and colon) occur more frequently in predominantly Ashkenazi Jewry than in 
other populations (Ostrer 2001). #is risk increase is present from the moment of 
conception, as opposed to risk increases, which are initiated a!er birth via causes 
such as smoking, radiation, viruses, and so forth. Although we may say that the 
pathomechanism (gene mutation) is the same for inherited and acquired genetic 
disorders, the causal initiation (fusion of egg and sperm versus later mutation, 
respectively) is clearly di"erent, as are the diseases themselves. While cystic $brosis 
is a disease of the inborn-genetic kind, many forms of cancer are of the acquired-
genetic kind, in which the responsible gene mutation occurs in response to exposure 
such as smoking, radiation, or viruses, which lead to full-blown cancer over longer 
stretches of time, that is, months, sometimes years, or even decades.12 Few will $nd 
acknowledging such pluralism of causes more problematic than acknowledging a 
pluralism of wild%owers.
4.4.2 Pluralism of causation
A much more interesting way to think about fundamental di"erences between illness 
causation processes is to think about fundamental di"erences between pathogenetic 
mechanisms. #is is the process of how causes initiate, facilitate, and predispose to 
illness. #ese kinds of processes are important for the health sciences, because if 
elimination of a cause to prevent illness occurrence cannot be achieved, interfering 
with the disease occurrence process might still be an option.13
Again, for causes to make a di"erence with regard to illness occurrence, it is not 
so much what they are, but what they do. Mervyn Susser (1921–2014) was one of the 
few epidemiologists who devoted part of his career to thinking about causality. He 
begins his 1973 book Causal !inking in the Health Sciences not with a de$nition 
of cause, but of the term determinant as “any factor, whether event, characteristic, 
or other de$nable entity, so long as it brings about change for the better or worse 
in a health condition” (Susser 1973:3). Although this de$nition does not endorse 
causal pluralism expressis verbis, it suggests that if any entity can be conceived of as 
a determinant of health, there should be di"erent ways in which these antecedents 
can do the bringing-about-change part, unless they are all doing it in the same way. 
In fact, Susser distinguishes di"erent forms of determination, including host reactions 
(causes that produce the e"ect), attributes/predispositions (causes that predispose 
to the e"ect), preconditions (a sine qua non cause), and immanence and heritability 
(causes that are programmed into a system that displays the e"ect). He recognizes 
that some might not be willing to consider examples for the latter three categories of 
causes; he lists sex, race, and age as attributes, male sex as a precondition for prostate 
cancer, and the ability to walk and talk as immanent and heritable. Still, even if 
we do not feel comfortable calling these characteristics causes, they are de$nitely 
candidates for the role of component cause in the Mackie-Rothman model discussed 
in Section 2.4.1, and perhaps even necessary component causes such as piece A in 
all three pies in Figure'2.2 or the component cause cc1 mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter. (#is would make sense at least for preconditions like male sex for 
prostate cancer.14)












4.4.3 Causes versus conditions
Susser’s four kinds of cause/determinant can be thought of as playing di"erent roles 
in the process of illness causation. For example, the host reaction kind produces the 
e"ect, while the precondition kind provides a necessary background condition. #e 
distinction between producing causes and background conditions has been, and 
probably still is, a matter of debate. Mill thought of the cause of an event as “the sum 
total of the conditions positive and negative taken together […] which being realized, 
the consequent invariably follows” (Mill 1856:217). Concerns regarding determinist 
versus probabilist notions in the “invariably follows” part aside, this concept of cause 
as the sum total of all conditions is re%ected in epidemiology in the Mackie-Rothman 
model.15
Broadbent has proposed the term problem of causal selection for “the problem of 
providing an account of the di"erence between cause and condition” (Broadbent 
2008). He holds that a simple counterfactual notion like Lewis’ (1973) cannot provide 
such an account: if C is a cause of e"ect E, then E does not occur if C does not 
occur beforehand ("C > "E; " indicating negation). Broadbent suggests that this 
counterfactual cannot distinguish between cause and (noncausal) mere condition, 
because it cannot tell us which one makes a di$erence between fact and counterfactual 
(and thus is the cause) and which one does not (the mere condition). #is reference to 
di"erence-making is based on a contrastive account of causation proposed by Peter 
Lipton (1954–2007); the quote from Lipton that Broadbent provides is: “… a cause 
marks a di"erence between the situation where the e"ect occurs and a contrasting 
situation where it does not” (Lipton 1992:136). #us, the di"erence between fact and 
counterfactual is de$ned by the presence or absence of E, not C. In the Lewisean 
scenario, conversely, the fact is the occurrence of C and the counterfactual situation 
is "C, and what “makes” the di"erence between these two situations is E, not C. 
Obviously, this is not the information we are looking for as support for any decision 
about C as a cause or condition.
In order to see whether C makes (and marks) a di"erence between fact (E) 
and counterfact ("E), we have to take a detour. Broadbent proposes the Reverse 
Counterfactual that holds that if C is a cause of E, then if E had not occurred (" E), 
then C would not have occurred ("C). He states that “the Reverse Counterfactual 
provides a good analysis of the sense in which causes make a di"erence to their 
e"ects” (Broadbent 2008:360). As an example, he sets up a hypothetical scenario 
in which he (Broadbent) strikes a match in the presence or absence of oxygen. 
Although it is true that both not striking the match (cause) and not having oxygen 
available (condition) would contribute to a situation in which the match does not 
light, he says that reverse counterfactual analysis can clarify which one is the cause 
because it makes a di"erence regarding the match lighting or not. He has us imagine 
him in his dry and warm kitchen. He strikes a match, and the match lights. #e 
factual situation here is that the match lights, and the corresponding counterfactual 
situation is one in which the match does not light. Now, Broadbent holds that in the 
closest counterfactual world, it is more likely that the match was not struck, not that 
there is no oxygen in the room. On this account, (not) striking the match made the 
di"erence, not the absence of oxygen.
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Broadbent o"ers multiple caveats that put his proposal into perspective, including 
restriction to necessary causes, overdetermination, and the problem of backtracking 
counterfactuals, among others. For more discussion, see Chapter 7, in which 
conditions feature prominently. For the time being, this approach might not be of 
much help in etiological explanations that include the concept of e"ect modi$cation, 
in which certain conditions modify causal e"ects.
In the next section of this chapter, the etiology of neurodevelopmental disorders 
among preterm newborns is discussed as an example of how Susser’s kinds of 
determinant/determination are aligned with kinds of pathomechanisms.
4.5  INFLAMMATION AND THE 
PRETERM!BRAIN
Going back to the distinction between causal and conceptual pluralism, we now 
have to ask whether pathomechanistic pluralism refers to (1) fundamentally di"erent 
kinds of real-life pathomechanistic processes that contribute to illness occurrence 
qua fundamentally di"erent functions in the disease causation process, or (2) just 
fundamentally di"erent kinds of pathomechanistic concepts.
In order to be able to endorse the notion that there are di"erent kinds of 
pathomechanisms, not just di"erent concepts of it, we need to show how di"erent 
real-life pathomechanisms work. As an example, let me brie%y outline the story 
of my own etiological research over the past 20 years. Aspects of my work will be 
aligned with Susser’s forms of determination (causal production, predisposition, 
necessitation, and immanence). Moreover, two other forms of pathogenesis are added 
that come in the form of causal interaction (preconditioning and sensitization). For 
the sake of brevity, one paragraph is devoted to each of these plus the following, 
introductory paragraph that sets the stage.
Birth before the end of the normal gestation period of about 40 weeks is associated 
with a prominently increased risk for perinatal brain damage and subsequent 
neurodevelopmental disability (Pascal et'al. 2018). #e classic etiological model has 
been that lack of oxygen (hypoxia) and of cerebral blood %ow (ischemia) damage the 
immature brain, leading to neurological disorders such as spastic cerebral palsy (du 
Plessis and Volpe 2002). My own work has focused on the observation that preterm 
birth is o!en a consequence of intrauterine infection, and on the hypothesis that 
in%ammatory responses of the fetus and newborn might contribute to both the 
preterm birth process and the neurodevelopmental disabilities among preterm 
infants (Dammann and Leviton 1997, 2004). Along this line of thinking, circulating 
in%ammatory proteins called cytokines play pivotal roles (Dammann and O’Shea 2008).
In%ammation-associated cytokines are proteins that are released by white blood 
cells in response to an infectious stimulus and which can produce tissue damage by 
leading to cell necrosis. One example is the cytokine tumor necrosis factor-alpha 
(TNF-#), which is capable of dissolving rapidly developing tumor tissue in mice 
(Old 1985). Administration of a closely related cytokine, interleukin 1-beta (IL-1$), 
to newborn mice results in brain damage and neurodevelopmental disability as seen 
in preterm human babies (Favrais et'al. 2011).












Any gene mutation that leads to an increased production of pro-in%ammatory 
cytokines should predispose a preterm infant to an increased risk of brain damage 
(Dammann, Durum, and Leviton 1999). #is means that preterm infants who carry 
such genetic variants should be at increased risk for neurodevelopmental disabilities, 
which has been con$rmed for genetic mutations that encode for increased production 
of TNF-# and IL-1$ (Kapitanovic Vidak et'al. 2012).
It is not di&cult to $nd an example for what Susser calls a precondition (like male 
sex as a precondition for prostatic disease). Perhaps the most prominent precondition 
for in%ammatory brain damage in preterm newborns is being born at a very early 
gestational age. #is notion is far from trivial. Immaturity renders the brain more 
vulnerable to developmental insults, because the brain is exposed to adversity at 
earlier developmental stages, yielding more serious structural and functional 
changes compared to infants exposed to similar insults at later developmental stages. 
Brain damage etiology, neuropathology, and clinical appearance di"er appreciably 
between preterm and term infants.
Susser’s immanence is yet another kind of causation that comes “from the inside,” 
so to speak. In this sense, developmental disabilities such as spastic cerebral palsy 
are immanent in children exposed to sustained perinatal in%ammatory insult(s). In 
essence, the child proceeds along her “programmed” developmental trajectory a!er 
the perinatal insult, and disability emerges with development. 16
One of the speci$c pathomechanisms we identi$ed in our research is the interaction 
of risk factors in the form of double hits. One particular form is preconditioning 
(not to be confused with Susser’s precondition as mentioned earlier), a situation 
where “a sub-injurious exposure renders the brain less vulnerable to a subsequent 
damaging exposure” (Hagberg et'al. 2004). Another kind of double-hit situation 
occurs when the same kind of insult occurs twice, thereby exaggerating the damage. 
We observed this sensitization e"ect when prenatal (placenta) in%ammation and 
postnatal in%ammation co-occurred (Yanni et'al. 2017). Of course, such interaction 
e"ects also occur when di"erent kinds of preconditioners and sensitizers precede 
other insults (Eklind et'al. 2005; Mallard and Hagberg 2007).
All kinds of pathomechanism reviewed in the preceding paragraphs are observable 
features of the etiological process of brain damage and subsequent neurodevelopment 
in preterm infants (or in animal models thereof). #e references given, and many 
more in the perinatal neuroscience literature, summarize observations that support 
the notion that these pathogenetic mechanisms are real-world phenomena, not just 
concepts.
In this chapter, the idea of etiological explanations was reviewed from a pluralist 
perspective. #e question of what part of the etiological process, if any, is plural was 
asked, and my answer is that we have both a pluralism of causes and a pluralism 
of causation before us. A variety of kinds of causes and kinds of causation were 
discussed, the latter in reference to an example from my own research. #e conclusion 
is that etiological pluralism is real-life pluralism of both causes and causation of 
illness occurrence.




In 2007, the author wrote with Alan Leviton that “[a]pparently, causal inference 
needs support from both observation and experiment, from both epidemiology 
and laboratory research” (Dammann and Leviton 2007). We also proposed four 
“criteria” that might support the claim that a certain risk factor might be causal: (1) 
the factor precedes damage, (2) it can produce damage in the experimental setting, 
(3) it is (statistically) associated with damage in (well-powered) observational studies, 
and (4) its absence from populations reduces the prevalence of damage compared 
to populations with the factor present. We saw the !rst as a requirement of causal 
primacy, the second as one of causal capability, the third as ascertaining that the 
problem is real, and the fourth as counterfactual, prospective manipulationist “proof 
of the pudding.”
At around the same time, in 2007, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson published 
what is now known as the Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT). "ey observed that in 
the health sciences, causal claims are o#en supported by both evidence of di$erence-
making (statistical associations) and evidence of mechanisms. Indeed, they went 
beyond this descriptive version of the RWT and stated a bit more prescriptively that 
“[t]o establish causal claims, scientists need the mutual support of mechanisms and 
dependencies” (Russo and Williamson 2007b).
In this chapter is o$ered an in-depth analysis of the RWT. First, an overview 
is provided of the papers by Russo and Williamson that proposed the RWT 
(Section%5.2). Second, criticism o$ered by others is discussed (Section 5.3). My own 
take is summarized in Section 5.3. My conclusion is that the RWT constitutes a 
descriptive account of the causation process that constitutes the !rst component of 
the etiological process, the substrate of etiological explanations.
5.2 RUSSO-WILLIAMSON THESIS
5.2.1 Mechanism and difference-making
In order to prevent illness, it is o#en su&cient to know the causes. Severing the 
connection between the causes of the causes and the causes themselves helps prevent 
the occurrence of illness. "is is the application domain of public health. Severing 
the connection between the causes and illness occurrence requires knowledge about 
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the pathogenetic mechanism. "is is the domain of medicine. "us, both public 
health and medical interventions need to be based on a detailed understanding of 
the process that leads to illness.
Between 2007 and 2011, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson published three 
papers that, taken together, established and elaborated on what is now known as 
the RWT (Russo 2009; Russo and Williamson 2007b, 2011b). In a nutshell, Russo 
and Williamson argue that “the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of 
evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies” (Russo 
and Williamson 2007b).
Although it reads like a descriptive notion, some read the RWT as a normative/
prescriptive statement,1 as in “scientists need the mutual support of mechanisms 
and dependencies” (Russo and Williamson 2007b:159; emphasis mine). Russo 
has clari!ed that this normativity applies to knowledge gathering, not to health 
(care) activities: “RWT is prescriptive about what we should establish at the level of 
knowledge, not what we should do.”2
"e RWT has been extensively criticized.3 Perhaps the heaviest blow so far comes 
from Jo$e, who argues that “causation in the actual living world has to involve both 
mechanism and di$erence making, and that they play a complementary role” (Jo$e 
2013:180). Indeed, he calls this “not a plea for pluralism, that di$erent accounts !t 
di$erent situations, but rather an integrative-monist account in which these two key 
aspects are necessarily present” (p. 180; italics in original).
First, and most important in our context, is the idea that if the RWT is indeed 
mainly about the gathering of scienti!c knowledge about illness occurrence, it is 
not about two kinds of evidence used to support causal claims but about etiological 
explanations. "e term etiology is used here as de!ned by MacMahon and Pugh 
(1970): a two-part sequence of causal events and subsequent pathogenetic mechanism. 
Traditionally, epidemiology is seen as dealing with the former, bench science with 
the latter.
Second, if the RWT is indeed about etiological explanations, di$erence-making 
and mechanism can be viewed as interrelated perspectives used to look at three 
kinds of evidence: exposure-outcome evidence that establishes the why of illness 
occurrence (causation – mainly in epidemiology), pathogenetic evidence that 
establishes the how of illness occurrence (pathogenesis – mainly in the lab), as well 
as the interventional evidence that con!rms that our etiological explanation is 
correct (intervention – randomized controlled trial [RCT] in humans; experiments 
at the bench).
"ird, Russo and Williamson might cast the net a bit too wide by referring to 
the “health sciences.” "ey may be referring to not all the health sciences, but to 
the speci!c branches of science that perform illness occurrence research, that is, 
epidemiological research in human populations and basic bench research in animals 
or simpler systems.
In this book, the proposal is defended that mechanisms and dependencies are two 
closely related, nonindependent kinds of evidence used to study the process of illness 
causation. "erefore, the RWT may be correct, but trivially so, because mechanisms 
and di$erence-making necessarily co-occur, not only in support of causal claims but 
also in support of pathogenetic and con!rmatory interventional claims. Whether 
we practice basic laboratory, epidemiological, or interventional research, we always 











rely on both evidence of mechanism and on di$erence-making, because all three 
approaches yield mechanistic and di$erence-making data.
5.2.2  Four papers promoting 
Russo-Williamson thesis
Russo and Williamson have proposed and defended their thesis in a number of 
papers. In what follows is a summary of the most signi!cant ones in establishing 
the RWT.
5.2.2.1 Interpreting causality in health sciences
In their !rst paper, Russo and Williamson begin by stating that the health sciences 
target two kinds of causes, that is, causes of disease and of e$ective treatment 
(Russo and Williamson 2007b:157). "ey state that health scientists have two goals, 
explanation and inference (ibid.), and argue, in explicit opposition to Lipton and 
Ødegaard (2005) that in order to intervene, it is insu&cient to have evidence that 
exposure E is statistically associated with outcome O. Instead, they hold that one 
needs causal information as well. "e authors provide examples from the health 
literature, stating that “[t]o establish causal claims, scientists need the mutual support 
of mechanisms and dependencies” (p. 159).
Russo and Williamson explain that by “probabilistic and mechanistic evidence” 
they refer to statistical correlations and biological changes at the microscopic level. 
"ey argue against both monist and pluralist accounts of causation in the health 
sciences, and conclude that neither account will do. Instead, they suggest that 
Williamson’s proposed epistemic account of causation is a good third candidate.4 
With this account, Williamson proposes the view that
the causal relation is mental rather than physical: a causal structure is part of an agent’s 
representation of the world, just as a belief function is, and causal claims do not directly 
supervene on mind-independent features of the world. (Williamson 2005:130)
"e main reason why Russo and Williamson think that epistemic causation provides 
a good backdrop for causation in the health sciences is because
[I]n the health sciences it is clear that there are a variety of kinds of evidence. For 
example, in cancer science one might have a dataset containing clinical observations 
relating to past patients, another containing observations at the molecular level, some 
knowledge of the underlying biological mechanisms, some knowledge about the 
semantic relationships between variables provided by medical ontologies, and so on. 
All these types of evidence will shape causal beliefs about cancer: the datasets provide 
statistical evidence concerning di$erence-making; mechanisms provide evidence 
of stability; semantic relationships may provide evidence against causal connection 
(two dependent variables that are ontologically but not mechanistically related do 
not require a causal connection to account for their dependence). "e epistemic 
theory of causality can account for this multi-faceted epistemology, since it deems the 
relationship between the various types of evidence and the ensuing causal claims to be 
constitutive of causality itself. Causality just is the result of this epistemology. On the 
other hand, a monistic account of causality in terms of just one of its indicators will 
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struggle to explain why the other indicators are so important. A pluralistic account will 
struggle to explain the apparent unity to our concept of cause and how any particular 
causal claim can have multi-faceted evidence. (Russo and Williamson 2007b:168; 
emphasis in original)
5.2.2.2 Generic versus single-case causality: The case of autopsy
In their second paper, Russo and Williamson turn to the distinction between 
generic/single-case causality, a kind of type/token distinction, as in “smoking 
causes lung cancer” versus “Harry’s smoking caused his lung cancer” (Russo and 
Williamson 2011b). "eir main question is how the generic and single-case levels 
are metaphysically related, and they o$er three potential scenarios: either level 
is reducible to the other or “each level is to be analyzed individually” (p. 54). As 
an example from medicine, Russo and Williamson discuss in detail how causal 
inference is being handled in autopsy and argue that in forensic autopsy, “single-
case non-causal evidence is used in conjunction with generic causal knowledge to 
establish a single-case causal claim” (p. 57) while in academic autopsy,
single-case non-causal evidence is used in conjunction with generic 
knowledge%of%mechanisms, theoretical background knowledge and generic causal 
knowledge to establish single-case causal claims. But these single-case causal 
relations are then generalised by induction to a new generic causal claim. Academic 
autopsies thus contribute, unlike the other kinds of autopsy, to generic medical 
knowledge. (p. 58)
Based on this distinction, Russo and Williamson conclude that
most metaphysical theories of causality—including pluralistic combinations of these 
theories—analyse any particular causal relation either in terms of di$erence-making 
relations or in terms of mechanistic relations, but not both. In the health sciences in 
general and in the case of autopsy in particular, evidence both of mechanisms and of 
di$erence-making is normally required to establish a causal claim. (pp. 61–2; emphasis 
mine)
Here, the authors modify their thesis by inserting the quali!er “normally”; they 
move away from their earlier, more rigid, and prescriptive version toward a more 
constrained realm of “normalcy.” "ey also so#en the initial version by stating 
that they had previously “put forward in Russo and Williamson (2007a, 2007b) 
that typically evidence both of mechanisms and of di$erence-making is required 
to establish a causal claim” (p. 63; emphasis mine). In sum, it seems as if Russo and 
Williamson, in their second paper, felt the need to open a backdoor, allowing for 
cases where having evidence both of mechanisms and of di$erence-making is not 
necessary to establish causal claims. Using this exit route, they make it clear that they 
do not think that a “simple-minded conjunctive analysis” would do the job, simply 
because some known causal relations make a di$erence but have no mechanism, 
while others have a mechanism but make no di$erence (Williamson 2009).
As they did in their !rst paper, Russo and Williamson end their second with the 
proposal to tackle the “autopsy” problem with the epistemic account of causality. 
Here we go again:
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"e epistemic theory proceeds as follows. A causal epistemology can be thought of as 
a mapping from sets of possible evidence to sets of causal relationships: given one’s 
evidence, a causal epistemology yields one or more sets of causal relationships that 
are compatible with that evidence. Now imagine that one had total evidence—one 
knew everything there was to know about the fundamental furniture of the world: the 
fundamental objects and the pattern of instantiation of the fundamental properties 
and the fundamental relations. Presumably, then, the correct causal epistemology—
call it mapping !—would yield the correct set of causal relationships. ("is ought to be 
the case whatever one’s metaphysical views about causality.) "e epistemic theory takes 
this to be all there is to causality: according to this view, the causal relation is not one of 
the fundamental relations to be taken as basic in an ontology, nor does it supervene on 
the fundamental stu$ by being de!nable in terms of di$erence-making or mechanisms; 
rather the correct set of causal relationships is just the set of relationships that would 
result from applying mapping ! to total evidence. "e epistemic theory, then, analyses 
the causal relation in terms of causal epistemology. (p. 64)
Russo and Williamson hold that this view yields a metaphysical theory that is tightly 
linked with the epistemological theory, because “if causal relationships are what the 
epistemic theory says they are, there is no mystery as to how one can come to know 
about them” (p. 65). "e epistemic theory treats both single-case and generic causal 
claims, and mechanistic and di$erence-making evidence on a par, thereby allowing 
for evidential pluralism while maintaining a metaphysical monist stance.
5.2.2.3 Epistemic causality and evidence-based medicine
In a companion paper published the same year, Russo and Williamson ask 
“what% causal claims mean in the context of disease” (Russo and Williamson 
2011a:563). "e authors begin by stating that causal claims have become a rarity 
in biomedicine and that talk about correlations prevails. Again, they suggest that 
evidence of correlation is insu&cient for intervention; instead, we need evidence of 
causation:
Research papers in the biomedical sciences that draw conclusions about correlations 
are only of interest for diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of diseases to the extent that 
those correlations are understood as supporting corresponding causal claims. (p. 563)
Nevertheless, they think that causal considerations have made it back into the 
biomedical sciences through the work of Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and 
colleagues (1993) and Judea Pearl (2000) who, according to Russo and Williamson, 
have clari!ed the relationship between correlation and causation,5 leading to a 
renaissance of causality in the biomedical sciences that deserves philosophical 
attention for at least two reasons. First, the distinction between generic and single-
case causation needs to be explicated (which they do in the companion paper 
reviewed earlier). Second, it needs to be de!ned what we mean by claims like “A 
is a cause of B.” "ey direct their attention to the second issue and state that what 
we mean is either that A makes a di$erence to B or that there is a mechanism 
connecting A and B. "ey then argue against this dual meaning claim, suggest 
an alternative interpretation from their epistemic perspective, and defend it. "ey 
end with a checklist of how all this would play out in what is called evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) (Group), a method developed in the 1990s to formally summarize 





















results from multiple randomized intervention trials (Sackett and Rosenberg 1995). 
"is concept, also known as meta-analysis, is widely used in biomedicine in order 
to generate a stronger evidence base for medical interventions than that provided 
by single randomized trials.
"e authors’ main point in applying the epistemic theory of causation to EBM has 
two parts. First, Russo and Williamson argue that the epistemic theory is the best, in 
fact the only !t for “causal assessment in medicine,” referring to the Hill guidelines 
(Russo and Williamson 2011a:570). "ey “argue that an epistemic interpretation of 
causality is required to underpin Hill’s causal assessment” (p. 571). Second, they 
move on to the “evidence hierarchy” in EBM, where the highest level of evidential 
authority is given to meta-analyses of RCTs, while expert opinion is at the lowest 
level. "ey criticize this hierarchy as (1) not being a hierarchy of evidence but of 
techniques of evidence-generation and (2) ignoring mechanistic evidence by looking 
for di$erence-making evidence only (at least at higher levels). "eir declared main 
point here is that
[S]ince the evidence hierarchy only really includes evidence of di$erence making 
(except perhaps at the bottom level, level IV), it loses the generality of Bradford Hill’s 
guidelines for causal assessment, which treat mechanistic and di$erence-making 
evidence on an equal footing. (p. 573)
Again, Russo and Williamson’s goal in this paper appears to be twofold: o$er 
arguments in favor of the RWT and advertise the epistemic theory of causation.
5.2.2.4 EnviroGenomarkers
In yet another publication, Russo and Williamson discuss an example from 
recent research in biomedicine (Russo and Williamson 2012). "ey discuss the 
EnviroGenomarkers project, a scienti!c multipartner collaboration designed to 
elucidate the association between environmental exposures and disease. "ey 
describe the project as identifying biomarkers (genetic or protein markers in tissue 
or blood) of exposure and disease and generating chains of di!erence-making, and 
they argue that di$erence-making is not the only evidence that can be derived from 
the observational studies that the project is analyzing, because they agree with 
molecular epidemiologists who think that biomarkers can help establish causal 
pathways (Vineis and Perera 2007).
Before they explain their view of causation in the context of the EnviroGenomarkers 
project, Russo and Williamson ask whether evidence of mechanisms is enough to 
establish causal claims, and they argue that it is not. "ey distinguish between 
process-tracing (Salmon-Dowe) versus complex-systems mechanisms and suggest 
that “in order to capture the mechanisms of EnviroGenomarkers, one needs to 
appeal to both Salmon-Dowe processes and complex-system mechanisms” (p. 256).
Finally, we get a glimpse of what Russo and Williamson conceive as “disease 
causation”:
Yet, while the process leading from exposure to the body may resemble a Salmon-Dowe 
process, that is not the end of the story. Disease causation is much more complex than 
the one-o$ process leading from Billy throwing the stone at the bottle to its shattering. 
It usually takes many instances of exposure to cause disease—up to the moment in 







which a threshold of “clinical vulnerability” is reached—and what goes on within the 
human body—involving the complex systems mechanisms for cell metabolism, cell 
repair, cell death and so on—very much determines whether and when disease will 
occur.
On the other hand, neither are these complex-systems mechanisms the end of the story. 
When the complex systems mechanisms for maintaining the integrity of the%body%fail, 
various processes are set in action that can lead ultimately to disease. "ese processes 
may be better understood as Salmon-Dowe processes than as mechanisms%for%disease, 
due to their unstable and irregular nature. "us while one might perhaps say that a 
particular kind of cancer has a mechanism for tumour growth, it may be more natural 
to conceptualise a haemorrhage as a Salmon-Dowe process. (p. 257)
"is quote suggests that Russo and Williamson use the term disease causation 
for the entire process from initial exposure to clinical disease occurrence. Most 
epidemiologists, however, acknowledge that they cannot speak to the issue of 
pathogenesis and tend to restrict the term causation to the causal role of observable 
risk factors that act as the initiators of the pathogenetic process.
5.3 ITS CRITICS
"e RWT has been criticized from the biomedical (Gillies 2011), philosophical 
(Broadbent 2011; Illari 2011; Weber 2009), social science (Claveau 2012), and 
epidemiological perspective (Fiorentino and Dammann 2015). In this section, each 
criticism is brie'y described without much comment and categories of objections are 
identi!ed. In Section 5.4, a few thoughts that go beyond those categories are o$ered.
5.3.1 Weber
Erik Weber agrees with the RWT in that he subscribes to an evidential pluralist 
perspective (using evidence of di$erence-making and of mechanism) and to an 
output monist view that assumes that health scientists use only one single notion of 
cause. His main argument is the one indicated in his article’s title that probabilistic 
theories of causation can account for the use of mechanistic evidence. My main 
problem with this hypothesis is that its formulation makes it hard to grasp what 
the author means. “To account for” usually means “to explain.”6 "us translated, 
one way to read Weber’s hypothesis is that working in a probabilistic framework can 
explain why mechanistic evidence is used. Another meaning – “to account for” as 
meaning “to be a particular amount or part of something” – does not make sense 
in this context.
Weber reviews one particular probabilistic theory7 and suggests that this theory 
is superior to other probabilistic theories (those of Suppes, Eels, and Humphreys) 
because it “de!nes causation in terms of what would happen in hypothetical 
populations, [while] those of Suppes, Eells, and Humphreys [,] de!ne causation in 
terms of probabilistic relations in the real world.” "is statement suggests that Weber 
prefers the potential outcomes approach to causation8 over others, which he con!rms 
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in a footnote, where he writes that others have used “a ‘potential outcome model’ 
of causation” (Weber 2009:293). His argument boils down to the notion that using 
mechanistic evidence is rational because
it happens that we want to make causal claims about populations while no probabilistic 
evidence is available. […] in such cases, mechanistic evidence can help: a bottom-up 
argument […] can lead to conclusions about the hypothetical populations X and K. It 
cannot give us a precise estimate of PX(E) and PK(E). However, […] this is not a problem: 
all we need is an argument that PX(E) is di$erent from PK(E) […] for a historian or 
social scientist that wants to make a Gierean causal claim about a population, it is 
perfectly rational to gather mechanistic evidence, since that evidence can help him to 
establish the claim. (p. 286)
Weber concludes that “[t]his undermines the thesis of Russo and Williamson 
that probabilistic theories of causality cannot account for the use of mechanistic 
evidence” (p. 293).
5.3.2 Gillies: Reformulation
Donald Gillies suggests a reformulation of the RWT because he thinks that two 
distinctions need to be appreciated (Gillies 2011). First, he suggests that in the health 
sciences, the evidence of di$erence-making and of mechanism are represented by 
evidence from observational epidemiology and experimental laboratory research, 
respectively. Second, he suggests that the RWT comes in a strong and a weak form, 
depending on whether a mechanism is con!rmed or plausible, respectively. He 
prefers this weak version:
In order to establish that A causes B, observational statistical evidence does not 
su&ce.% Such evidence needs to be supplemented by interventional evidence, 
which%can%take the form of showing that there is a plausible mechanism linking A to 
B. (p. 115)
5.3.3 Illari: Disambiguation
"is, of course, opens an entirely new can of worms: is the RWT about causal 
evidence or about evidence of causation, and about mechanistic evidence or evidence 
of mechanism? Phyllis Illari has argued that the RWT “is multiply ambiguous, so that 
it has a range of possible interpretations” (Illari 2011:140). Her !rst major point is that 
Russo and Williamson do not write about ways of mechanistic evidence generation, 
but about evidence of mechanisms and di$erence making. She argues that both, the 
evidence gathering techniques on the one hand and types of evidence on the other, 
are independent. She thinks that “there is no particular reason to assume, in advance 
of investigation, that any particular evidence-gathering method can only be used to 
gather evidence of one particular type of thing” (p. 141).
"is author completely agrees with Illari that, for example, results from laboratory 
experiments need !rst to be di$erence-making to be counted as mechanistic evidence 







and that observations of di$erence-making (associations between risk factors and 
health outcomes) can indeed provide mechanistic evidence even outside the realm 
of RCTs, for example, via data manipulation.
5.3.4  Broadbent: Usefulness without 
mechanism
Alex Broadbent argues that the RWT is mistaken in its normative form, which 
states that in order to establish a causal claim, the identi!cation of an underlying 
mechanism is necessary, but not su&cient, because statistical evidence is needed 
as well (Broadbent 2011:57). Instead, Broadbent argues that knowledge about the 
underlying mechanism is not necessary for a health intervention to be practically 
useful (p. 68).
Broadbent holds that epidemiologists do not need evidence of mechanisms but can 
initiate successful interventions based only on evidence of di$erence-making.9 For 
example, he writes that the RWT would justify the stance that, if the germ theory 
was not yet accepted, it would be rational not to accept Semmelweis’ life-saving 
intervention (require medical students and physicians to wash their hands a#er they 
have !nished working in the morgue and before they attend to their patients in the 
maternity ward), “no matter how much evidence we had gathered in the meantime 
about the e&cacy if disinfecting hands.” (pp. 58–9). He concludes that “refusing to 
make a causal inference until a mechanism is known can be seriously detrimental 
to public health” (p. 60).
Broadbent goes further and rejects the RWT even in its descriptive form, because 
there are de!nitely instances in which it just is not the case that causal claims in 
the health sciences are based on both evidence of di$erence-making and evidence 
of mechanisms. Indeed, the Semmelweis case as presented is such an instance in 
which no mechanistic evidence was available to support the causal claim other than 
his assumption that “the cause of the greater mortality rate was cadaverous particles 
adhering to the hands of examining obstetricians. I removed this cause by chlorine 
washings. Consequently, mortality in the !rst clinic fell below that of the second” 
(Semmelweis 1983).
Russo and Williamson respond directly to this concern in their third paper 
on the RWT, where they state that their argument was that “in the health 
sciences, it is a matter of fact that mechanistic and di$erence-making evidence 
are treated in an egalitarian way when establishing causal claims” (Russo and 
Williamson 2011a:576). "ey call this their “descriptive claim,” which may be 
immune to Broadbent’s objection not because Broadbent is wrong, but because 
Russo and Williamson have shi#ed the goalposts sideways ever so gently. "ey 
also “advocate the strong normative thesis that […] one ought to treat mechanistic 
and di$erence-making evidence in an egalitarian way” (p. 576). Again, this is a 
lateral move that helps them evade Broadbent’s criticism without responding to 
it. Egalitarian necessity to justify causal claims was what they requested in their 
earlier papers, not egalitarian treatment. "us, I think that Broadbent’s point still 
stands unrefuted.
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5.3.5 Claveau: Two theses
François Claveau sees the RWT as two theses, not one (Claveau 2012). In his view,
the !rst Russo-Williamson "esis is that a causal claim can only be established when 
it is jointly supported by di$erence-making and mechanistic evidence. … "e second 
[…] is that standard accounts of causality fail to handle the dualist epistemology 
highlighted in the !rst "esis. (p. 806)
However, instead of elevating Claveau’s second RWT to the status of “"esis,” in 
this book it is considered a mere characteristic of the !rst. "us, RWT is used in the 
singular.
Claveau objects to the !rst by describing a counterexample that has established 
causation based on mechanistic evidence only, and to the second by arguing that 
the counterfactual-manipulationist account of causation “can make perfect sense 
of the typical strategy in [his] case study to draw on both di$erence-making 
and mechanistic evidence.” In the biomedical health sciences, both correlative, 
di$erence-making and mechanistic evidence are part of both epidemiological studies 
and experimental bench research. "is may all be “just an instance of the common 
strategy of increasing evidential variety” (p. 812). However, the four types of evidence 
de!ned by cross-tabulating these two dyads do not just increase evidential variety 
in the qualitative sense by gathering support for a causal hypothesis from various 
di$erent angles, but also in the sense of strengthening our justi!cation of that causal 
claim, which moves from weaker to stronger on a !ctitious evidential scale with each 
additional piece of evidence we accumulate.
5.4 MY TAKE
Russo and Williamson fail to give solid arguments for their descriptive and normative 
claims (Section 5.4.1); they leave unclear what they mean by “the health sciences,” 
and “disease causation” di$ers from scienti!c de!nitions (Section 5.4.2); and they 
are imprecise in what kind of evidence of mechanism the RWT requires (Section 
5.4.3). My view is that di$erence-making is causal by de!nition (Section 5.4.4) and 
explains how mechanisms can be di$erent in three ways, distinguishing between 
entity-based, association-based, and activity-based mechanistic evidence (Section 
5.4.5). If the RWT is true, it might be truism (Section 5.4.6).
5.4.1 Where is the argument?
"e RWT is a simple description of what “health scientists” have always done: 
they mount evidence in support of a causal hypothesis by drawing on all kinds 
of evidence. Russo and Williamson acknowledge that Hill’s nine “viewpoints” 
do exactly that, that is, strengthen causal claims. In support, they quote Kundi: 
“the Bradford Hill criteria were established such that, in the case they are met for 
a speci!c factor, this would increase our con!dence in this factor being causally 
related to the disease” (Kundi 2006:970). "ey do not make an argument. All they 






do is use their observation of dual usage as support for the “need-both argument,” 
which it cannot provide. Just because both are used does not implicate that both 
have to be used. "us, although the authors cogently demonstrate that the evidential 
dyad they champion is used in causal inference in epidemiology and medicine, 
merely showing that evidence of both di$erence-making and mechanism is used to 
support causal claims does not at all support the notion that they are necessary to 
support causal claims. One response to this objection would be that the “observation 
of dual usage” was not intended to support the need-both argument; it was just 
stated as a fact that usage of both can be observed when looking at professional 
practice, preempting possible objections that would arise if we could not make such 
observation. "is response, however, would not contradict my claim; it would just 
inform us that Russo and Williamson brought it up as some kind of background 
information for their need-both argument.
A more intriguing response, and actually the one that Russo and Williamson 
seem to advance, would be the claim that “observation of dual usage” does indeed 
support the need-both argument, because the “observation of dual usage” somehow 
depends on the truth of the need-both argument. In other words, the response would 
mount a counterfactual argument along the lines of “If the need-both argument 
were false, dual usage could not be observed.” "is response, however, fails because 
it is eminently obvious that dual usage can be observed regardless of whether we 
always need just one or both kinds of evidence. For example, nowhere do the “Hill 
guidelines” require that all nine need to be checked o$ to support a causal claim. 
Rather, as eminent pediatrician and epidemiologist Leon Gordis states, “it is not 
so much a count of the number of guidelines present that it is relevant to causal 
inference but rather an assessment of the total pattern of evidence observed that may 
be consistent with one or more of the guidelines” (Gordis 2014:253; italics in original). 
"us, the fact that both kinds of evidence are re'ected in the Hill guidelines does not 
su&ce to support the need-both argument because it could certainly be the case that 
a causal claim !nds support by only “one or more of the guidelines,” which may or 
may not include guidelines representing both kinds of evidence.
5.4.2  What are “the health sciences” and 
“disease causation”?
Broadbent’s critique of the RWT (as outlined earlier) invalidates the RWT by showing 
that it is too broad. Broadbent talks about epidemiology and public health; Russo and 
Williamson talk about the health sciences. Unfortunately, Russo and Williamson 
do not really tell us what they mean by “the health sciences.” "e term is only 
vaguely de!ned in Russo and Williamson’s papers; it is unclear if pharmacology and 
medicine, as well as epidemiology and public health would count as health sciences. 
"us, the thought is (in accordance with Broadbent) that the RWT might have some 
value in some but not all of the health sciences, and certainly not in epidemiology 
and public health.
While Broadbent’s example of intervention being justi!ed without knowledge 
of mechanisms is certainly true in epidemiology and public health, it is not true 
in pharmacology and medicine. Here, knowledge of mechanisms is of crucial 





















importance because pharmacological interventions are designed to interfere with 
pathomechanisms.
But here, the two kinds of evidence support two di$erent kinds of causal claims: 
the mechanistic evidence from pharmacological research supports the claim that 
pathomechanism P1 does indeed cause a certain disease, while the di$erence-making 
evidence from RCT supports the claim that the drug works. However, it could also 
be the case that the drug does not interfere with P1 but instead with a completely 
separate pathomechanism P2 that also leads to the disease of interest.
5.4.3 Evidence of what kind of mechanism?
Russo and Williamson do not specify in much detail what kinds of mechanisms 
they refer to. It seems as if they mean biological, a.k.a., pathogenetic mechanisms, 
sometimes called causal pathways. Vineis and Perera (2007) claim that biomarkers 
can help establish causal pathways. In such research, biological molecular markers 
of pathogenetic processes are measured in epidemiological studies and analyzed 
in the same way risk factors are analyzed, that is, by relying on biostatistical 
evidence of di$erence-making. Still, molecular biomarker epidemiologists claim 
that knowledge of biomarkers can provide insight into the mechanism of action: 
“molecular epidemiology approaches facilitate testing the association between 
mechanistic events in a de!ned continuum” (Schulte and Perera 1993:7). From this 
perspective, molecular epidemiology helps elucidate pathomechanisms by !nding 
associations between components, which is evidence of di$erence-making. "us, at 
least in the context of biomarker epidemiology, evidence of di$erence-making is used 
to establish evidence of mechanism.
5.4.4 Difference-making?
Initially, Russo and Williamson used the term “probabilistic dependence” to denote 
their view that “a cause needs to make a di$erence to its e$ects, that is, there needs to 
be some appropriate probabilistic dependence” (Russo and Williamson 2007b:159). 
Later, they replace “probabilistic dependence” with “di$erence-making,” because 
“causes are di$erence-makers” (Russo 2009), which is in keeping with the view of 
both philosophers of science (Bunge 1979) and epidemiologists (MacMahon and 
Pugh 1970; Susser 1991). In probabilistic theories of causality, such di$erence 
generated by a cause is an increased probability of its e$ect to occur (Eells 1991). 
Russo takes this de!nition and runs with it: “We will know about causes of disease 
by investigating whether some speci!c variations in exposure lead to variations in 
disease,” and states that “the de!nitions of cause are underpinned by a variational 
epistemology” (Russo 2009:544).
First, di!erence-making is not a good term for evidence based on quantitative 
relationships such as associations and correlations that may or may not be causal. 
Di$erence-making suggests that the di$erence is indeed made, which in turn bears 
causal meaning, thus making the claim circular and a noninformative “explanation.” 
"e same goes for “dependencies”; dependence suggests a causal link. But if all 
di$erence-making is causal, why is di$erence-making evidence alone insu&cient 
to support a causal claim?






Second, di$erence-making is not separate from evidence of mechanism. 
Di$erence-making evidence is used to establish exposure-outcome evidence (e.g., 
in epidemiological studies) and to elucidate mechanisms (e.g., in biological bench 
experiments).
5.4.5 Three kinds of evidence
In our discussion of the RWT’s di$erence-making and mechanism in the context 
of evidence-based medicine, the suggestion is to replace, at least in the health 
sciences, “evidence of di$erence-making” or “evidence of dependencies” by the less 
causally fraught term “exposure-outcome evidence,” honoring the epidemiological 
terminology for the purported cause-e$ect relationship (Fiorentino and Dammann 
2015). More importantly, however, we suggest a more detailed appreciation of what 
constitutes evidence of mechanism.
In particular, we advocate a view that distinguishes between entity-based, 
association-based, and activity-based mechanistic evidence, each one having 
a di$erent explanatory power, according to complexity and context. Entity-
based evidence is evidence of the presence and/or location of de!ned entities in 
a mechanism. For example, consider the following discovery of the presence of a 
certain signaling molecule:
Fetal lung surfactant synthesis requires communication between mesenchyme and 
adjacent type II epithelial cells. "e speci!c nature of the communication is poorly 
understood. Conditioned media from fetal lung !broblasts stimulate fetal type% II 
epithelial cells to synthesize surfactant. "is activity is ascribed to the presence of 
an unidenti!ed polypeptide, termed !broblast–pneumocyte factor (FPF). Here 
we demonstrate that NRG-1, a stromal-derived growth factor active in cell–cell 
communication in mammary development, is secreted by fetal lung !broblasts. 
Puri!ed NRG-1" mimics the stimulatory e$ect of lung !broblast-conditioned medium 
(FCM) on surfactant synbook. Moreover, a neutralizing antibody to NRG-1 inhibits 
this stimulatory activity in the FCM. "is indicates that NRG-1" plays a major role in 
type II cell maturation. (Dammann, Nielsen, and Carraway 2003)
Association-based mechanistic evidence is, just like exposure outcome evidence, 
evidence of a statistical association between two phenomena. "e only di$erence 
is that epidemiological exposure-outcome evidence describes such associations 
in human populations, while association-based mechanistic evidence describes 
associations of parts of mechanisms with one another. Activity-based evidence is 
direct evidence of activities (processes) in which parts of mechanisms are involved.
5.4.6 Is RWT a truism?
"e RWT in its descriptive form (“causal claims in the health sciences receive 
support by both evidence of di$erence-making and evidence of mechanism”) is 
an astute observation, but it lacks novelty. Russo and Williamson dissect the most 
frequently cited list of purported causal characteristics of epidemiological studies, 
Hill’s guidelines, and separate them into characteristics of di$erence-making and 





















mechanism (Russo and Williamson 2007b). "us, if the RWT is true, it is not new. 
Both kinds of evidence, mechanism and di$erence-making, are already on Hill’s list, 
and both are o#en observed together.
Let us assume causation is really out there; a relation between two occurrences, 
of cause and e$ect, and that, at least in the health sciences (however de!ned), there 
is indeed a physical or biochemical process in between the two. In other words, let 
us assume that all causation in the health sciences needs a mechanism. In this case, 
evidence of mechanism, however generated or produced, would support a causal 
claim. Now the question is: do we need, as the RWT suggests, additional evidence of 
di$erence-making? "ere really is no choice, because evidence of mechanism is also 
evidence of di!erence-making.
It can be argued that the RWT may get it right, but only trivially so, because all 
evidence of causation in biomedicine is both di$erence-making and mechanistic. 
Any health-related causal phenomenon can be observed only by observing a 
di$erence, between exposed/intervention group and a control group, in all of 
analytical epidemiology and experimental bench science. Such di$erences can 
only be produced by mechanisms, biopsychosocial mechanisms at the population 
and individual levels. Observation of a di$erence (at the population level) suggests 
the presence of a mechanism at the level of the individual. "e mechanism is what 
makes the di$erence, and the workings of the mechanism can only be elucidated by 
observing di$erences within the mechanism.
My somewhat provocative argument would go as follows. All causation is 
mechanistic. All evidence in support of causal claims, therefore, somehow refers to 
mechanisms. "us, all causal evidence is evidence of mechanism, and some evidence 
of di$erence-making is always part of evidence of mechanism. When we talk about 
causation we o#en mean to indicate that there is a mechanism that connects cause 
and e$ect. First, we have the di$erences made in the mechanism, among its parts, 
for example, the changes in relative position of the wheels and pinions in a clock 
movement). Second, we have the di$erence made by the mechanism, that is, the 
di$erence the mechanism makes between potential e$ects. However, this evidence 
is generated in di$erent ways, using di$erent perspectives or lenses, including the 
observation of di$erence-making under various conditions.
In this view, evidence of mechanism and evidence of di!erence-making always 
coexist in causal explanations. No causation without mechanism, no mechanism 
without di$erence-making. "e observable di$erence-making inside the mechanism 
is evidence of a mechanism, while the observable di$erence between cause and e$ect 
is the result of (made by) that mechanism at work. While the former kind of evidence 
refers to causal relationships within the mechanism at a lower level, the latter refers to 
causal relationships that result from the mechanism at a higher level. "us, evidence 
of mechanism boils down to observation of di$erence-making inside the mechanism, 
the di$erence being the changes in position and movement of the parts of the 
clockwork, while the “making” in this kind of di$erence-making is the constant 
provision of a driving force, the spring of the clock, another mechanism, even further 
down, which can only be established by observing further di$erences further down. 
It is impossible to observe the occurrence of the e$ect without observing a change 
in circumstances, that is, a di$erence. It is also impossible to gather evidence of 
mechanism without observing a di$erence. In essence, mechanisms make di$erences 






at a higher level; thus, higher-level di$erence-making is evidence for the presence of 
a mechanism. Lower-level di$erence-making is evidence for the mechanistics of the 
mechanism. One upshot of this proposal is that causation just is mechanisms at work, 
but this claim needs to be further explored.
In the health sciences, at least in those parts of the health sciences that concern 
themselves with illness causation, higher-level di$erence-making is observed at the 
level of the individual, in cases and case series by clinicians, and in larger study 
populations by epidemiologists. Lower-level di$erence-making is observed by bench 
scientists, who typically cannot wait until a mechanism pops up to be observed; 
thus, bench scientists generate models of disease that can be tested in the lab. 
Clinicians, epidemiologists, and bench scientists basically sandwich the mechanism 
by gathering di$erence-making evidence. In etiological explanations, the name for 
that mechanism is “pathomechanism.”10
5.4.7 Support, not explanation?
Argument has been presented that while both kinds of evidence may support 
causal claims, they do not both explain a causal relationship. Instead, evidence of 
mechanistic function (lower-level di$erence-making) explains the causal claim, 
which in turn explains why we can observe exposure-outcome evidence (higher-
level di$erence-making). We wrote that
exposure-outcome evidence (previously known as di$erence-making evidence) 
provides associations that can be explained through a hypothesis of causation, while 
mechanistic evidence provides !ner-grained associations and knowledge of entities 
that ultimately explains a causal hypothesis. (Fiorentino and Dammann 2015)
In essence, we accepted Broadbent’s suggestion to shi# from a focus on causation and 
causal inference to explanation and prediction (Broadbent 2013:8). We suggest that 
association-based mechanistic evidence [exposure – x # y – outcome] is explained 
by a mechanistic causal claim [exposure%>%x > y">%outcome], which in turn explains 
the overall causal claim [exposure%>%outcome].
In other words, could it be that the mechanism just is the causal process, and what 
the mechanism does just is what we mean by “causation”? If that is the case, we can 
amend our proposal quoted earlier to read
Observations of the di$erence made by the occurrence of the results of mechanisms at 
work (e-o-evidence) can be explained through a hypothesis of causation (the hypothesis 
that there is a mechanism), while observations of the di$erence made by parts of the 
mechanism at work provide !ner-grained associations and knowledge of entities that 
ultimately explains a causal hypothesis.
"e current practice in the health sciences, broadly construed, goes beyond the 
RWT type of evidence. Di$erence-making and mechanistic types of evidence are 
formal types, classi!ed by their respective roles as criteria for causal inference. In 
biomedicine, we need to consider subject matter types of evidence, of etiology (risk 
factors that might be causes) and pathogenesis (the biological disease mechanism). 





















Russo and Williamson appear to confuse these levels when they talk about 
probabilistic evidence as “observed dependencies in a range of similar studies” 
(Russo and Williamson 2007b:162) and about mechanistic evidence as “chemical 
reactions, electric signals, alterations at the cellular level, etc” (ibid.), respectively.
Russo and Williamson talk about two types of evidence and state that association 
(di$erence-making) and mechanism support single causal claims. Etiological 
explanations are di$erent in that they consist of causes and pathomechanisms; they 
explain illness occurrence by referring to which factors contribute to the etiological 
process and how.
In keeping with this idea, it might be helpful to modify RWT and Illari’s 
disambiguation in the context of illness occurrence:
For illness occurrence to be explained comprehensively, we need evidence of both 
di$erence-making and of mechanism at both the exposure-outcome level and at 
the pathogenetic level, as evidence of the presence and function, respectively, of an 
etiological process.
Although this statement reads like a normative one, which it was claimed not to 
be prior to the RWT, my statement does not ask you to accept it for all etiological 
explanations, only for comprehensive ones. "is is not a loophole to escape criticism 
but an acknowledgement that etiological explanations come in degrees. A causal 
explanation may refer to the causes of illness without reference to mechanisms, as in 
“excessive radiation causes skin cancer.” Similarly, a mechanistic explanation may 
focus on mechanisms, without referring to causes, as in “impaired double-strand 
DNA breakage repair mechanisms lead to skin cancer.” Both causal and mechanistic 
explanations can be considered partial etiological explanations. "e RWT, conversely, 
does not provide evidence that comes in degrees, and it does not allow for partial 
conclusions that partially support causal claims. In etiological explanations, when 
causal explanations and mechanistic explanations come together to form causal-
mechanical explanations, they become comprehensive and, thereby, better etiological 
explanations, in particular if they biologically plausibly enhance and support each 
other, and perhaps even !t coherently with other kinds of explanation into a uni!ed 
etiological framework, which, for example, allows for multiple di$erent etiological 
explanations for individual diseases or disorders.11
"e concept of mechanism features prominently in the RWT and critiques thereof. 
Due to space limitations, a full-'edged critique of the current wave of thought about 
mechanisms in the philosophy of the health sciences is not presented (Broadbent 
2011; Craver and Darden 2013; Williamson 2011a, 2011b). However, in this and 
the next chapter, it is argued that it would be worthwhile, at least in the context of 
etiological explanations, to at least consider a process view along with the focus on 
mechanisms. In the next chapter, this proposal is taken to the next level by zooming 
in on the idea that when we say that X causes Y, we not only imply that they are linked 
by a mechanism, we also imply that this mechanism is a process. Making both a bit 
more explicit might help make etiological explanations more useful.




In Chapter 5, the emphasis was on mechanisms as part of the Russo-Williamson thesis 
(RWT), which holds that causal claims in the health sciences require both evidence 
of di!erence-making and of mechanism. Agreement was made with Broadbent that 
RWT evidence is not necessary and not even universal in biomedical and population 
health practice for making causal claims (Broadbent 2011). Another di"culty with 
the RWT is that all di!erence-making must come with some mechanism that 
explains how the di!erence is made, and that mechanistic evidence always requires 
the observation of di!erence-making. On this view, the mechanism comes with 
implicit di!erence-making, and the observation of di!erence-making comes with 
implicit mechanism. #erefore, it was suggested to zoom in on exposure-outcome 
evidence, the high-level di!erence-making observed regarding di!erential outcomes 
in exposed versus nonexposed groups of individuals (Fiorentino and Dammann 
2015). #is kind of observation (“exposure is associated with the outcome”) can 
be explained by a causal hypothesis (“exposure causes the outcome”), which in 
turn can be explained by pathomechanistic evidence (“mechanism M plausibly 
connects exposure and outcome”), which includes the observation of lower-level 
di!erence-making.
#e focus in this chapter is on the process perspective of mechanism and etiological 
explanations. Why process? One reason is, at least in my thinking, that etiological 
explanations do more than RWT-like justi$cations of causal claims, precisely because 
they take a process view of what happens along the biological trajectory from cause 
to illness.1
First, they provide information about the causation process by proposing candidate 
causes and the pathomechanisms they initiate. Second, they provide information 
about the disease process by specifying how the pathomechanism leads to clinical 
illness. #ird, they thus generate knowledge about the overarching etiological 
process.2 For example, one possible etiological explanation of skin cancer would 
provide information about radiation and how it induces DNA double-strand 
breakage, specify how DNA double-strand breakage leads to uncontrolled skin cell 
growth and clinically visible skin abnormalities, and thereby generate knowledge 
about the overarching etiological process from radiation to skin cancer. Viewed from 
this perspective, talk about mechanism tells only part of the story, while talk about 
process tells the whole story (or at least more of it).
PROCESS PERSPECTIVE









Another reason to take the process perspective is that a sole focus on causes would 
ignore the mechanism, and a sole focus on mechanism would ignore causes. Ignoring 
the mechanism may be acceptable in primary prevention, because a reduction in 
exposure should lead to a reduction in outcome at the population level, regardless of 
the mechanism. In medicine, however, knowledge of the pathomechanism is helpful 
for the development of pharmacological interventions. But, ignoring the causes in 
favor of the mechanism can lead to an inappropriate focus on details of purported 
mechanisms that generate unfruitful research. In the context of my own research $eld 
of perinatal neuroepidemiology, this has happened following initial reports from the 
1960s that “trouble breathing” among newborns was causally responsible for the brain 
damage they sustained (Banker and Larroche 1962). Subsequent work focused almost 
exclusively on one purported pathomechanism, hypoxia-ischemia (Vannucci and 
Hagberg 2004), despite ample evidence that this mechanism is but one among multiple, 
and perhaps not even the most important pathomechanism (Gilles et%al. 2017).
Section 6.2 is based on a paper previously published in the journal Perspectives 
in Biology and Medicine (Erdei and Dammann 2014).3 In it, we mount the evidence 
in support of the notion that autism is not a static disorder but a process. We begin 
with a discussion of the unique link between preterm birth (birth before 37 weeks’ 
gestational age) and autism. We then outline the link between immune system 
characteristics and both prematurity and autism. Finally, we suggest that Rothman’s 
model of su"cient cause and component causes, combined with theories of causation 
concepts, can be interpreted as a mechanistic model of autism causation. In Section 
6.3, clari$cation is made of some of the terminology we used in that paper by aligning 
it with the terminology used in this book. Di!erences and similarities between the 
ideas of mechanism and process in the context of etiology are presented.
6.2 PROCESS ETIOLOGY OF AUTISM4
6.2.1 Introduction
Explaining the causal mechanisms that contribute to autism spectrum disorder (ASD; 
henceforth, autism) occurrence remains a conundrum in developmental medicine, 
neuroscience, and child psychiatry (Ashwood et%al. 2011; Goyal and Miyan 2014; 
Patterson 2009; Ronemus et%al. 2014). Recent research has led to consensus about 
behavioral de$nitions and their underlying cognitive processes, early diagnosis and 
standardized assessments, evidence-based interventions, systems-level approaches 
to neurobiology, and identi$cation of genetic variants and their interaction with 
epigenetic and environmental factors (Lai, Lombardo, and Baron-Cohen 2014) 
However, an explanatory model of autism causation remains elusive.
Perhaps, as suggested, it might be “time to give up on a single explanation 
for autism” (Happé, Ronald, and Plomin 2006) and, one might add, for other 
neurodevelopmental disorders as well, including, but not limited to, cerebral palsy, 
intellectual disability, or attention de$cit hyperactivity disorder. Most experts 
will agree that autism occurrence is what has been called “multifactorial,” in the 
sense that multiple factors play a role in it (Goyal and Miyan 2014; Hallmayer et%al. 
2011). Multiple individual risk factors have been proposed as possibly leading to 
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autism, including genetic factors, de novo mutations, drug and environmental 
exposures, maternal infections during pregnancy, selenoenzymes and antioxidant 
metabolism, maternal nutrients and supplement de$ciencies, or abnormalities in 
the gut &ora (Atladottir et%al. 2012; Braun et%al. 2014; Gidaya et%al. 2014; Gorrindo 
et%al. 2012; Hallmayer et%al. 2011; Iossifov et%al. 2014; Lyall, Schmidt, and Hertz-
Picciotto 2014; Raymond, Deth, and Ralston 2014; Ronemus et%al. 2014; Sandin et%al. 
2014). Particular attention has been given in recent years to immune dysfunctions 
and neuroin&ammation as a common thread of some of these individual factors 
(Ashwood et al. 2011; Goyal and Miyan 2014; Meyer, Feldon, and Dammann 2011; 
Rossignol and Frye 2012).
6.2.2 Prematurity and autism
#e question “What causes preterm birth?” has preoccupied researchers for decades 
(Bezold et%al. 2013). At over 11%, the United States continues to have one of the 
highest rates of preterm birth among developed countries (Beck et%al. 2010; Martin, 
Hamilton, and Osterman 2014). #e idea put forward in this chapter is that whatever 
initiates the preterm birth process might also initiate abnormal pathways of brain 
development, thereby creating a “perfect storm” of interactions among genetic 
background and environmental exposures that initiates a fetal immune response 
and leads to both preterm birth and altered development of the brain and neural 
connectivity. It is possible that the ongoing process of in&ammation, via activation 
of microglia, will ultimately result in what has been termed encephalopathy of 
prematurity (Volpe 2009), which in turn could lead to atypical neurodevelopment, 
including autism (Figure 6.1).
Many studies have reported an association between preterm birth and autism (Hack 

















Figure 6.1 In!ammation, preterm birth, and autism causation. The initial trigger that occurs in utero can 
contribute to birth prior to term, and, at the same time, interferes with normal brain development and synapse 
formation mainly via microglial activation. This, in time, will lead to clinical features consistent with autism.









et%al. 2008; Mahoney et%al. 2013; Schendel and Bhasin 2008). One hypothesis that 
explains this association is that a sustained presence of in&ammatory mediators in 
the maternal, fetal, and neonatal blood may not only initiate the preterm labor and 
delivery process but also interfere with normal brain development and increase a 
child’s risk for atypical development (Dammann, Kuban, and Leviton 2002; Favrais 
et%al. 2011; Malaeb and Dammann 2009; Meyer, Feldon, and Dammann 2011).
Cytokines and chemokines are in&ammatory blood components present in the 
maternal, placental, and fetal compartments during pregnancy (Dammann and 
Leviton 1997). #ese proteins recruit cells to defend and repair the brain, but they 
sometimes also contribute to clinical disease (Ja!er, Wade, and Gourlay 2010). 
Importantly, these in&ammatory proteins can act as the contributors to neurological 
and behavioral abnormalities (Dammann and O’Shea 2008; Kerschensteiner, Meinl, 
and Hohlfeld 2009). Animal and human studies suggest that in&ammatory protein 
imbalances during critical windows in early brain development have the ability to 
sensitize the brain for subsequent insults (Aden et%al. 2010; Du et%al. 2011; Hagberg, 
Gressens, and Mallard 2012; Rousset et%al. 2006; van de Looij et%al. 2012). A major 
observation in autism research is the presence of in&ammatory markers in the 
brain tissue or cerebrospinal &uid of individuals with autism (Morgan et%al. 2010; 
Rodriguez and Kern 2011; Vargas et%al. 2005; Zimmerman et%al. 2005). Activation 
of microglia, a type of glial cells within the central nervous system involved in 
synaptogenesis, is one pivotal mechanism in the neuro-in&ammatory process, and 
it may lead to alteration or even loss of neuronal connections (Chez et%al. 2007; Li 
et%al. 2005; Morgan et%al. 2010; Rodriguez and Kern 2011; Vargas et%al. 2005; Verney 
et%al. 2012; Zimmerman et%al. 2005). #is altered connectivity may be due to the loss 
of neurons, whose migration toward the future cortical layers is interrupted by the 
“mine$eld” of activated microglia in the intermediate zone (future white matter) 
of the developing brain (Leviton and Gressens 2007). Many studies report altered 
brain connectivity in individuals with autism, and the degree of abnormalities in 
brain connectivity appears to be proportional to the severity of a child’s behavioral 
symptoms (Barttfeld et%al. 2011; Damarla et%al. 2010; Di Martino et%al. 2011; Just 
et%al. 2012; Minshew and Keller 2010; Zikopoulos and Barbas 2013). In sum, neuro-
in&ammation, via cellular processes such as microglial activation, seems to play a 
central role in the pathogenesis of autism (Figure 6.1).
Children born preterm are one unique subset among individuals with autism. 
#eir exposure to in&ammation begins during pregnancy and can continue into 
the neonatal period and a!ect brain connectivity over long stretches in time. For 
example, systemic upregulation of pro-in&ammatory cytokines is more common 
and more prominent in school-age children with cerebral palsy than in controls (Lin 
et%al. 2010). As the systemic in&ammation can be either intermittent or sustained, 
the term intermittent or sustained systemic in!ammation (ISSI) has been proposed 
(Dammann and Leviton 2014). Since ISSI is linked to brain abnormalities in preterm 
newborns and prematurity is associated with autism, it follows that ISSI might be 
linked to autism in children born preterm. One crucial component of this causation-
process model is that neuroin&ammation does not occur at a single point in time 
but rather constitutes an ongoing exposure during an individual’s developmental 
trajectory (Malaeb and Dammann 2009). An ongoing interaction between innate 
and adaptive immune factors and the typical developmental process leads to 











immature brain structure changes, such as white matter abnormalities and neuronal/
axonal de$cits in the cortex, thalamus, basal ganglia, brainstem, and cerebellum. 
#is, in turn, leads to altered neuronal connectivity, which underlies a spectrum 
of neurodevelopmental disorders, including autism, cerebral palsy, or intellectual 
disability, and it will lead to di!erent abnormal function at di!erent time points 
during development (Figure%6.2).
Understanding in&ammatory causes and mechanisms in autism will provide 
clues about possible therapeutic strategies. One proposed hypothesis is that reducing 
the neurotoxic aspects of microglial activation might reduce the neurodestructive 
e!ects of chronic in&ammation and allow for improvement of neuronal connectivity 
(Rodriguez and Kern 2011). To what degree such an approach might help improve 
behavioral symptoms at a clinical level is still a matter of speculation.
6.2.3 Causal-process model of autism
Evidence suggests that autism might not be a static disorder but a neuro-immunological 
process that interferes with another process, that of typical neurodevelopment. Both 
processes appear to contribute to the occurrence of autism, albeit in di!erent ways. 
#erefore, both should be considered of etiological import and thus etiologically 
relevant. Rothman’s theoretical framework of su"cient cause and component 
causes can be interpreted as a mechanistic model of causation, integrating both 
neurodevelopment and ongoing/prolonged neuro-in&ammation processes that 

























Figure 6.2 The traditional scenario of perinatal brain injury (a) postulates that a single and rather short 
insult damages existing structure and leads to altered function. The alternative view (b), postulates 
that after an initial trigger has occurred, an ongoing interaction between innate and adaptive immune 
processes adversely affects the development of brain structure and function over an extended time period.
(Reproduced with permission from Malaeb, S. and O. Dammann. 2009. J Child Neurol. 24(9), 1119–26.)









provide new insights into autism etiology, it provides a framework for thinking about 
it. A similar conceptual model has previously been used in relation to cerebral palsy, 
described by its authors as a sequence of events leading to an outcome through causal 
chain or e!ect modi$cation (Stanley, Blair, and Alberman 2000).
6.2.3.1 Suf!cient causes, component causes
Let us reconsider the Mackie-Rothman model described in Section 2.4.1. In 1976, 
Ken Rothman de$ned a cause as “an act or event or a state of nature which initiates or 
permits, alone or in conjunction with other causes, a sequence of events resulting in 
an e!ect” (Rothman 1976). He suggested that disease occurrence always has multiple 
causes, and that “necessary” and “su"cient” causes should not be considered at the 
same explanatory level.
In Rothman’s view, su"cient causes are causal constellations (o'en depicted as 
pies; see Figure 6.3) composed of units (pieces of a pie, each being called “component 
cause”) that are either necessary (present in all su"cient causal constellations) 
or nonnecessary (present in some, but not all su"cient causal constellations). 
In essence, Rothman speci$es three di!erent categories of causes: (1) su"cient 
causes, represented by a whole pie; (2) necessary component causes, which are part 
(pieces) of all known possible su"cient causes (pies) of a disease of interest; and (3) 
nonnecessary component causes (pieces of some but not all pies), which are neither 
su"cient nor necessary. On this view of multifactorial causation, it is the unique 
combination and potentiation of necessary and nonnecessary component causes that 
will ultimately lead to illness occurrence. #e obvious similarity to Mackie’s concept 
of an insu"cient but necessary part of an unnecessary but su"cient condition 
(Mackie 1965, 1974) is interesting but beyond the scope of this book.
In our mechanistic model, each pie represents one unique etiological pathway 
to autism, consisting of one unique combination of pathogenetic mechanisms that 
represent the perfect storm leading to autism. Each piece of each pie represents one 
pathogenetic mechanism, such as prematurity, neuro-in&ammation, or genetics. 
Although components of pathogenetic mechanisms that give rise to each etiological 
pathway are not represented in Rothman’s model, they could be displayed within 
each single piece of the pie. In essence, both etiological (pies) and pathogenetic 
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Figure 6.3 Model of suf"cient etiological mechanisms (I, II, and III) composed of component causes 
that are either necessary (nPCMs, represented in shades of red) or unnecessary (uPCMs, represented 
by numbers 1–7 in shades of blue). (ND, neurodevelopment; NI, neuro-in!ammation; SEM, suf"cient 
etiological mechanism.)











mechanisms (pieces) can be conceived of as causal mechanisms at di!erent 
(etiological versus pathogenetic) levels.
6.2.3.2 Etiological pathway as causal mechanism
In an article that suggests disease causation as the basis for disease classi$cation 
systems, Severinsen states that
if asked to give an objective answer to what the mechanism or the causal structure 
behind a disease is, one could argue that there are many “causal factors” in a complex 
structure of causes, and that, in most cases, those factors are neither su"cient nor 
necessary, but only contributory. (Severinsen 2001)
#e use of the term mechanism in this passage coincides with a general surge of 
interest in mechanisms and mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of science 
over the past two decades. One frequently cited de$nition of mechanism is that of 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver: “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to $nish or 
termination conditions” (2000:3).
In this sense of the term mechanism, the su"cient component cause model can 
integrate etiological and pathogenetic mechanisms of autism causation. Consider 
each su"cient cause (pie in Figure 6.3) representing a su"cient etiological mechanism 
(SEM). Each component cause (piece of the pie) represents one risk factor, one more 
basic fact we need to know about in order to understand the SEM. Moreover, each 
component cause (piece of pie) represents a pathogenetic component mechanism 
(PCM), either necessary (nPCM) or unnecessary (uPCM). In explanatory diagrams, 
candidate risk factors can be joined together inside one etiological pathway (SEM) by 
biologically plausible linkage points between elements of pathogenetic mechanisms 
in neighboring PCMs.
In keeping with this model, all identi$ed risk factors of autism should be viewed 
primarily as candidate PCMs, which together form one SEM that is su"cient to 
create one version of the perfect storm leading to clinical autism. It is possible that 
di!erent PCMs might make unequal contributions to our model. For example, 
as the incidence and severity of adverse neurodevelopmental outcomes increase 
with increasing degree of prematurity, the associated PCM might carry di!erent 
weights depending on the gestational age at which a child was born. For a child born 
late or moderately preterm (32–36 weeks’ gestation), the preterm birth-associated 
PCM% might contribute to a lesser extent compared to that of a child born very 
preterm (28–31 weeks’ gestation) or extremely preterm (less than 28 weeks’ gestation). 
Since it is not known whether the risk for autism varies linearly with the degree of 
prematurity, further research is needed to better understand the contribution of 
various degrees of prematurity to our model.
Note that this model allows for multiple di!erent etiological pathways to autism, 
each one represented by a di!erent SEM. For example, up to about half of all autism 
cases appear to be attributable mainly to genetic factors (Gaugler et%al. 2014; Iossifov 
et% al. 2014). #is means that genetics may be a uPCM (any piece of pie marked 
with a number 1–7 in Figure 6.3), because autism can occur without underlying 
genetic abnormalities, at least until good scienti$c evidence to the contrary becomes 









available. Prematurity is another uPCM, because autism can occur in children not 
born preterm. Similarly, male sex is a uPCM, as preterm boys are at higher risk for 
developing autism (Johnson et%al. 2010).
#is hypothetical framework could be explored through longitudinal studies 
involving biomarkers and examination of the neurometrics of functional imaging, 
in order to further enhance our understanding of autism causation and guide 
interventions for families of children at risk. Further research should also examine if 
this model is generalizable to all degrees of prematurity, to children with underlying 
genetic vulnerabilities, and to both sexes equally.
6.2.3.3 Interacting pathogenetic component mechanisms
In keeping with Carl Craver’s suggestion to think of neuroscienti$c explanations 
as descriptions of multilevel mechanisms (Craver 2007), we suggest thinking 
of developmental neuroscientific explanations as descriptions of multilevel 
developmental mechanisms. Most developmentalists will agree that neurodevelopment 
is a neurobiological mechanism that eventually leads to the typical structure and 
function of the adult nervous system. #erefore, we argue that neurodevelopment is 
a causal process instantiated as one nPCM. While the process of neurodevelopment 
is still ongoing (beginning in utero and ending in early adulthood), a second nPCM 
(neuro-in&ammation and/or ISSI) interacts with the $rst. In our explanatory model, 
microglia activation represents one pathogenetic mechanism within the nPCM 
neuro-in&ammation, and neuronal migration toward the future cortex represents 
one pathogenetic mechanism within the nPCM neurodevelopment. #e result is 
a deviation from the typical neurodevelopmental trajectory (the outcome at brain 
level) that is characterized by atypical function (the outcome at the clinical level).
6.2.4 Developmental causation
Rather than focusing on localized gene expression or environmental triggers as 
the main causal pathways to developmental disorders, Annette Karmilo!-Smith 
proposed thinking about these two essential pathogenetic mechanisms from a 
“neuroconstructivist” perspective (Karmilo!-Smith 1998). Her theory integrates the 
timing of gene expression and key interactions with other genetic and environmental 
factors, while taking into account the complex dynamics inherent to both normal and 
atypical human development. Rather than concentrating on a disorder or diagnosis 
when it signi$cantly a!ects a child’s functioning, Karmilo!-Smith suggests that it 
is of utmost importance to “study disorders in early infancy, and longitudinally, 
to understand how alternative developmental pathways might lead to di!erent 
phenotypical outcomes.”
#e same developmental pathway might lead to di!erent phenotypical outcomes 
at di!erent time points during child development. Take, for example, the ongoing 
interaction between ISSI and neurodevelopmental mechanisms in the context of 
preterm brain damage (Malaeb and Dammann 2009; Volpe 2009). While damage 
to the developing brain structure will occur early, impairment of the developing 
function is not apparent until much later, when the demands of the environment 
exceed the capabilities of the child. Consequently, an early in&ammatory insult “not 
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only destroys what exists, but also changes what develops” (Malaeb and Dammann 
2009). If we apply this theoretical framework to autism, it becomes clear that it is 
essential to study the atypical developmental processes early on, over time, and with 
consideration of multiple possible etiological scenarios (SEMs) for a speci$c clinical 
outcome. #e proposed ongoing interaction between the neuro-in&ammatory nPCM 
and the neurodevelopmental nPCM opens potential windows of opportunity at 
multiple times during childhood. Well-timed interventions could mechanistically 
target the ongoing pathogenetic processes during these windows of opportunity and 
modify the disease trajectory in a favorable direction.
6.3  PROCESS PERSPECTIVE IN 
ETIOLOGIC EXPLANATIONS
#e main thrust of Section 6.2 is the proposal that autism is an ongoing process, 
not a static disorder. #us, the distinction suggested is not between process and 
mechanism but between disease process and static disease. #e argument is, basically, 
that it would be advantageous to study the etiology of autism from a developmental 
process perspective and not look at it as a disorder that suddenly pops up out of 
nowhere when some genetic or environmental cause happens to &ick a biological or 
biopsychosocial switch. #is perspective might be advantageous, because it would 
provide space for a discussion of candidate interventions at various stages of illness 
development. #e classical genetic paradigm of autism holds that one of multiple 
known gene aberrations leads to the autistic phenotype and that we cannot do much 
about this. Taking the process perspective might o!er multiple entry points for 
preventive or therapeutic intervention along the developmental pathway.
#e paper that serves as the basis for Section 6.2 was my $rst attempt to take the 
etiological perspective by talking about causes, mechanisms, and processes in the 
natural history of autism. Based on my discussion in this book, some of the terms 
used previously should probably be clari$ed. #is is done in Section 6.3.1. #erea'er, 
the mechanistic and process perspectives on etiological explanations are contrasted 
in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, respectively.
6.3.1 Terminological clari!cation
In Section 6.2, autism is referred to as an “etiologic process interfering with a second 
underlying process, that of typical neurodevelopment.” #ree points of clari$cation 
are in order.
First, reference was made to Rothman’s su"cient-component cause model as a 
mechanistic model. In light of my discussion in this book, the model might better 
be viewed as integrating causes and pathomechanisms and, thus, be referred to as a 
causal-mechanical explanatory model.
Second, complete pies represented one etiological pathway to autism. If this 
pathway is the overarching etiological process as depicted in Figures 3.1 and 7.1, 
ranging from causes via pathomechanism to disease occurrence, each complete pie 
would depict a comprehensive etiological explanation.









#ird, each piece of the pies was referred to as one pathogenetic mechanism. 
We should perhaps say instead that each piece of the pie can depict a cause 
or a pathomechanism. #us, a whole pie would include the causal part, the 
pathomechanistic part, as well as other contributors discussed in Chapter 7.
In sum, the su"cient-component cause model can be interpreted as an etiological 
process model if (1) entire pies are taken to denote comprehensive% etiological 
explanations that explain etiological processes, and (2)%pieces of the pies are taken 
to represent causes or pathogenetic mechanisms%that, taken together, make up the 
comprehensive etiological story we want to tell.
In the next two sections, previous explorations of what biomedical illness causation 
researchers mean when they talk about illness causation are expanded. Discussion 
zooms in on, and contrasts, two views of illness causation, as a mechanism and 
as a process. It is not my intention to replace the notion of mechanism with the 
notion of process. Rather, justi$cation is provided of my suggestion to take a process 
perspective when building etiological explanations.
6.3.2 Mechanisms
Mechanisms have taken center stage in the philosophy of science.5 As mentioned 
earlier, Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s de$nition has mechanisms as “entities and 
activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or 
set-up to $nish or termination conditions” (2000).
Rothman’s pies are conceptualized as SEMs that consist of constellations of 
component causes,6 each of which can be seen as a PCM that can be either necessary 
(nPCM) or unnecessary (uPCM). Per my earlier clari$cation, the process perspective 
makes us see whole pies as su"cient etiological processes (SEPs) that consist of 
component causes and pathomechanisms. Together, these can form component 
causation processes (see Figures 3.1 and 7.1) that can be necessary or unnecessary.
Let’s consider the following example of a comprehensive etiological explanation. 
Pediatric dermatologists Jenkins and coworkers explain the occurrence of tuberous 
sclerosis complex (TSC), a genetic multi-organ disease that a!ects the brain, skin, 
eye, and heart by way of abnormal tissue (i.e., tumor) generation, as follows:
Tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC) is a disorder caused by mutations in the tumor 
suppressor genes TSC1 and TSC2, which encode the proteins hamartin and tuberin, 
respectively. #is results in reduced inhibition of the mammalian target of rapamycin 
(mTOR) complex, which promotes cellular growth and proliferation. Clinically the 
disorder is characterized by development of benign hamartomatous neoplasms of 
various tissues. (Jenkins et%al. 2016)
Here, the TSC1/TSC2 mutation is the purported cause, and reduced inhibition of 
growth promoter complex mTOR is the purported pathogenetic mechanism that 
explains how the genetic mutation causes the disease. #e explanation also speci$es 
two other component mechanisms (PCMs): $rst, abnormal hamartin and tuberin 
encoding, which links the cause (mutation) to the pathogenetic mechanism (lack of 
growth inhibition); and second, abnormal cell growth and proliferation, which links 
the pathogenetic mechanism to the disease (tuberous sclerosis). #us, we have three 
Q4
Q5


















mechanisms in between cause and clinical disease, and all together would qualify as 
a SEP that explains comprehensively why TSC comes about (gene mutation), and how 
(via abnormal hamartin and tuberin encoding, subsequent lack of growth inhibition, 
which leads to abnormal cell growth and proliferation).
None of these components alone is su"cient to lead to TSC because they are 
only components of the pie, which is su"cient i! (if and only if) it is complete. #e 
question whether one of them (or both) is necessary or unnecessary is a question 
of whether there are SEPs other than the one that consists of the components listed 
that also explain the occurrence of tuberous sclerosis. #is is the case because either 
one of the TSC1 and TSC2 gene mutations is capable of initiating lack of growth 
inhibition, the central pathomechanism that leads to TSC. #us, neither TSC1 nor 
TSC2 is a necessary component cause of TSC.
Sometimes, however, authors attribute explanatory power only to the causes of 
illness, not the pathogenetic mechanism. Going back to the autism literature, one 
$nds statements like this:
A total of 134 healthcare workers participated in the study. In all, 78 (58.2%), 19 (14.2%) 
and 36 (26.9%) of the healthcare workers were of the opinion that the etiology of 
childhood autism can be explained by natural, preternatural and supernatural causes, 
respectively. (Bakare et%al. 2009)
Or this one, again on autism spectrum disorders (ASDs):
For the majority of individuals with ASD, the causes of the disorder remain unknown; 
however, in up to 25% of cases, a genetic cause can be identi$ed. Chromosomal 
rearrangements as well as rare and de novo copy-number variants are present in  
!10–20% of individuals with ASD, compared with 1–2% in the general population and/
or una!ected siblings. Rare and de novo coding-sequence mutations a!ecting neuronal 
genes have also been identi$ed in !5–10% of individuals with ASD. (Huguet, Ey, and 
Bourgeron 2013)
Although the authors talk about causes in terms of the di!erence they make (mutations 
present in 10%–20% of ASD cases versus only 1%–2% in the general population), 
they do not talk about mechanisms. Others, however, do put mechanisms front and 
center in ASD etiology, in particular DNA methylation. #eir argument is based on 
a syllogism:
evidence demonstrate[es] that: (i) environmental factors contribute to determining 
individual ASD risk and/or severity; (ii) developmental exposures to environmental 
chemicals can alter DNA methylation in multiple tissues, including the brain; and 
changes in DNA methylation have been documented in autistic individuals and 
implicated in ASD pathogenesis. #e question remaining is whether these events 
are causally linked. Currently, evidence pointing to changes in DNA methylation as 
a mechanism by which environmental chemicals contribute to ASD risk is limited 
[…] but the few studies that have addressed this question have potentially signi$cant 
implications regarding the importance of environmental epigenetics in the etiology of 
ASD. (Keil and Lein 2016)
In essence, the authors infer that environmental chemicals are a cause for ASD via 
the mechanism of DNA methylation.7
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Going back to TSC, Jenkins et%al. are explicit about their mechanistic stance when 
they write “dysregulation of the mammalian target of rapamycin pathway is the 
underlying pathogenic mechanism in tuberous sclerosis complex” (Jenkins et%al. 
2016).8 #e apparent explanatory value of this decidedly mechanistic stance is further 
exempli$ed in the following quote from the abstract of another paper:
Antiphospholipid antibody syndrome (APS) is an autoimmune acquired thrombophilia 
characterized by recurrent thrombosis and pregnancy morbidity in the presence of 
antiphospholipid antibodies (aPL). […] #e exact pathogenetic mechanism of APS is 
unknown, but di!erent, not mutually exclusive, models have been proposed to explain 
how anti-PL autoantibodies might lead to thrombosis and pregnancy morbidity. 
(Negrini et%al. 2016)
#e keyword here is, of course, pathogenetic mechanism, which is deemed necessary 
to explain how the cause leads to the outcome. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind 
that while some say that mechanism denotes the “causal structure behind a disease” 
(Negrini et%al. 2016), it represents only that part of the “causal structure” that clari$es 
how disease occurs, not why.
Although the term pathomechanism is ubiquitous in biomedicine and biomedical 
research, some think that pathomechanisms do not even qualify as mechanisms in the 
$rst place. Justin Garson proposes a sense of mechanism that focuses on its function. 
His main claim is that “mechanisms serve functions [, which] places substantive 
constraints on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism” 
(Garson 2013). Most interesting for my current discussion is that Garson further 
suggests that “there are no mechanisms for pathology. #ere is no mechanism for heart 
disease or Alzheimer’s disease or schizophrenia because (e.g.,) heart disease on the part 
of a system is not a function of that system” (ibid.). Apparently, Garson uses the term 
function in a rather restrictive way to exclude dysfunction. #e term purpose seems to 
$t his meaning well; he writes, for example, that “[t]he dolphin’s $n can act as a hook 
that entangles the dolphin in nets. But it is not usually described as a mechanism for 
doing so. #at is because getting entangled in nets is not its function” (p. 318).
Following are reasons for my disagreement. First, from the biomedical perspective, 
we do not (always) talk about mechanisms for. Instead, we talk about mechanisms 
how. We are interested in mechanisms and pathomechanisms precisely because we 
want to understand the mechanisms’ function. We are not asking the teleological 
question why a mechanism does what it does, but the pragmatic one, how does it do 
it? Second, we are interested in the workings of biological mechanisms, which, at 
least for bioscientists, just is the mechanisms’ function. In other words, biomedical 
function includes dysfunction, while Garsonian functionalists would need to exclude 
it. Consequently, they would not be able to construct comprehensive etiological 
explanations, unless they take the process perspective and talk about dysfunction as 
part of the etiological process.
6.3.3 Or process?
Etiology is the process of how illness comes about. Etiological explanations 
both require and generate knowledge about this process. #erefore, etiological 
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explanations play a major role in medicine, epidemiology, the basic biomedical 
sciences, biomedical informatics, epidemiology, computational epidemiology, and 
medical malpractice litigation.9 To review brie&y, causes of illness are factors that 
induce and/or a!ect illness occurrence; they are the beginning of the etiological 
pathway that leads from cause to e!ect, from initiator to illness. Most illness 
causation is biological, in the sense that causes and the remainder of the causation 
process (pathogenesis) constitute the etiologic explanation for illness occurrence. 
Taken as one process, the causes (e.g., ultraviolet radiation in skin cancer causation10) 
and the pathogenetic mechanism (e.g., failed repair of ultraviolet-radiation-induced 
cell damage11) form the basis for a comprehensive etiological explanation.
Another look at Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s mechanisms (“entities and 
activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or 
set-up to $nish or termination conditions”) makes it quite obvious that mechanisms 
can be conceived as processes (from start or set-up to "nish) during which the production 
of regular changes happens. I suggest that the etiology of illness is described well as 
overlapping causation and disease processes, nested in the etiological process (Figures 
3.1 and 7.1). Let us go over some biological notions of process.
In the biosciences, “mechanism” is o'en used synonymously with the dual 
notion that states that (1) there is a process (a token sequence of plausibly related 
phenomena) and (2) here is how it works (a type blueprint for sequences of the same 
kind).12 #us, can we think of all mechanisms in action as a process? Are some 
processes not mechanisms, that is, grief, a divorce, a safari? Waddington’s epigenetic 
landscapes depict human development as a slanted surface of moguls with a ball 
rolling downhill in between them, and you never know where the ball might end up 
(Waddington 1957).
For some, the term mechanism has a rather deterministic connotation. For 
example, John Dupré suggests that
#ere are good reasons to think that biological systems – organism, cells, pathways –  
are in many ways quite misleadingly thought of as mechanisms. (Dupré 2013:28)
Dupré’s view is that mechanisms are machine-like.13 #is is what Nicholson has 
called the “machine mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ (de$ned as) stable assemblies 
of interacting parts arranged in such a way that their combined operation results in 
predetermined outcomes” (Nicholson 2012:2). Dupré writes that it is not so much 
parts (=things) that “are stable and robust in biology, […] but processes” (p. 30).
#e term process is usually taken to mean “a sequence of events” (Blackburn 
2016:385). William Bechtel writes that the idea of sequential ordering, which 
is equivalent to Rothman’s “sequence of events resulting in an e!ect,” makes it a 
“valuable $rst approach in explaining biological processes” (Bechtel 2011; emphasis 
mine). #us, we can say that a description of the sequence of biological events (causes 
and mechanisms) that represents the process of illness occurrence quali$es as an 
etiological explanation.
According to the Gene Ontology Consortium, a biological process is de$ned as 
follows:
A biological process is a recognized series of events or molecular functions. A process is 
a collection of molecular events with a de$ned beginning and end. Mutant phenotypes 
o'en re&ect disruptions in biological processes.14
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A biological process term describes a series of events accomplished by one or more 
organized assemblies of molecular functions. Examples of broad biological process 
terms are “cellular physiological process” or “signal transduction.” Examples of more 
speci$c terms are “pyrimidine metabolic process” or “alpha-glucoside transport.” #e 
general rule to assist in distinguishing between a biological process and a molecular 
function is that a process must have more than one distinct step.
A biological process is not equivalent to a pathway. At present, the GO does not try 
to represent the dynamics or dependencies that would be required to fully describe a 
pathway.15
#e concept of constellations of multiple contributing causes, especially in a 
biomedical context, lends itself toward an interpretation from the causal process 
perspective, which holds that causation is to
be understood in terms of causal processes and interactions (and) any facts about 
causation as a relation between events obtain only on account of more basic facts about 
causal processes and interactions. (Dowe 2009)
Process views have a longstanding tradition in general philosophy (Rescher 1996, 
2000; Whitehead 1929 [1960]) and in the philosophy of causation (Dowe 2000; Dowe 
2009; Salmon 1984, 1998a, 1998b). What distinguishes a process from a mechanism? 
When Nicholson proposes that “in biology, the phenomenon produced by the 
causal process described in a causal mechanism usually enables the ful$llment of a 
function” (Nicholson 2012), the mechanism is considered a blueprint that describes 
the sequence of events (the process) that, in turn, produces a phenomenon that ful$lls 
a function. #erefore, “specifying the causal mechanism for a function explains how 
this function is causally brought about” (ibid.).
One particularly interesting causal process theory (brie&y discussed by Dowe) 
is Aronson’s transference theory (Aronson 1971). Aronson discusses earlier work 
by Collingwood and Gasking, who proposed that all causal claims are ways of 
talking about related events in manipulationist, anthropomorphic ways and that any 
biological disease causation process that does not involve intelligent manipulation 
would, therefore, not be causal.16 #us, according to the Collingwood/Gasking view, 
none of the pathogenetic component causes of autism – the topic of Section 6.2 – 
can be considered a cause of autism. Aronson rejects the anthropomorphic view of 
causation and claims that “there are certain changes that take place in individuals 
that can be completely accounted for without having to appeal to the behavior of 
other individuals. I’ll call these changes, ‘natural changes’” (p. 421). He proposes an 
account of causation that conceptualizes any causal relationship between (cause) A 
and (e!ect) B to require (1) the change in B to be unnatural, (2) a physical contact 
between A and B at the time B occurs, and the transfer of a quantity from A to the 
object that displays the e!ect, manifesting as B. In essence, this proposal allows for 
any causation without human intervention, but it excludes all developmental changes 
in biology, because it “contrasts a caused change in a object with a change that would 
have taken place if it were le' to itself” (ibid.; emphasis in original). #us, according 
to Aronson, only nonnatural component causes of autism can be considered causes 






















cause of autism. Neither would any other biological cause qualify as such, which 
renders Aronson’s theory useless for etiological explanations of ASD.
In my proposed etiological explanation of ASD, neurodevelopment quali$es as a 
cause via being a background condition. In a sense, neurodevelopment contributes 
to the etiology of ASD by virtue of being the biological process that causes, and 
pathomechanisms of ASD are piggybacking on so that, over time, the clinical ASD 
phenotype emerges.17 In the next chapter, this framework is outlined and discussed 
further.




!is chapter builds on previous sections by expanding on causes versus conditions 
(Section 4.4.3), mechanism (Chapters 5 and 6), and process (Chapter 6). My goal is to 
defend the position that background conditions such as socioeconomic status and 
other factors can contribute to the etiology of illness in ways that make a di"erence 
without being what is usually considered a cause. In essence, comprehensive 
etiological explanations may gain in explanatory depth if we include contributors 
whose role in the etiology of illness is not to initiate or induce the pathomechanism, 
but to interfere in other ways with the etiological process that make a di"erence to 
the outcome without #tting traditional de#nitions of a cause.
Section 7.2 is based on a previously published paper (Dammann 2017) written 
in response to a piece by Michael Kelly, Rachel Kelly, and Federica Russo (2014). 
!e authors propose to integrate biological, behavioral, and social mechanisms 
into what they call mixed mechanisms that are situated in the individual’s lifeworld. 
In response, terminological discrepancies were discussed, and their pathogenetic 
perspective was replaced with my etiological stance, which includes, but is not limited 
to, pathogenesis (Figure 7.1). Also discussed was whether the lifeworld concept 
adds to what we consider an individual’s environment. It was also suggested, and 
this brings me to the topic of this chapter, that the notion of mixed mechanisms be 
replaced with the concept of combined contributions in etiological explanations of 
illness.
In Section 7.3, more detail is added to what was written in the original paper 
by showing how etiological explanations could become more comprehensive and 
perhaps even more useful when enhanced by the notion of combined contribution. 
For starters, a model that includes inducers, modi#ers, and mediators as potential 
contributors to etiological processes is outlined (Figure 7.2). 
7.2 EXPLAINING ILLNESS OCCURRENCE
Models of illness causation play a crucial role in medicine and public health. In their 
recent paper on this topic, Michael Kelly, Rachel Kelly, and Federica Russo state that 
the integration of social, biological, and behavioral causes in the same etiological 
mechanism remains to be clari#ed. In particular, they think that current models of 
illness causation do not appreciate “the truly integrated nature of bio-social-behavioral 
COMBINED 
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... the story that explains illness occurrence
Figure 7.1 The etiological stance conceptualizes etiology as a two-step process. The !rst phase (causation 
process) includes causes and the subsequent pathogenetic mechanisms they induce. The second phase 
(disease process) includes the pathogenesis and clinical disease. Knowledge about both (etiological process), 
combined with knowledge about the actions of other contributors to the etiological process at all levels, 








Figure 7.2 Combined contribution is the view that talk about causes is less useful than talk about the joint 
role of all etiological factors that contribute to illness occurrence. Such factors are, for example, causal 
initiators/inducers of pathogenesis (depicted as sun and toxic cloud), causal mediators (radiation and 
rain), genetic susceptibility modi!ers, and social facilitators (e.g., gender bias, poverty), among many 
other possibilities.

















pathogenesis” (Kelly, Kelly, and Russo 2014:309). In brief, they suggest that (1) two 
levels of explanation are at work in medicine and public health, biological and social; 
(2) integration is di$cult because of resistance to including social determinants of 
disease in both the biomedical and social sciences; and (3) we should “move to an 
integrated model, where biological and social factors are ontologically equivalent, in 
the sense that both have a role in disease etiology” (p. 310).
!e authors begin to support their argument by describing what they call “the 
original public health vision” of medical and public health pioneers, including Snow, 
Virchow, and Duncan, who “did not demonstrate empirically what today would be 
de#ned as the biological causes of disease, [but] they gathered enough circumstantial 
evidence to show the associations between poor social conditions and disease, and 
they intervened on the basis of that circumstantial evidence” (p. 312). Kelly, Kelly, and 
Russo think that recent developments in public health have led to “the separation of 
the social from the biological and of the individual from the population” (p. 311). !ey 
proceed by outlining current views of social causation: George Engel’s biopsychosocial 
model, the Sussers’ eco-epidemiology, Geo"rey Rose’s causes of causes, and Nancy 
Krieger’s web of causation (Engel 1977; Krieger 1994; Rose 1992; Susser 2004), But, 
alas, all accounts fall short of their expectations, because even their favorite one 
(Krieger’s) does not “stress fully enough the explanatory import of social%factors or 
the social level of explanation and their connection with the biological” (p. 316).
In order to #ll that void, Kelly, Kelly, and Russo suggest using social categories not 
just as descriptive characteristics of individuals and populations, which, they hold, 
masks “the active causal role of social factors in the etiology of diseases” (p.%317). 
Instead, they propose that “Social categories should not be mere classi#catory devices, 
but explanatory devices” (ibid.; emphasis in original). !ey use the term lifeworld to 
mean the sum of all social and material factors that are relevant to humans in their 
immediate environment. In this sense, they argue, an individual’s lifeworld includes 
the “physical, economic, social, and microbiological” causes of disease (ibid.).
!e authors also suggest that the establishment of causal claims in the health 
sciences requires evidence of both statistical correlation and pathogenetic mechanism. 
!is claim, the topic of Chapter 5 in this book, holds that we need evidence of not 
only correlation1 between candidate causes (risk factors) and health outcomes but 
also mechanisms linking the two (Russo and Williamson 2007b). In this context, 
evidence of association, sometimes referred to by philosophers as evidence of 
di"erence-making, is evidence of a statistical association between risk factors and 
diseases. It has been suggested that this kind of evidence should be called “exposure-
outcome evidence,” at least in epidemiological contexts.2 Evidence of mechanism, on 
the other hand, is evidence of biological processes that involve chemical reactions or 
other kinds of biological signal transduction. While Kelly, Kelly, and Russo appear 
to accept that associations between social and biological factors are appreciated 
in biomedicine, they hold that full acceptance as causes of illness would require 
the demonstration of how they are connected mechanistically. As one possible 
location of what they call “mixed mechanisms” of disease development, they discuss 
epigenetics, the phenomenon of noninherited, environmental-induced changes to 
genetic information.
My goal in this chapter is to show that what is convincing in Kelly, Kelly, and 
Russo’s argument (integrate social and biological factors) is not new, and what is new 















(mixed mechanisms) is not convincing. First, a few thoughts are o"ered about the 
dichotomy of original versus current visions of public health (as perceived by Kelly, 
Kelly, and Russo). Clari#cation is provided of how the terms process and mechanism 
are used in this chapter. Second, four brief suggestions are given on how to modify 
and build on the thesis by Kelly, Kelly, and Russo.
7.2.1  Original versus current visions of 
public health
Kelly, Kelly, and Russo claim that classic pioneers of public health did not demonstrate 
mechanisms, such as John Snow, who discovered the association between certain 
sources of drinking water and cholera incidence during an outbreak in London in 
1854.3 But how could they without access to the concepts and machinery needed to do 
proper molecular microbiology? Moreover, we still rely on circumstantial evidence in 
some of our most successful public health interventions in the twentieth and twenty-
#rst centuries. For example, smoking cessation clearly reduces mortality, although 
the mechanism by which smoking causes deadly lung disease is still incompletely 
understood today (Anthonisen et% al. 2005; Cooper et% al. 2013). Knowledge of 
pathogenetic mechanisms is not needed for public health intervention, although it is 
obviously crucial for the development of pharmacomedical interventions that target 
such mechanisms (more on this later in this chapter). Most importantly, however, 
current public health still promotes the idea that biological and social factors play 
equally important roles in models of disease causation. In his proposal to move from 
risk factors to explanations in public health, Ian McDowell asked for explanations that
should span several layers of causal processes. !ey should incorporate a plausible 
theory, or theories, that trace the connections between the levels. !ere should be 
an analysis both of the dynamics of the process (“why did this occur?”); and of its 
functioning (“how do the processes operate?”). (McDowell 2008:223)
Of note, McDowell uses the term causal process, not mechanism. Perhaps those of 
us who work in public health and epidemiology are a bit more process oriented and 
less mechanistically inclined than basic biomedical researchers. Indeed, this author 
had a similar scenario in mind when writing that
systems epidemiology adds yet another level consisting of antecedents that might 
contribute to the disease process in populations. In etiologic and prevention research, 
systems-type thinking about multiple levels of causation will allow epidemiologists 
to identify contributors to disease at multiple levels as well as their interactions. 
(Dammann et%al. 2014)
Let’s brie&y summarize again the di"erences between process and mechanism as the 
terms are used in this book. First, both are used in the context of the story that explains 
illness occurrence, the etiology of illness. In the epidemiological tradition, etiology is 
de#ned as a three-step process (Figure 7.1), beginning with initiating causal events 
and subsequent mechanisms in the body that culminate in clinically visible disease, 
which may or may not undergo phenotype changes over time, o'en referred to as its 
Q1

















“clinical course” (MacMahon and Pugh 1970). !us de#ned, the etiological process 
includes causes, pathogenesis, and disease. !e etiological process can be subdivided 
into the illness causation process, including causes and pathogenesis, which overlaps 
with the disease process, which includes pathogenesis and the clinical course of 
disease. Pathogenesis (etiology minus initial causes and subsequent disease) is o'en 
considered a mechanism and sometimes called pathomechanism.
!ese epidemiological views are in keeping with philosophical de#nitions. For 
example, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy has this for the process entry: “a sequence 
of events” (Blackburn 2016). !e de#nition of mechanism, in its probably most 
frequently cited version in recent philosophy of science, is a bit more complicated: 
“(m)echanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to #nish or termination conditions” (Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver 2000:3). In biology, dynamic explanations o'en describe 
phenomena that are not sequential but include complex cyclic feedback loops 
(Bechtel 2011). !us, this author endorses what Bechtel calls “dynamic mechanistic 
explanations” when it comes to biological explanations of pathogenetic phenomena. 
His de#nition for this kind of mechanism is
a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component 
operations, and their organization. !e orchestrated functioning of the mechanism, 
manifested in patterns of change over time in properties of its parts and operations, is 
responsible for one or more phenomena. (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010:323)
Using these de#nitions for process and mechanism, the natural history of illness 
occurrence can be seen as proceeding sequentially from causes via pathomechanisms 
to illness. In this etiological process, the pathomechanism of a certain disease is 
the internal dynamic biological mechanism that explains the apparent link between 
external causes and clinical illness.
Now we go back to public health. In what is called the “expanded host-agent-
environment paradigm,” biological as well as social factors are considered 
characteristics of both the host and the environment. !e environment can 
be involved in this process in at least two ways: #rst, by contributing “factors to 
host susceptibility; for example, unemployment, poverty, or low education level” 
(Tulchinsky and Varavikova 2009:49); and second, by contributing the agents that 
induce the disease process – in other words, infectious or noninfectious factors 
mainly of biological nature. Much of this multilevel illness causation model has been 
developed and is being cogently promoted by Galea and colleagues:
First, factors at multiple levels, including biological, behavioural, group and macro-
social levels, all have implications for the production and distribution of health. 
Secondly, these factors frequently in&uence one another and, in addition, are sometimes 
in&uenced by the health indicators of interest. (Galea, Riddle, and Kaplan 2010:98)
Moreover, mechanisms of how social factors are biologically linked to health 
outcomes have been documented in the basic science literature for quite some time. 
For example, Eisenberger and Cole have summarized evidence in support of the 
claim that “social connections reach deep into the body to regulate some of our 
most fundamentally internal molecular processes,” and they predict that “social 















neuroscience approaches will be important for deciphering both how and why social 
relationships are critical for health” (Eisenberger and Cole 2012:673).
In other words, contrary to Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s conception, the current 
public health paradigm of illness causation does integrate biological and social 
factors and considers them equally important; however, both play multiple roles as 
characteristics of both the individual and his or her environment – or what Kelly, 
Kelly, and Russo call lifeworld – and can function as modi#ers of susceptibility and 
as inducers of pathogenetic mechanisms.
7.2.2 Terminology matters
Two points should be mentioned with regard to Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s usage of 
disease causation terminology. First, they use the terms etiology and pathogenesis 
as if they are interchangeable. !ey are not. As previously outlined, etiology is the 
entire process that leads to illness occurrence, while pathogenesis is the intrapersonal 
pathophysiological mechanism that explains the link between causes and clinical 
illness (Figure 7.1). On this view, pathogenesis is both the intra-individual second 
stage of the disease causation process and also the #rst stage of the disease process.
Second, I disagree with Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s interpretation of the common 
usage of proximal and distal causes of disease as synonymous with biological and 
social. !e original proposal to distinguish two kinds of causes in biology goes back 
to Ernst Mayr (1904–2005), who wrote in 1961 that “proximate causes govern the 
responses of the individual (and his organs) to immediate factors of the environment 
while ultimate causes are responsible for the evolution of the particular DNA code” 
(Mayr 1961:1503). In contrast to both Kelly, Kelly, and Russo, and Mayr, and in keeping 
with my distinction between processes and mechanisms in disease etiology, refer to 
elements of pathogenetic, micro-etiological mechanisms as proximal, and to pre-
pathogenetic, macro-etiological risk factors (candidate causes) that induce, facilitate, 
or modify pathogenetic mechanisms, as distal. While pathogenetic mechanisms are 
mainly, and perhaps exclusively, biochemical functional networks, macro-etiological 
factors can be biological (such as microbes), physical (ambient particulate matter), 
or social (poverty). In this sense, distal causes and proximal mechanisms are also 
indicators of the time sequence of the illness development process, to wit the etiology 
of illness.
7.2.3 Etiological stance
Regarding Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s request to use social characteristics as 
explanatory devices, social epidemiologists will respond that this is in fact exactly 
what they do already. Mervyn Susser (1921–2014), a champion of social epidemiology 
and prominent advocate for rigorous causal thinking in his discipline, wrote that 
“epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of states of health in 
human populations,” and that “a determinant can be any factor…so long as it brings 
about change for better or worse in a health condition” (Susser 1973:3). Accordingly, 
today’s social epidemiologists de#ne their trade as “the branch of epidemiology that 
studies the social distribution and social determinants of states of health” (Berkman 

















and Kawachi 2000:6). Both perspectives suggest that at least some epidemiologists 
are readily prepared to accept social characteristics as explanatory devices.
Illness causation is better captured in an etiological framework, not just a pathogenetic 
one. Following MacMahon and Pugh (1970:26), the term etiological stance is used to 
refer to the causal process that includes causal induction and pathogenetic mechanism, 
which overlaps with the disease process, which includes pathogenetic mechanism and 
clinical disease. !e former spans the time from #rst exposure to a risk factor to the end 
of the pathogenetic mechanism. !e latter begins with the pathogenetic mechanism 
and includes all of the clinical course of the disease of interest.
Note that factors that play a role during the causation process (e.g., inducers, 
modi#ers, mediators) are viewed as any kind of state (such as socioeconomic status), 
event (exposure to asbestos), or behavior (eating vegetables) that can be thought of as 
playing a biologically plausible role in determining the beginning of a pathogenetic 
mechanism. In this conceptual framework, etiological knowledge comprises 
knowledge about the entire process, including knowledge about pre-pathogenetic 
causes (generated mainly by epidemiologists) and knowledge about pathogenetic 
mechanisms (generated mainly by bench scientists). Again, knowledge about 
pathogenetic mechanisms is needed mainly for the development of pharmacomedical 
interventions, while knowledge about causes is o'en su$cient for disease prevention.
7.2.4 Bio-Social lifeworlds
Kelly, Kelly, and Russo use the term lifeworld to describe the space in which human 
relationships, as well as other social, biological, and physical environmental 
characteristics function as portals for adverse exposures. Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) 
used the term “living conditions” (Lebensbedingungen) when describing his view of 
the primacy of external causes in the form of changes in altered living conditions 
on heritable acquired characteristics (“eine erbliche Variation irgend einmal durch 
eine Causa externa, durch eine Veränderung der Lebensbedingungen entstanden sein 
muss”) (Wenig 1998–99:221).
!e usage of the term lifeworld by Kay S. Toombs in her discussion of George 
Engel’s biopsychosocial account of the physician’s and patient’s lifeworlds (Toombs 
1992) suggests that Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s vision of mixed mechanisms is identical, 
or at least compatible with, the disease model of psychosomatic medicine, which has 
been called “the scienti#c foundation of the biopsychosocial model” (Novack et%al. 
2007). It is the standard view of psychosomatic medicine that social factors play an 
enormous role as health determinants, not only as initiators of the disease process, 
but also as protectors in the form of social support (Cobb 1976). !us, one is le' 
wondering what Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s proposal o"ers beyond the biopsychosocial 
and psychosomatic models of illness causation.
7.2.5 Combined contribution
Kelly, Kelly, and Russo propose “mixed mechanisms” as a concept to bring social and 
biological mechanisms together in the individual’s lifeworld. I think that what they 
envision might be better described as “combined contribution” (Figure 7.2).
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Although Kelly, Kelly, and Russo think that an integrated model of disease causation 
should allow social and biological factors to interact mechanistically, they do not 
explain how this overarching mechanism could look (form) and work (function). 
!ey use the lifeworld image to circumscribe the space where they see such a 
mechanism taking place, and they use epigenetics as an example of a current research 
#eld in which “mixed mechanisms are at work.”
Kelly, Kelly, and Russo describe epigenetics as a link between social and biological 
mechanisms in disease causation. !is is an interesting example but too narrow 
a view of existing models of sociobiological causation. A full-&edged discussion 
of epigenetics would go far beyond the scope of this chapter. Brie&y, noninherited 
environmentally induced changes in the genetic makeup (speci#cally in DNA 
methylation status) of individuals can provide a link between environmental 
factors and biological responses. As causally suggestive titles of scienti#c reports on 
epigenetic #ndings may be – such as “Social crowding during development causes 
changes in GnRH1 DNA methylation” (Alvarado et%al. 2015) – I do not see how 
such a mechanism is mechanistically di"erent from others that link social causes 
and biological pathogenetic mechanisms. For example, social considerations appear 
to be the major driver among adolescents for their risky tanning behavior, which 
increases their exposure to ultraviolet radiation, whose cutaneous carcinogenicity is 
mechanistically well understood (Pfeifer and Besaratinia 2012; Sjoberg et%al. 2004).
Although the epigenetics example is an interesting one, it does not o"er an 
explanation of how social forces in a person’s lifeworld result in epigenetic events 
at the genetic level. !e authors suggest that “studying these epigenetic marks may 
provide the previously unknown mechanistic links between genetics, disease, and 
the environment” (Kelly, Kelly, and Russo 2014:320). Nowhere do they even allude 
to the idea that the form and function of at least some integrated sociobiological 
mechanisms are actually known.
Reverse mechanisms, to wit explanations of how biological factors determine social 
behaviors, have been studied by E. O. Wilson (1980). Although such mechanisms 
might be equally important in the context of illness causation, Kelly, Kelly, and 
Russo do not refer to these at all, probably because they lament the perceived lack 
of attention to mechanisms that integrate socio-causal explanations with existing 
biological ones, not the lack of attention to mechanisms that integrate bio-causal 
explanations with accepted social ones. Still, if their idea is to integrate both in one 
model, both directions are worthy of consideration as components of a comprehensive 
account of etiology of illness.
However, why is it necessary to bring up mechanisms at all? !e past decades 
have brought forward a great number of publications in the philosophy of science 
literature that de#ne and discuss mechanisms and causality in the context of science 
and of biology, medicine, and epidemiology (Bechtel 2008; Bechtel 2011; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Broadbent 2011; Clarke et%al. 2013b; 
Craver and Darden 2013; Erdei and Dammann 2014; Garson 2013; Glennan 1996a; 
Illari and Williamson 2012; Kincaid 2011; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; 
Nicholson 2012; Williamson 2011a, 2011b). As explained earlier and as depicted 
in Figure 7.1, the term process is used here to describe the entire etiological story 
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of disease occurrence, close to or perhaps even synonymous to Lewis’s “causal 
history” (Lewis 1986). Although the term mechanism (in Bechtel’s sense of dynamic 
mechanism) is used, the preference is to abstain from the term altogether, mainly 
because the term does not #t biological phenomena well. First, it is, in general, 
unclear as to what a mechanism is, as indicated by the multiple available de#nitions 
(Illari and Williamson 2012). Second, unless tweaked to include cyclic organization 
of phenomena, the term appears to be too rigid to capture the fact that biological 
signaling networks are quite stable and robust over generations despite their 
&exibility to adapt (Bechtel 2011). !ird, de#nitions of mechanism include too broad 
a range of reference to things and functions, for example, “entities” and “activities” 
(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000), “interactions between parts” (Glennan 
2002), and “parts” and “operations” (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). Fourth, this 
raises the possibility that “there is a serious danger of vacuity … that mechanisms 
just are whatever explains whatever happens” (Dupré 2013). One suggestion in 
response to at least two of these considerations is to replace mechanism with process 
in etiological explanations, because what is “stable and robust in biology are not 
things, but processes” (Dupré 2013). A full-&edged defense of this proposal has to 
wait for another time.
7.2.5.2 Explanation
Kelly, Kelly, and Russo subscribe to the Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT), the view 
that to “establish causal relations we typically need both evidence of correlation 
and evidence of mechanisms” (Kelly, Kelly, and Russo 2014:316). Alex Broadbent, 
conversely, has observed that the history of epidemiology suggests that intervention 
on causal claims without mechanistic evidence can be very successful, as in the 
examples of John Snow (1813–58) and cholera, and Ignaz Semmelweis (1818–65) 
and childhood fever. He concludes that his vignettes “cast doubt on the usefulness 
of a methodological principle stating that discovery of mechanisms is necessary 
for warranted causal inference” (Broadbent 2011:57). However, in order to o"er 
comprehensive etiological explanations, knowledge about the entire etiological 
process is needed, including both causal and pathogenetic components.
Here the question arises, what exactly do we do when we explain? One answer is 
that to give a causal explanation for “an event is to provide some information about 
its causal history” (Lewis 1986:217). Although such causal history can already be 
interpreted as being equivalent to what we mean by etiology (including both causal 
and pathogenetic components), Salmon’s “causal/mechanical explanation” #ts the 
bill even better. He actually used the term etiological explanation – borrowing it from 
Wright (1976) – to refer to “a causal network consisting of relevant causal interactions 
that occurred previously and suitable causal processes that connect them to the fact-
to-be-explained” (Salmon 1984:269). Salmon also referred to kinds of explanation 
that place emphasis on “the causal behavior of the constituents … rather than upon 
a set of antecedent causes” (p. 270). He called this kind of explanation “constitutive 
explanation,” which seems equivalent to what is now called mechanistic explanation. 
Lewis’s “causal history” is potentially synonymous with the epidemiological meaning 
of etiology, although his de#nition of “causal explanation” is silent about mechanisms 
that connect causes and e"ects. Salmon and Wright’s “etiological explanation,” 
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however, clearly is an explanation of a disease’s etiology as used here, because it 
includes information about both the antecedent causes and suitable pathogenetic 
mechanisms.
7.2.5.3 Combined contribution
One has to be mindful of the close link between knowledge and action, in medicine 
and in public health. All action in medicine and public health needs to be justi#ed, 
and knowledge based on evidence is the Big Justi#er. What kind of evidence do 
we need to generate knowledge that is solid enough to justify action? Instead of 
relying solely on causal claims, based on separate evidence of di"erence-making and 
evidence of mechanism (Russo and Williamson 2007b), we may want to consider 
relying on evidence of contribution, which can come as either evidence of di"erence-
making or of mechanism, or both.
Viewed from the pragmatic angle, it might be most helpful to spike etiological 
explanations with knowledge about all kinds of contributors to illness occurrence, 
including, but not limited to, causal initiators/inducers of pathogenesis (depicted 
as sun and toxic cloud in Figure 7.2), causal mediators (radiation and rain), genetic 
susceptibility modi#ers, and social facilitators (e.g., gender bias, poverty), among 
many other possibilities My suggestion to move from causation to combined 
contribution echoes Morten Severinsen, who wrote that
One of the problems which the principle of objective disease mechanism gives rise to, is 
that diseases are multifactorially conditioned (e.g., by having a so-called multifactorial 
etiology): If asked to give an objective answer to what the mechanism or the causal 
structure behind a disease is, one could argue that there are many “causal factors” in a 
complex structure of causes, and that, in most cases, those factors are neither su$cient 
nor necessary, but only contributory. (Severinsen 2001:322)
For example, one epidemiological scenario in which one factor contributes to the 
causal process by modifying the link between a certain exposure and a certain 
disease is e!ect modi"cation. E"ect modi#cation occurs in any situation in which 
individuals in two (or more) subgroups, de#ned by a variable called the e!ect 
modi"er, di"er quantitatively with regard to the respective exposure-outcome 
association. Such e"ect modi#cation “is a #nding to be reported rather than a bias to 
be avoided” (Rothman and Greenland 1998:254). E"ect modi#cation is one method 
in which epidemiologists honor the proposal by Kelly, Kelly, and Russo to invoke 
both biological and social explanations for their #ndings. Consider the following 
quotation from the abstract of a real-life epidemiological study:
Job related mechanical exposure in both sexes, and psychosocial factors in women, 
seem independently of each other to play a part for development of shoulder and 
neck pain in vocationally active people. !e e"ect of psychosocial factors was more 
prominent in women, which could be the result of biological factors as well as gender 
issues. !ese results suggest that interventions aiming at reducing the occurrence of 
shoulder and neck pain should include both mechanical and psychosocial factors. 
(Ostergren et%al. 2005)
!e upshot of this conclusion is that biological, psychosocial, and mechanical 
factors can be readily identi#ed and put together in an integrated explanation of 
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their combined contributions to shoulder and knee pain, which can be used as a 
step toward helpful interventions. However, despite the recognition of multifactorial 
disease models in the medical and lay communities, current etiological research is 
still dominated by attempts to identify “independent risk factors,” presumably causal 
antecedents of illness that contribute to illness occurrence independent of others. 
!e underlying idea appears to be that by identifying “independent risk factors,” 
one identi#es necessary causes of illness, which would reduce illness occurrence if 
avoided. However, the tension between attempts to identify (in practice) independent 
preventable risk-reducing factors and the acknowledgment (in theory) that there is no 
such thing as a single cause of illness deserves consideration. !e current “conception 
of multifactorial causes” holds that
all kinds of causal factors form a “causal complex,” “causal web” or “web of causation” 
that contributes to the development of a disease. Each factor is neither necessary nor 
su$cient, for producing the disease state, but their combination and potentiation lead 
to the e"ect. (Dekkers and Rikkert 2006)
Replacement of notions of causation with notions of contribution would require more 
than a mere change in terminology. In particular, I think that the overly simplistic 
folk concept of illness causation (“one cause, one disease”) prevents some etiological 
factors that are not direct inducers of illness from being considered in etiological 
explanations. Any factor that facilitates illness onset, changes susceptibility, or 
modi#es illness risk contributes to illness occurrence. !erefore, we should assemble 
all of these factors, together with direct causes, under the term contributor and 
denote their collective action as “combined contribution.”
Replacing narrow notions of causation with wider notions of contribution 
at all etiological levels will hopefully redirect attention, away from single causes 
toward a more holistic explanation of etiological processes. Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s 
contribution is a very important step in the right direction, one that can perhaps be 
improved along the lines discussed. To comprehensively explain complex etiologies, 
we need comprehensive, &exible concepts. In what follows, this proposal is outlined 
in more detail.
7.3  CONTRIBUTORS TO ILLNESS 
OCCURRENCE
Some, and perhaps even most etiological explanations are qualitatively di"erent from 
other examples of causal-mechanical explanations, such as why and how &ipping a 
light switch makes a di"erence by making the room seem lighter or darker. Etiological 
explanations of some diseases have become so complex that the disease is actually 
called a “complex disease.”4 Over the centuries, health scientists have developed 
techniques that help them generate more comprehensive etiological explanations. 
What makes etiological explanations more comprehensive is when more details can 
be added to the story of how disease develops.
In the remainder of this chapter, some examples are o"ered of what kind of factors 
would qualify. In brief, any factor, broadly conceived as a sociological, psychological, 
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or physico-biological fact or event, that makes a measurable contribution to illness 
occurrence should qualify. !e term contributor is used because it includes all factors 
that contribute to outcome occurrence (Figure 7.3), including factors that induce, 
modify, mediate, or moderate the etiological process, at the level of the cause, the 
pathogenesis, or the illness. 
7.3.1 Kinds of contribution
A framework for etiological explanations that replaces talk about causes with talk 
about contributors, without suggesting to replace causes with contributors, was 
suggested. Instead, look at causes as only one of multiple classes of factors that 
contribute to the etiology of illness. On this view, all causes are contributors, but not 
all contributors are causes (Figure 7.2). In epidemiology, causes are usually those 
factors or events that initiate the etiological process. But there are other kinds of 
contributors and conditions that are not usually considered to be causes. Here, the 
term cause is used in this epidemiological sense, not in the (many) broader senses 
that populate the philosophical literature.
1. Inducers
1a – Causes
1b – Causes of causes
1c – Causes of illness other than 1a
2. Modifiers
2a – Modifiers of causes (e.g., facilitators, inhibitors, …)
2b – Modifiers of causation process
2c – Modifiers of pathomechanism
2d – Modifiers of disease process
2e – Modifiers of illness
3. Mediators
3a – Mediators between causes and pathomechanisms
3b – Mediators between causes and illness








Figure 7.3 Inducers, modi!ers, and mediators are contributors to etiological processes.




















Here is a #rst attempt to de#ne etiological contributors (EC).
EC: A contributor to a health outcome is any factor that is part of and plays a 
functional role in an etiological process.
So de#ned, meddling with a contributor will likely change outcome occurrence; 
it will make a di"erence. However, we are not (yet) prepared to make di"erence-
making a criterion for all kinds of contribution. Still, some sort of manipulationist 
framework of contribution might be helpful, simply because the goal of medicine 
and public health is to intervene in order to reduce the burden of illness. !us, 
it seems prudent to include only contributors that, when changed, yield changes 
in health outcomes. However, this would be a mistake. We should not exclude 
contributors that cannot be modi#ed for the purpose of health improvement, such 
as age or race. If such factors make a di"erence in outcome, they will still enrich 
our etiological explanations. And even if they do not make a measurable di"erence 
in outcome, they still make a contribution to such di"erence-making. One example 
would be redundancies, as they o'en occur in biology. If a pathomechanism such 
as in&ammation works via receptor activation of one pro-in&ammatory cytokine, 
a similar receptor for a related cytokine might be a passive bystander until the 
reservoir of the #rst cytokine is exhausted. !e bystander would then become 
an active part of the pathomechanism. I think that the second cytokine-receptor 
pair should count as a contributor to the pathomechanism if only in its bystander 
function as a backup.
Some process theories of causation (in particular Salmon’s) employ the criterion 
of mark transmission. !e idea is Reichenbach’s, who used the term mark the way 
we now use the term di!erence, as in di"erence-making (Reichenbach 1957:136).5 
Reichenbach writes that his “de#nition of causal connection considers the causal 
chain a signal, that is, the transmission of a mark” (p. 271). Salmon initially adopted 
this criterion for his distinction between causal processes from pseudo-processes 
(Salmon 1984:142) and later agreed with Dowe’s suggestion to replace the mark 
transmission criterion with one of conserved quantities (Dowe 1995; Salmon 1997). 
It is not my goal to review this discussion here, but mark transmission as in sending 
a signal would be a good description for what is going on in etiological processes.
At the etiological level, a cause is that #rst step in the causation process that 
initiates the pathomechanism, and the pathomechanism is the biological 
mechanism that initiates the disease process (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). Here, the cause 
sends a signal that initiates the pathomechanisms, which in turn culminates in a 
signal that leads to clinical illness. !e term contributor is used here for all entities 
that are involved in the sending (causes), changing (modifying), or transduction 
(mediation) of signals in the etiological process, be it biological, psychological, or 
social signals. One objection is that, at a certain level way down in the biological 
swamp of molecules, and peptides, and their receptors, all of these contributors 
are causes, because whatever they do to help drive the etiological process forward, 
they must do it by causing a change. My response is that all components of complex 
etiological processes can be viewed as playing di"erent roles when viewed from 
di"erent angles. From this perspectivist vantage point, etiological explanations 
and their components can di"er depending on the observer’s interest, just as all 
explanations are interest-relative in one way or another.















We want to be as inclusive as possible for a very pragmatic reason. We cannot 
a"ord, in medicine or public health, to miss any potentially actionable target for 
intervention that would help reduce the burden of illness. Even if some components 
of the etiological process cannot be acted on directly, they still may increase our 
knowledge of what is going on in an etiological process, which may help identify other 
actionable target entities. !erefore, we should consider all kinds of factors involved in 
the etiological process, including, for example, inducers (senders of signals), modi#ers 
(changers of signals), and mediators (carriers of signals), all of which come in various 
social and biological shapes and colors.
!e idea of a contributor is not mine, and it is not new. !is idea is being 
discussed as re&ected in the Mackie-Rothman INUS-pie model of su$cient and 
component causes (in Section 2.4.1). Mackie developed his notion INUS based on 
J.S. Mill’s admittedly rather determinist statement that “[i]t is usually between the 
consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being 
requisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent.”6 
!is concurrence of multiple contributors to the causal process is also re&ected 
in David Lewis’ suggestion that explaining a particular event is to tell its “long 
and complicated causal history. We might imagine a world where causal histories 
are short and simple; but in the world as we know it, the only question is whether 
they are in#nite or merely enormous” (Lewis 1986:214). Modern bioscientists build 
on this assumption and try to tell the etiological story by drawing on di"erent 
kinds%of%evidence and di"erent interacting kinds of causal contribution. While the 
Lewis quote refers to particular (token) events, he also spoke to the issue of kinds 
of (type) events:
information may be provided about what is common to all the parallel causal  
histories%– call it general explanatory information about events of the given kind. To 
explain a kind of event is to provide some general explanatory information about 
events of that kind. (Lewis 1986:225; italics is cursive in original)
!is is exactly what epidemiologists do: identify kinds of etiological explanations by 
providing general explanatory information that consists of plausible and true data 
about what is common to their causal histories.
In Section 7.2, Kelly, Kelly, and Russo’s (KKR) article that “what is new isn’t 
convincing and what is convincing isn’t new” is written about. !e same could 
be said about my proposal, if the two main notions of our respective proposals 
(mixed mechanisms versus combined contribution) were semantically equivalent. 
!ey are not. KKR subscribe to the view put forward by the RWT, that “to 
establish causal relations we typically need both evidence of correlation and 
evidence of mechanisms” (Kelly, Kelly, and Russo 2014:316). Looking through the 
epidemiological lens, we #rst talk about causes of illness in a more restricted way, 
referring only to the inducers of etiological processes (Figure 7.1). Second, we take 
the illness causation process to be the sum of the causes and the pathomechanisms 
they induce, and the disease process to be the sum of the pathomechanisms and the 
clinical disease (yes, they overlap by both including the pathogenetic mechanism). 
One could say that the KKR/RWT way to explain illness occurrence (what they 
call “explain disease”) (Kelly, Kelly, and Russo 2014:316) is a shi' toward inclusion 




















of contributors that are not direct producers of their e"ects and will broaden the 
#eld of discussion.
We would bene#t from a more &exible concept of etiological thinking and 
causal inference that does exactly what doctors and researchers might o'en not 
be interested in, namely, provide descriptions of the entire “causal complex” or 
“causal connection” of diseases with a multivariable etiological story (Dekkers and 
Rikkert 2006). However, such &exible etio-theory needs to o"er room for “fuzzy” 
techniques of data analysis and causal inference, and probably most importantly, 
must let go of notions of “true causes of disease.”7 Fourth, enhancing notions of 
causation with notions of contribution might redirect the attention of researchers, 
physicians, nurses, and other healthcare workers from single elusive bits toward an 
understanding (or its absence) of etiologic wholes by appreciating comprehensive 
etiological explanations.
In what follows is described how certain parts of those causal histories provide 
di"erent kinds of general explanatory information. !e concept of contribution is 
described in detail by giving examples for three di"erent kinds of contributors, that 
is, inducers, mediators, and moderators. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list and 
can probably be expanded appreciably in interesting ways.
7.3.2 Induction
!e importance given to the term exposure by epidemiologists re&ects the 
assumption that it is the #rst of multiple events that lead to illness and, thus, induces 
the etiological process (in the sense of initiating it). In traditional and molecular 
epidemiology, such inducers are o'en called the “exposure of interest” (Schulte and 
Perera 1993:6). Inducers are o'en considered “the cause” of the etiological process 
(item #1a in Figure 7.3). !ey start the etiological process, and the exposure of an 
individual to an inducer is thought of as the initiation of the process of illness 
causation. Obviously, however, causes also have causes (#1b), a concept that has 
recently received attention from the social determinants of health perspective 
(Braveman and Gottlieb 2014). Also, many kinds of illness have multiple kinds 
of causes (#1c). One simple example includes genetic disorders that have multiple 
di"erent gene aberrations as a possible “root cause,” such as autism spectrum 
disorders (Gaugler et%al. 2014).
Philosophers have contrasted what they call causal productivity or production 
with causal propagation, the in&uence of events at one place and time on events at 
another place and time (Salmon 1993), or relevance/di!erence-making, the idea that 
a cause can make a di"erence to an e"ect without producing it (Glennan 2011). Since 
the etiological process is a biological process, the inducer has to have the capacity 
to start the biological chain of events.8 In the biosciences, this capacity is conceived 
of as the logical and biological capability of a signal to be propagated in a biological 
process.9
Consider, for example, one review article in the Journal of Experimental and 
Clinical Cancer Research is entitled, “Dual e"ect of oxidative stress on leukemia 
cancer induction and treatment” (Udensi and Tchounwou 2014). !e paper describes 
the double-edged-sword-like e"ects of oxidative stress (OS), mainly in the form of 















an overabundance of reactive oxygen species (ROS) in tissues, on body cells in both 
pro- and anticancer biological processes. !e authors use the term induction in a 
causal way, as illustrated by the following examples:
 • “Many chemotherapeutic drugs have been shown to exert their biologic activity 
through induction of OS in a"ected cells.”
 • “Endogenous DNA damage demonstrates the genotoxic, carcinogenic, and 
mutations induction properties of ROS.”
 • “A traditional Chinese medicine, Mylabris, exerts its anticancer e"ects through 
induction of oxidative stress.”
In all these examples, induction is a form of causation that is de#ned as the 
initiation of a mechanism, the starting of a process, and the generation of a 
biological phenomenon, mainly inside the body. In epidemiology, the induction 
kind of causation is conceptualized as the beginning of the disease process by 
induction of the bodily disease causation process from outside the body. Examples 
are exposure to radiation or tobacco smoke, which induce changes in skin and 
lung cells, respectively, which demarcates the beginning of the skin/lung cancer 
pathogenesis process. In philosophy, this kind of causation has been called “primary 
cause” (Bunge 1979:49), “e$cient cause [,] or stimulus condition” (Mumford and 
Anjum 2011a:33).
!e idea that mechanisms play a prominent role in etiological processes o"ers 
room for the view that di"erent parts of such mechanisms have di"erent functions 
in that they contribute to the etiological process in di"erent ways. !e suggestion 
to move from concepts of illness causation to the concept of contribution to illness 
goes back to Severinsen’s discussion of disease mechanism as a basis for disease 
classi#cation systems, in which he states that
if asked to give an objective answer to what the mechanism or the causal structure 
behind a disease is, one could argue that there are many “causal factors” in a complex 
structure of causes, and that, in most cases, those factors are neither su$cient nor 
necessary, but only contributory. (Severinsen 2001:322)
7.3.3 Modi!cation
John Stuart Mill (1806–73) coined the phrase “composition of causes” for cases “in 
which the joint e"ect of several causes is identical with the sum of their separate 
e"ects” (Mill 1856:Chapter v, §1). In cases, however, where
a concurrence of causes takes place which calls into action new laws, bearing no 
analogy to any that we can trace in the separate operation of the causes, the new laws 
may%supersede one portion of the previous laws but coexist with another portion, 
and may even compound the e"ect of those previous laws with their own. (Mill 
1956:Chapter v, §2)
!is comes close to what statisticians call interaction, what epidemiologists think 
of as e!ect modi"cation, and what psychologists mean when they use the term 
moderation (Figure 7.3, in particular 2b–d). In epidemiology, the concept of e"ect 




















modi#cation, a.k.a., e!ect measure modi"cation (Rothman, Greenland, and Lash 
2008b), is rather important.
Consider the following situation. In a large randomized trial including almost 
40,000 healthy women, 45 years or older, designed to test the hypothesis that low-dose 
aspirin prevents cardiovascular disease in women, a prominent statistically signi#cant 
protective e"ect of aspirin on major cardiovascular events (risk reduction by 26%) was 
identi#ed in women 65 years or older, while no e"ect was observed among women 
64 years or younger (Ridker et%al. 2005). !is is an example of e"ect modi#cation by 
age: an e"ect is observed in one age group but not in another. Obviously, such results 
have direct implications for interventionalists. While it may seem best to prescribe 
aspirin to women 65 or older, but not to younger women, potential risks must be 
weighed against the bene#ts. In this case, in the age group 65 years or older, 44 fewer 
myocardial infarctions or deaths were seen, but aspirin use came with 16 more cases 
of gastrointestinal hemorrhage.
One particularly interesting kind of modi#cation is inhibition (Figure 7.3, #2a):
 • “[Substance X] has been reported to exert its therapeutic action against APL 
cancer through induction of cell di"erentiation via mechanisms that include 
degradation of PML-RARA gene and inhibition of arachidonic acid metabolic 
pathway in other cancer cells.” (Udensi and Tchounwou 2014:8)
 • “Application of antioxidant principles may illicit same effect [sic], for 
example% inhibition of intracellular antioxidants such as GSH and heme 
oxygenase-1 (HO-1).” (p. 10)
Inhibitors of causal processes can remove the cause entirely or partially block its 
immediate e"ects to various degrees. !ey can also interrupt the pathomechanism or 
slow it down. !us, inhibitors can result in the prevention of illness or in other, more 
gradual changes in illness occurrence, for example, by slowing down the etiological 
process. One objection to this proposal would be that process inhibition cannot 
count as a causal contributor because it does not contribute to the occurrence of a 
health phenomenon, other than potentially decreasing the risk of the outcome to 
occur. !is is what protective risk factors do; they are associated with a reduced risk 
of the outcome under investigation. Inhibition does not contribute to the merely 
qualitative aspect of illness occurrence, at least not in the sense of contributing to its 
occurrence among individuals who do not have it. However, their potential to reduce 
illness severity or even prevent illness occurrence renders inhibitors very important 
contributors to illness etiology that we should be interested in at least as much as we 
are interested in root causes.
Another objection would be that inhibition is by de#nition not a contribution 
to the process that it interferes with, because it represents a separate process, 
that is, that of process inhibition. It would be taking the easy way out to say that 
inhibitory factors are part of the etiological story of a certain illness, because #nding 
such%a%factor%is%mouthwatering for epidemiologists and biomedical scientists because 
they now have a new target for intervention. Hold on to the notion that inhibition 
is a kind of explanatory part of the etiological process, not so much because it 
helps%explain why the health outcome occurs, but because interference helps explain 
why the outcome occurs in the form and magnitude it does, but not in a di"erent one.
















It is arguably self-evident that mediation is contribution. Mediators (Figure 7.3, 
#3a,b) are intermediate factors in the form X > M > Y. In this scenario, X causes Y, 
but only indirectly so, that is, by causing M, which in turn causes Y. !us, we say the 
e"ect of X on Y is wholly mediated by M when X cannot lead to Y except through 
mediation. Mediation can also be partial, when X causes Y directly as well as via 
mediation by M (Figure 7.4).10
Woodward distinguishes between two notions of cause. !e #rst is the notion of 
a total cause, which is a cause if and only if an intervention on it and on no other 
variables results in a nonzero total e"ect on the outcome (Woodward 2003:50). In 
contrast, a contributing cause is a direct or indirect cause that has a nonzero e"ect 
on the outcome by in&uencing a direct cause of the outcome while all variables that 
are not on the causal pathway are kept constant.11 Per Woodward, direct causes 
are always contributors, while some contributors may also be indirect. In our 
current context, all mediators are contributors, because they are all considered 
direct causes.12
Taken together, I think that induction, modi#cation, and mediation qualify as 
modes of contribution to stories of illness occurrence in ways that render them 
helpful in understanding the etiology of illness. If nothing else, this makes them 
valuable items in comprehensive etiological explanations.
Given the heterogeneity of contributors displayed in Figure 7.2, I feel the need 
to reiterate that contributors include causes and all other kinds of factors that 
somehow contribute to illness occurrence. In this sense, a contributor is anything 
that transmits a mark. Of course, we need some kind of justi#cation to include or 
exclude contributors in etiological explanations. !is is the topic for the next and 
last chapter, where my thinking about explanatory coherence as a way to create such 




Figure 7.4 Partial mediation of X ’s effect on Z.





In Chapter 3, etiological explanations were introduced, and it was argued that they 
fall under a pluralist concept (in Chapter 4). Introduced was the kind of explanation 
envisaged by the central argument of the Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT), who 
talk about evidence of di!erence-making (association) and evidence of mechanism 
in support of causal claims in the health sciences (Chapter 5). My take on this is 
that, instead of RWT kind of evidence, we need evidence that supports etiological 
explanations. In Chapter 6, it was proposed that etiological explanations are 
explanations of a biological trajectory from causes via pathomechanisms to disease 
and that, therefore, etiological explanations explain a process. In comparison to 
explanations of mechanisms, where the focus is on components of mechanisms 
and their relationships, process explanations focus on the sequence of events in the 
etiological story. In Chapter 7, it was argued that including background conditions 
and other contributors such as mediators and modi"ers can render etiological 
explanations of illness occurrence more comprehensive, which is considered an 
explanatory virtue.
In this chapter, "rst, some brief, overarching thoughts about explanatory 
coherentism are o!ered. #is philosophical framework might be a good "t for the 
design of comprehensive etiological explanations (Section 8.1). Section 8.2 is based 
on a paper previously published in the American Journal of Epidemiology (Dammann 
2018). It is an attempt to connect Hill’s viewpoints (introduced in Section 2.5.2 
and expanded upon later) with concepts from Ted Poston’s book, Reason and 
Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism (Poston 2014). Poston’s theory 
of explanatory coherentism is well suited as a tool for etiological explanation in the 
health sciences, particularly in epidemiology. As a caveat, Poston’s theory is not 
one of explanation but of explanatory justi!cation. It$explicates why explanatory 
coherentism can deliver justi"cation to believe certain claims.
Coherence has not only played a role in epidemiology as one of Hill’s viewpoints, 
it can also provide background theory for the development of explanatory systems 
by integrating epidemiological evidence with a diversity of other error-independent 
scienti"c data. Computational formalization of Hill’s viewpoints in an explanatory 
coherentist framework would provide an excellent starting point for a formal 
epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) project designed to improve causal 
explanation in the health sciences. As an example, Paul$#agard’s ECHO System 
is introduced and my responses to possible objections to my proposal are o!ered.















In Section 8.3. we dig a little deeper into what Hill’s intentions might have been 
and %esh out my proposal that his heuristics make for an interesting explanatory 
coherentist framework for etiological explanations. In what follows, the foundations 
for that proposal are set out.




#is section is a response to two invitations. #e "rst comes from philosopher Alex 
Broadbent, who asks epidemiologists to take an explanatory stance in the causal 
interpretation of measures of association (Broadbent 2013). #e second is from 
epidemiologist Alfredo Morabia, who suggests that Hill’s viewpoints (Hill 1965) 
cannot be traced back to the work of classic philosophers of causality, Hume and 
Mill, but constitute a sui generis approach to causal discovery, “which still awaits its 
philosophers” (Morabia 2013).
Ted Poston’s version of explanatory coherentism (Poston 2014) is introduced. 
Next, Hill’s concept of coherence is revisited. #en, the idea that the two could 
be brought together in a formalized analysis so&ware, such as #agard’s ECHO 
system, is considered. Finally, the position against three main objections from the 
foundationalist perspective, from the perspective of the potential outcomes approach 
(POA) (Glass et$al. 2013), and from the “computational skeptic” angle is defended.
8.2.2 Explanatory coherentism
Philosopher Ted Poston probably did not have epidemiologists in mind as a 
target audience for his book Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory 
Coherentism (Poston 2014). Still, his theory appears to be relevant to epidemiology 
as a potential way to semiformalize the kind of approach to causal explanation 
represented by Hill’s viewpoints. Ken Rothman and coauthors suggest that for 
Hill, “causal inference is a subjective matter of degree of personal belief, certainty, 
or conviction” and that “this view is precisely that of subjective Bayesian statistics” 
(Rothman et$al. 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Epidemiologists should be interested in 
theories such as Poston’s because explanatory coherentism is the justi"cation of a 
statement by showing that it is part of an explanatory system, which is internally 
coherent and externally better than alternative systems. It deserves mention 
that the idea, to require not just a good causal explanation, but one that is better 
than others, is not Poston’s, but is based on a concept in philosophy of science 
called “inference to the best explanation” (Harman 1965; Lipton 2004), which is 
essentially a method of eliminating alternative explanations until one, purportedly 
the best, remains unchallenged. A more detailed discussion of this idea goes far 
beyond the scope of this chapter.
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Poston’s theory holds that the normative position of a person’s reasoning is de"ned 
by how that person explains what is going on in herself and the world around her, and 
that she justi"es her beliefs by "tting them into a “virtuous explanatory system” (as 
de"ned later) that is better than relevant alternative systems. She gathers data about 
facts, puts them in context, compares her explanatory system to others, and considers 
her beliefs justi"ed if her belief system turns out to beat all competitors.
Naturally, not all agree that such a view can replace one that favors the truth over 
coherence. In philosophy, this camp is called the “foundationalists,” whose claim 
is that coherentism and other nonfoundationalist theories fail because the world 
cannot rest on the back of a turtle that rests on the back of a turtle that rests on the 
back of a turtle …, and it is turtles all the way down.1 Foundationalists hold that there 
is one last turtle all the way down, and it stands on a foundation that is not based on 
any inference.
Poston o!ers a theory of justi"cation that incorporates the notions of explanation, 
coherence, and contrast. He states that one “has justi"cation for believing p if and 
only if p is a member of a su'ciently virtuous explanatory system, E, and E is more 
virtuous than any competing system E!” (Poston 2014:87). At this point, let’s de"ne 
two crucial elements of Poston’s earlier statement.
First, being a member of an explanatory system means being an item that explains 
(explanans) or that is to be explained (explanandum). Second, for this explanatory 
system to be “su'ciently virtuous” means, in Poston’s framework, to be “su'ciently 
conservative, simple, or great in power.” An explanation is conservative if we 
always have a situation in which we have some background knowledge that helps 
defending our belief in the truth of a statement even without additional evidence. An 
explanation is simple if it involves fewer components than competitor explanatory 
systems. Finally, an explanation is powerful if it explains a diversity of phenomena.
Second, all of these involve contrastive evaluation of explanatory systems, and 
evaluation in comparison to alternatives. #is notion is derived from inference to 
the best explanation, the idea that explaining why risk factor A but not risk factor B 
causes outcome O is better than just explaining why A causes O. Of course, inference 
to the best explanation also has noncontrastive characteristics, which are of lesser 
importance in our present context than contrastivity.
In the "nal chapter of his book, Poston shows that explanationism and Bayesianism 
are compatible – a connection that is in keeping with Rothman et$al.’s link between 
causal inference and subjective Bayesianism, as well as Lipton’s defense of the 
compatibility of inference to the best explanation and Bayesian inference (Lipton 
2004). Explanation and its virtues represent the scienti"c tradition of using the notions 
of law, causation, and explanation to argue for the superiority of some hypothesis 
over others. Bayesianism is a purely formal model that does not incorporate these 
notions. Poston shows how the two views of inductive inference "t together and in 
fact supplement each other – an observation that is welcome to those who advocate 
for the integration of Bayesian thinking in meta-analysis (Sutton and Abrams 2001), 
genetic (Wilson et$al. 2010), spatial (Lawson 2012), and clinical epidemiology (Luthra 
2015), as well as in causal inference (Williamson 2005) and causal theory building 
(Sloman and Lagnado$2015).
Poston’s theory is well suited for causal explanation in epidemiology for two closely 
related reasons. First, coherence is one of the classical Hill viewpoints (Hill$1965). 















Second, Poston’s work can provide background theory for the development of 
explanatory systems. Within epidemiology, it can serve as one way to decide among 
competing explanatory systems. In a transdisciplinary context, it can help integrate 
epidemiological evidence with evidence from independent sources, such as basic 
laboratory science, interventional trials, and postmarketing data.
8.2.3 Explanation in silico
A particularly intriguing way to use Hill’s heuristics as explanatory virtues would be 
to integrate it with a computational coherence assessment system. For example, Paul 
#agard has developed computational models of coherence and integrated them with 
aspects of scienti"c communication into a consensus model of scienti"c discourse 
(#agard 2000). #agard and colleagues have formalized his theory of explanatory 
coherence (#agard 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007) in the computational model ECHO. #e 
algorithm accommodates seven principles2:
E1. Symmetry: Explanatory coherence is a symmetrical relation. #at is, two 
propositions P and Q cohere with each other equally.
E2. Explanation: (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it explains, which can either be 
evidence or another hypothesis; (b) hypotheses that together explain some other 
proposition cohere with each other; and (c) the more hypotheses it takes to explain 
something, the lower the degree of coherence.
E3. Analogy: Similar hypotheses that explain similar pieces of evidence cohere with 
each other.
E4. Data priority: Propositions that describe the results of observations have a degree 
of acceptability on their own.
E5. Contradiction: Contradictory propositions are incoherent with each other.
E6. Competition: If P and Q both explain a proposition, and if P and Q are not 
explanatorily connected, then P and Q are incoherent with each other. (P and Q 
are explanatorily connected if one explains the other or if together they explain 
something.)
E7. Acceptance: #e acceptability of a proposition in a system of propositions depends 
on its coherence with them. (#agard 2006)
As an example, #agard modeled the coherence of the decision-making process 
in the courtroom (#agard 2004). He fed ECHO information available to jurors in 
the notorious case of Martha von Bülow, who was found unconscious in 1980 and 
remained in a coma until her death in 2008. Her husband Claus was found guilty 
of assault with intent to murder in 1982. He appealed and was acquitted in a second 
trial. #agard successfully demonstrates that ECHO arrives at the same results: “For 
the "rst trial, ECHO ends up accepting the hypothesis that Claus injected [his wife] 
with insulin, but for the second trial ECHO ends up rejecting it” (#agard 2004).
It is possible to design a so&ware similar to ECHO in which Hill’s viewpoints 
are incorporated as explanatory virtues. Each one of ECHO’s requirements listed 
earlier can be viewed as a decision point; Hill’s viewpoints are nothing else. Once 
fed with pertinent epidemiological and other bioscienti"c data, such a program 
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could function as a decision-tree-like algorithm, which is a computational method 
that has regained importance in the context of machine learning (Kelleher,$Mac 
Namee, and D’Arcy 2015). It would be possible to validate such semiformal so&ware 
in comparison to informal current analyses of causal explanation, for example, of 
the causal association between Zika virus and birth defects (Frank,$Faber, and Stark 
2016; Rasmussen et$al. 2016). Due to space limitations, the semantics of such so&ware 
cannot be fully developed, but here are a few desiderata: the input of evidence data 
should include text-mining strategies moderated by human expertise; a modi"able 
weighting of Hill’s heuristics should be included; and the so&ware designers would 
need to be creative in translating Hill’s open-ended questions into the rigid syntax 
of a programming language in order to retain the overarching explanatory intention 
of Hill’s viewpoints.
In this section, it was proposed that a computational explanatory coherentist 
tool for decision-making might be helpful in the overall project of bringing causal 
explanation together with complex systems thinking in epidemiology (Galea, Riddle, 
and Kaplan 2010; Marshall and Galea 2015; Pearce and Merletti 2006). Discussed in 
the next section is how this proposal is aligned with Hill’s viewpoints.
8.2.4 Hill’s coherence
Since their initial publication, Hill’s viewpoints have been extensively discussed in 
the epidemiological and philosophical literature (Hö%er 2005, 2006; Ioannidis 2015; 
Morabia 1991, 2013; Phillips and Goodman 2004, 2006; Rothman 1988; Rothman 
and Greenland 2005; #ygesen, Andersen, and Andersen 2005; Ward 2009a, 2009b; 
Worrall 2011). #e overall agreement appears to be that although they cannot prove 
causation, they can still be useful. Phillips and Goodman put it in a nutshell: “Hill’s 
famous considerations are thus both over-interpreted by those who would use them 
as criteria and under-appreciated as lessons in basic scienti"c thinking” (Phillips 
and Goodman 2006).
It is not my intention to discuss all nine viewpoints in detail in this chapter. 
Instead, the focus is on Hill’s view of coherence and how it can support causal claims 
in epidemiology and beyond.
An explanatory coherentist reconstruction of Hill’s viewpoints is in keeping with 
his intention to o!er a tool for decision-making. Interpreting Hill’s approach as 
motivated by a contrastive explanatory stance is aligned with re%ection on cases 
from the literature where his heuristics are used as explanatory virtues in causal 
explanations.
First, Hill’s heuristics can be viewed as “explanatory virtues” that are used to assess 
the relative worth of competing causal explanations; the greater their contrastive 
explanatory virtue, the more we are justi"ed to assume causation. Hill was convinced 
that his viewpoints can be useful by means of "nding alternative explanations that 
are better than causation (Hill 1965:298).
Hill suggests that causal claims can be strengthened by coherent evidence from 
multiple observations and gives as an example the coherence of the claim that 
causally relates smoking and lung cancer with observations such as concomitant 
increase of both exposure and outcome over time, as well as sex di!erences in both 
smoking behavior and mortality (p. 298).
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In this part of his explication of “coherence,” Hill refers to evidence from within 
epidemiological research. He argues that an association between smoking and 
lung disease that can be detected by conducting a cohort study should not be easily 
contradicted by results obtained in, for example, an ecological study, which (as in his 
earlier example) would yield population-level data for both smoking and lung disease 
over time without reference to person-level data.
Second, interpreting Hill’s heuristics as explanatory virtues appreciates their value 
as “countervailing evidence limiters.” Looking at possible competitor explanations in 
light of Hill’s heuristics increases the likelihood that the index causal claim remains 
at the top of the list of explanations, at least until one such competitor explanation 
turns out to be more coherent.
#ird, epidemiological evidence in support of causal claims may be strong if 
supported by multiple observations, but it is even stronger if supported by multiple 
di"erent kinds of observation. Hill’s viewpoints ask for error-independent evidence 
(Claveau 2012), the explanatory bene"t carried by multiple sources of evidence that 
cannot be invalidated for the same reason. In brief, two or more pieces of evidence 
are error-independent if the failure of one does not a!ect the stability of the other. 
In our context, if epidemiological evidence turns out to be false, it would not render 
otherwise coherent biological evidence incorrect, and vice versa. #us, evidence 
becomes stronger “if multiple, (more or less) error-independent, evidential elements 
support the same claim” (Claveau 2012:812).
Hill suggests further that epidemiological evidence should not be in con%ict 
with background information about the biological mechanism of the disease. As$an 
example, he refers to histological abnormalities in the lung and the isolation of 
carcinogenic substances from cigarette smoke (Hill 1965:298).
While some philosophers of science think that in order to make causal claims 
in the health sciences, one needs evidence of both di!erence-making (statistical 
associations) and evidence of mechanism (Russo and Williamson 2007b), some of us 
hold that having both kinds of evidence may be su'cient but certainly not necessary 
for successful causal claims (Broadbent 2011; Fiorentino and Dammann 2015). In this 
regard, Hill remains completely neutral by explicitly denying that "nding evidence in 
support of his viewpoints should be considered necessary to establish causal claims.
8.2.5 Objections and rebuttal
Among the possible objections to this proposal are objections against coherentism 
in general, against Hill’s viewpoints as a method for causal explanation, and against 
the idea to formalize Hill’s heuristics.
Objections against coherentism come, for example, from anticoherentist Erik 
Olsson, who writes (with direct reference to #agard’s version of coherentism) that 
“there is no way to de"ne a useful informative concept of degree of coherence such 
that more coherence implies a higher likelihood of truth ceteris paribus” (Olsson 
2005). #is argument, although probably considered a strong one by foundationalists, 
is beside the point in our current scenario, simply because we are not searching 
for truth ceteris paribus, but for an explanation that leads to more fruitful action 
than competitors. Moreover, foundationalism has yet to deliver a method to infer 
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truth from observed data. Note that switching to the fruitful action criterion does 
not invalidate Olsson’s objection; it merely moves the goalposts into a pragmatist 
direction. It remains to be shown whether and how it is possible to establish degrees 
of coherence. Perhaps by allocating relative weights to Hill’s viewpoints – while 
one (temporality) is being considered a sine qua non (Rothman et$al. 2008a, 2008b, 
2008c), another (analogy) we can live without, although its presence in the body of 
evidence would certainly add to the overall coherence of the system to be explained.
Perhaps the strongest opposition might come from advocates of the POA, who 
consider their approach worthy of the appellation “modern approach,” while 
Hill’s viewpoints are implicitly demoted to the status of “classic framework” 
(Glass$et$al.$2013). Glass and colleagues note that
(Hill’s) classic framework was developed to identify the causes of diseases and […] 
has proven useful […], but does not re%ect the current, more clearly articulated view 
of causal processes. Additionally, the guidelines used to evaluate evidence have not 
changed for decades. (Glass et$al. 2013)
#ere are no less than four points to be argued with this statement.
First, it is incorrect that Hill’s goal was to “identify causes.” Instead, he wanted to 
o!er help with contrastive explanation (“is there any other way of explaining the set 
of facts before us” [Hill 1953]). Yes, contrastive explanation can help identify causes 
via inference to the best explanation (Lipton 2004). However, Hill’s heuristics help by 
providing evidence in support of the inference part, not by criteria for what the best 
explanation should entail. Glass and colleagues write that the fundamental problem 
with causal inference from observational data is confounding and that one needs 
to bend over backward to adjust for all possible measured confounders by using 
appropriate methods like matching, strati"cation, propensity scores, g-estimation, 
and so forth. #ose who deal with confounders for a living will ask what has become 
of residual confounding. #e term is conspicuously absent from Glass et$al.’s paper. 
Either the authors forgot to discuss it (unlikely), or they do not consider residual 
confounding an important issue (even more unlikely). Douglas Weed wrote some 
time ago that “causation cannot be seen. Causation cannot be proven. […] Nor can 
causation be made certain. It is, at best, an expert’s judgment, at worst, an expert’s 
guess” (Weed 2008). #at is, I think, what Hill had in mind: to support experts’ 
admittedly fallible judgements by o!ering a set of questions they can ask themselves 
to ponder before we “pass from this observed association to a verdict of causation” 
(Hill 1965). #at future semiformal ECHO-like algorithms might contribute to the 
generation of fair verdicts and judgements that are better than those arrived at via 
free-%oating nonformal assessment.
Second, Hill’s viewpoints are useful despite their fallibility. More than half a 
century a&er their publication, they are still given room in epidemiology textbooks, 
for a reason: #ey help epidemiologists to evaluate and weigh the available evidence 
for and against causal hypotheses, as in recent publications on Zika virus infection 
and birth defects (Lipton 2004).
#ird, Hill’s viewpoints should be able to take care of causal processes. I am also 
not sure in what way our view of causal processes is now more clearly articulated now 




















process in the 1960s as much as they do now, and the idea of an etiological process 
was well established in 1949, as evidenced in a case report on methemoglobinemia 
and Minnesota well water, in reference to the kinds of etiological processes that 
epidemiologists try to disentangle:
#e father of the "rst infant [suggested a] reaction between the well water and  
the soy$ bean preparation used in the baby’s formula […] analysis of the well  
water showed$a$high nitrate content. #us the etiologic process was discovered. (Bosch 
et$al. 1950)
Fourth, it is true that the guidelines have not changed since their initial publication 
in 1965. #ere is no reason to assume that they should be changed just because they 
were published half a century ago. #ey have stood the test of time for a reason: 
they are useful. Moreover, the nature of illness causation has not changed much 
over the past 50 years. What has changed are our concepts of causal inference and 
explanation, but adapting our interpretation of Hill’s heuristics accordingly may be 
insu'cient to maintain their value for epidemiological reasoning.
Why should the POA be any better than “modern” reconstructions of Hill’s 
apparently rather successful viewpoints? Observational data, even if strati"ed and 
analyzed according to the presence or absence of hypothetical interventions, are 
still observational. Why should data from hypothetical interventions be better than 
observational data if even data from real interventions, such as randomized trials, 
might not necessarily be epistemologically superior (Cartwright 2010; Worrall 
2007)? #e POA and Hill’s approach are di"erent, in that the POA is a quantitative 
method to extract causal information from observed data, primarily from one 
particular dataset to which the approach is applied. In contrast, Hill’s framework is 
a qualitative approach, integrating information from multiple sources, not just one 
study. #us, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive; to the contrary, they are 
supplementing each other.
#ere are doubts that the POA should be considered superior and become the 
sole standard approach to causal explanation in epidemiology. Vandenbroucke, 
Broadbent, and Pearce wrote that they “feel (the POA) would damage the discipline 
if it became the dominant paradigm” (Vandenbroucke, Broadbent, and Pearce 
2016). #eir critique is addressed to a particular version of the POA that they call 
the restricted POA, that is, a POA restricted by the rejection of (1) manipulations 
that are not humanly feasible and thus not interesting to epidemiologists, and 
(2) causal claims that do not allow for predictions under hypothetical scenarios. 
A full discussion of their comprehensive discussion is far beyond the scope of 
this chapter; su'ce it to say that Vandenbroucke et$al. cogently argue against the 
notion that the tools of the restricted POA “are the only or even the best tools for 
assessing causality” and are in favor of “a pragmatic pluralism about concepts 
of causality” (ibid.) Indeed, the integration of multiple kinds of evidence in the 
search for actionable causes of illness is a central characteristic of our current 
epidemiological thinking, albeit still without a formal theoretical framework for 
knowledge integration.
Another objection would be to say that a computational approach to a coherentist 
version of Hill’s framework as explanatory virtues is unlikely to be better than Hill’s 
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framework as is. My response to this is: we do not know this until we have tried. 
#us, my proposal to explore the value of computational coherentist tools for causal 
thinking in epidemiology and biomedicine is justi"ed. I also suggest that theories 
such as Poston’s and #agard’s would provide an excellent starting point for such a 
project.
8.3  POSTSCRIPT – HILL’S ETIOLOGICAL 
COHERENTISM3
8.3.1 Introduction
#e seminal paper by Sir Austin Bradford Hill (1965) on causal inference in previous 
chapters.4 In the previous section, development has begun on a framework that 
conceives of Hill’s viewpoints as an explanatory coherentist system. #is proposal 
goes beyond coherence as one of Hill’s nine viewpoints.5 Instead, explanatory 
coherence can be seen as the theory behind Hill’s viewpoints, or what others have 
called “aspects” (Ward 2009b), “values” (Poole 2001), or “considerations” (Hö%er 
2006).
In this section, response is given to Broadbent’s invitation to “advance beyond 
Hill’s viewpoints [by asking] how good evidence needs to be before it warrants a 
causal inference” (Broadbent 2013:69). But before going there, in Section 8.3.2 we ask 
what Hill’s conception of illness causation may have been in the "rst place and what 
he may have wanted to present, if not criteria for causation. He was clearly interested 
in developing a heuristic for the justi!cation of decisions to act. It seems to be explicit 
in his paper that Hill suggested his viewpoints with action in mind. However, Hill 
knew that he would have to pay a price for getting to a justi"cation of action: he 
would have to replace the idea of causal inference based on solid criteria with the 
idea of inference based on heuristics (viewpoints, aspects, etc.), thereby embracing 
the epistemological intricacies of inductive fallibility.
We also provide an answer to the question of what Hill’s criteria have to o!er 
if they are neither a checklist of characteristics for those who seek a “yes” or “no” 
answer to the causal question, nor a continuous measure of how strong the evidence 
is in support of such a “yes” or “no” answer. In Section 8.3.3, it is proposed that Hill’s 
viewpoints are explanatory virtues in an explanatory coherentist system (Poston 
2014) of statements that can be compared to alternative systems. In recognition of 
my space constraints in this chapter, three topics are only brie%y addressed that 
will remain to be explored in depth at a later time (Section 8.3.4). First, future work 
needs to outline in what ways and why there is disagreement with Poston’s notion of 
explanatory primitiveness; second, it remains to be shown whether and how my Hill-
Poston-inspired view of etiological explanations resonates with uni"cationist models 
of explanation (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1989); and third, my observation that Hill’s 
viewpoints are metaphysically heterogeneous needs to be outlined in more detail 
(Russo and Williamson 2007b; #ygesen, Andersen, and Andersen 2005), which 
further improves their explanatory virtue by providing what Claveau has called 
error-independent evidence (Claveau 2012).















8.3.2  Hill’s heuristics as justi"cation 
for!action
It is interesting that nowhere in his paper does Hill write anything about his 
perception of what illness causation is – he does not o!er a de"nition. He writes that 
he does not have the “wish, nor the skill, to embark upon a philosophical discussion 
of the meaning of ‘causation’” (Hill 1965:295). By saying this, Hill makes it clear 
that his approach is not guided by metaphysical considerations. Instead, he states 
his epistemological problem a few lines below: “#e decisive question is whether 
the frequency of the undesirable event B will be in%uenced by the environmental 
feature A” (ibid.). #us, Hill’s question is about causation as in#uence. As such, it is 
a question about the relationship between the two sets of characteristics, one being a 
constellation of risk factors that, taken together, appear to be responsible for illness 
occurrence by exerting an in%uence, and the other being the set of characteristics 
that de"nes the illness under consideration. In this context, it seems that causal 
inference is about what we think we should think about relationships between 
characteristics of etiological systems we have before us. It is about what beliefs we 
think we are justi"ed to hold about the relationship between risk factors and illness 
occurrence. To make that decision (whether we think we are justi"ed or not), we 
need explanations, based on observed data and their coherence among each other 
and with prior knowledge.
#ere is no intent to add much to the discussion of whether or not the Hill “criteria” 
are, in fact, criteria in the sense of necessary and su'cient conditions. Many years of 
debate about this in the epidemiological literature suggests that there is no such thing 
as hard criteria for illness causation. But what are Hill’s “criteria,” if not criteria?
Hill stated in no uncertain terms that the causal knowledge we are to gain from 
his viewpoints is needed to guide our actions. He writes that
before deducing “causation” and taking action, we shall not invariably have to sit 
around awaiting the results of that research. (Hill 1965:295)
#is brief quote from Hill’s paper’s "rst page anticipates what he devotes a whole 
section to on its last, entitled “#e case for action.” In that section, Hill makes some 
important statements worthy of mention. He writes that
the evidence is there to be judged on its merits and the judgment (in that sense) should 
be utterly independent of what hangs upon it – or who hangs because of it. (Hill 
1965:300)
Still, he asserts that in occupational medicine (his own "eld of research), action is 
o&en the objective. He thinks that once the
operative cause and […] deleterious e!ect [have been identi"ed] we shall wish to 
intervene to abolish or reduce death or disease. (ibid.)
Hill also had good results in mind. He was goal oriented, and his goal was to inform 
decisions about actions by means of the best possible causal inference, de"ned by 


















yielding the best possible results. In pragmatist terms, we may call a result good 
if it helps improve the human condition. In the health sciences, success of good 
inferential thinking is measured in terms of successful public health interventions 
that prevent illness, medical interventions that make patients better, and surgical 
interventions that increase and improve survival. But how good must evidence 
be before it warrants causal inference (Broadbent 2013:69)? We come back to this 
question later.
Despite his enthusiasm for causal inference in the service of action, Hill knows$that
All scienti"c work is incomplete – whether it be observational or experimental. All 
scienti"c work is liable to be upset or modi"ed by advancing knowledge. #at does not 
confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the 
action that it appears to demand at a given time. (Hill 1965:300)
Hill’s quest is an epistemological one, a search for a (more or less) formal framework 
for inquiry that helps generate knowledge, a set of rules to distinguish between 
association and causation. If viewed from his action-oriented perspective, one 
could think of his suggestions as being motivated by the search for a set of reasons 
that would persuade others to take action.6 His viewpoints can be seen as points of 
guidance toward evidence that justi"es action.
However, Hill knows that the kind of knowledge generation he is a&er is not 
rule based. #erefore, he makes sure his readers understand the limitations of his 
“aspects” and writes that
in asking for very strong evidence I would, however, repeat emphatically that this does 
not imply crossing every “t,” and swords with every critic, before we act. All scienti"c 
work is incomplete – whether it be observational or experimental. All scienti"c work 
is liable to be upset or modi"ed by advancing knowledge. (ibid.)
Hill’s argument resonates well with the commonplace notion that there is no such 
thing as complete and persistent certainty, in science or, arguably, anywhere else.
#is perspective gives rise to an interesting thought. While Hill shies away from 
the concept of criteria and moves toward the less stringent heuristic of viewpoints 
instead, he does not leave us with the impression that he considers this a weakness of 
his proposal. To the contrary: In the last paragraph of his paper, Hill writes hopefully 
and in a rather upbeat fashion:
Who knows, asked Robert Browning, but the world may end tonight? True, but on 
available evidence most of us make ready to commute on the 8.30 next day. (ibid.)
It seems as if Hill was con"dent that his viewpoints would do a reasonable 
job even without being criteria. #is suggests that we can live with uncertainty 
in the health sciences and still do a good job. Just like every one of us makes 
sense of our everyday lives in rather inexact ways,7 it seems likely, based on the 
successes of medicine and public health over the past century, that we do not need 
criteria and that Hill’s viewpoints have done a pretty good job as helpers toward 
better, albeit imperfect, causal inference and explanation, justi"ed actions, and 
improved$health.















Based on these considerations, for Hill, the meaning of his viewpoints was, more 
or less, their function as pointers toward aspects of an observed association that 
would make it potentially useful as a target for intervention. In other words, Hill’s 
viewpoints are characteristics of an association that, if being acted upon, is likely to 
yield useful results.8 At least partially, it is also a goal-oriented, “functional approach 
to causation, (…) that takes as its point of departure the idea that causal information 
and reasoning are sometimes useful or functional in$the sense of serving various 
goals and purposes that we have” (Woodward$2014).
In summary, Hill’s heuristics are not criteria, and the decision that an observed 
association between risk factor and illness is causal has no foundation in some 
sort of criteria. What Hill’s viewpoints o!er, however, is help in explaining illness 
occurrence – as argued next.
8.3.3  Hill’s viewpoints as backbone of 
coherent etiological explanations
Beyond providing justi"cation for action, Hill was also interested in explaining 
disease occurrence, in providing etiological explanations.9 Etiological explanations 
are scienti"c explanations. Scienti"c explanations provide pieces of information 
(explanantia) about phenomena (explananda) that increase our knowledge about 
why and how the explananda come about (Woodward 2017). Coherentism comes in 
three forms, each one with di!erent goals. #e coherence theory of truth “states that 
the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some speci"ed set of 
propositions” (Young 2018). #e coherence theory of justi!cation holds that “a belief 
or set of beliefs is justi"ed, or justi"ably held, just in case the belief coheres with a 
set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system or some variation on these themes.”
#e third kind of coherence theory, explanatory coherence, holds that evidential 
coherence adds explanatory force to an explanation; “it is what makes it an explanation, 
not just another fact.”10 In this view, having credible support by multiple pieces of 
evidence from multiple sources for an explanation would make that explanation 
better than another one that is supported by only one or two pieces of evidence from 
only one or two sources. #is kind of coherence does not support truth statements, 
and it does not bear on someone’s justi"cation to believe or act in such and such a 
way, but it does help distinguish between, for example, good explanations and better 
explanations. An explanation is good if it o!ers a credible set of pieces of evidence 
that support it; an explanation is better if it o!ers a credible and coherent set of 
pieces of evidence that support it. Note that it is not the amount of evidence but 
the coherence among pieces of evidence that makes it better than incoherent ones. 
However, coherent explanations can be improved by providing more data that are 
coherent with previously available coherent data. Taken together, we can show how 
Hill’s heuristics and Poston’s explanatory coherentism can reach across the aisle 
between coherence theories of explanation on the one hand and coherence theories 
of justi"cation on the other hand.
Poston suggests that “a subject’s propositional justi"cation for any claim is a 






















In other words, Poston o!ers an explanationist theory of justi!cation (Ex-J):
S has justi"cation for believing p if and only if p is a member of a su'ciently virtuous 
explanatory system, E, and E is more virtuous than any competing system E!. (Poston 
2014:87)
#is is a coherentist approach to justi"cation that is based on explanatory systems. 
It tells us that someone is justi"ed to believe a claim or hypothesis, namely, if it is 
part of a coherent explanatory system that is more virtuous than its competitors are. 
#us, Ex-J has two conditions for justi"cation, proper membership in a su'ciently 
virtuous coherent explanatory system and superior virtuosity of that explanatory 
system over competitors. Obviously, both conditions require further clari"cation in 
order to make the relevant decisions when a new pi becomes available. For the "rst, 
we need to specify what quali"es as good evidence and what quali"es as su'cient 
virtuosity. For the second one, we need to decide what quali"es as greater virtuosity. 
For example, does the virtuosity of E increase with an increasing number of its 
members p1 … pn that qualify as being justi"ed to be believed in? In that case, having 
evidence for the E makes it a stronger competitor against any weaker explanatory 
system E!. Only if E wins over E! is the view justi"ed that the etiological explanation 
captured by E is better than another etiological explanation E!. Still, Ex-J does not tell 
us anything about what exactly an explanatory system is, how we come to know that 
it is su'ciently virtuous, and how we "nd out whether it is more virtuous than other 
systems, let alone any other system. However, Hill’s heuristics can be used to make 
the decision whether any new data ful"ll both the proper membership and superior 
virtuosity requirements.11
To do this, we need to proceed as in the following example. First, we need to 
apply the "rst condition of Ex-J, proper membership, to an etiological explanation 
à la Bradford Hill. Let pi be any one of Hill’s viewpoints p1 … p9 and etiological 
explanation E be the union of all viewpoints [p1 … pi] for which we have good 
evidence that we consider su'ciently virtuous.. According to Ex-J’s "rst requirement, 
subject S is justi"ed to believe that p i if and only if it is a member of E. Consider a 
situation in which we are interested in the etiology of skin cancer and we already 
have evidence that strongly supports Hill’s viewpoint #1, strength of the association. 
Let us assume we have data from an observational cross-sectional study12 performed 
in Italy that show a strong association between duration of direct sun exposure 
and skin cancer. New data become available from a second cross-sectional study, 
this time from Spain, also showing a strong association. According to the proper 
membership requirement of Ex-J, we are justi"ed to believe the Spanish data if it is a 
proper member of the explanatory system E, which, until now, consists only of the 
Italian data. #e strong association of the data from Spain are in accord with Hill’s 
viewpoint #1 (strength). However, before we can make the Spanish data a component 
of E, we need to also ful"ll the second requirement for Ex-J, superior virtuosity, which 
requires that E is more virtuous than any alternative explanation E!. It is easy to see 
that this requirement is ful"lled as well, because the Spanish data provide similar 
evidence from a di!erent population, which satis"es Hill’s viewpoint #2, consistency. 
#us, not only are the Spanish data coherent with the Italian data (which actually 
satis"es another one of Hill’s viewpoints, #7), but also the Spanish and Italian data 















form a coherent explanatory system. If we accept ful"llment of an increasing number 
of Hill’s heuristics as a measure of increasing virtuosity, we are now justi"ed to 
believe the Spanish data, because they are now a member of E (with Italian and 
Spanish data as members), which is more virtuous than E! (with only the Italian 
data).
Let us further assume that new evidence becomes available, this time from a 
cohort study from Greece that yields a similarly strong measure of association. #is 
third piece of evidence not only satis"es Hill’s viewpoints #1, #2, and #7, but also #4, 
temporality.13 Again, we are justi"ed to believe in the Greek data, because they are 
now a member of E (together with Italian and Spanish data), which is more virtuous 
than E! (with only the Italian and Spanish data), and much more virtuous than E" 
(with Italian data only).14
8.3.4 Outlook
#e earlier designation of Hill’s list of viewpoints as explanatory virtues in a 
coherentist explanatory framework should be considered only the beginning of a 
broader project. Such a project would need to drill down to what the individual 
viewpoints #1–#9 exactly entail in light of what others have written. It should also o!er 
comprehensive examples of how the Hill-Poston version of etiological coherentism 
can be implemented in real-life health science.15 Moreover, in the remainder of this 
section, allusion is made to three interesting topics that should be integrated in 
such future work, that is, a rebuttal of Poston’s primitiveness claim, a comparative 
exhibition of etiological coherence theory versus uni"cationist approaches, and a 
discussion of whether etiological explanations based on the Hill-Poston model "t 
Claveau’s idea of error-independent evidence (Claveau 2012).
8.3.4.1 Epistemic primitivity of explanation à la Poston
Poston considers explanation primitive, that is, he thinks that explanation cannot 
be analyzed in terms of su'cient and necessary conditions. He starts from the 
position that explanations remove a mystery, and in science, they o&en do so by 
providing a reason why things happen. In parallel to Williamson’s argument “that 
knowledge lacks an analysis into informative necessary and su'cient conditions,”16 
Poston arrives at the conclusion that “we can identify criteria for weighing di!erent 
explanations, but explanation lacks an informative analysis in terms of necessary 
and su'cient conditions” (Poston 2014:73). He calls this the primitiveness claim and 
presents three arguments that the nature of explanation is primitive. First, he argues 
that early in cognitive development, humans start to ask “why” and take “because” 
for an answer, simply because that is what explanations are supposed to do. He 
thinks that the ability to appreciate the di!erence between how things appear and 
how things are is a quintessential feature of human cognition, and that explanations 
provide the means to make that di!erentiation. Poston argues that this capability is 
so deeply engrained in our human cognitive repertoire that it should be considered 
fundamental.
Second, he shows that some mathematical proofs are explanatorily di!erent from 
others. He gives examples of brute force and reduction proofs, which show that a 


















claim is true, and contrasts them with constructive proofs, which explain why it is 
true. One reason for the existence of such explanatory di!erence is that explanation 
is fundamental.
#ird, Poston argues that explanation is epistemically primitive. As an example, 
he uses modus ponens. He holds that
[a]t the level of a theory of content, we can specify a true logical principle; for example, 
every admissible interpretation that assigns both “p” and “p Æ q” true must assign 
“q” true. Yet this true principle does not track a metaphysical principle about human 
inference. (Poston 2014:80)
#is absence is what is to be expected if explanatoriness is indeed epistemically 
primitive. For the present context, this would mean that the explanation part of 
etiological explanations cannot be analyzed, but di!erent etiological explanations can 
be compared and weighed, which requires the integration of Hill’s viewpoints with 
Poston’s explanatory coherentism. Contrary to Poston, however, while explanation 
may not be reducible to simple underlying concepts, it is explainable. Such meta-
explanation would do exactly this, that is, explain how explanations come about; 
such meta-explanation is precisely what Hempel and Oppenheim, Salmon, van 
Fraassen, Kitcher, and other philosophers of explanation o!ered when they o!ered 
theirs (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Kitcher 1989; Salmon 1984; Van Fraassen Bas 
1980). One such meta-explanation is explanatory uni"cation.
8.3.4.2 Explanatory uni"cation
#e Hill-Poston approach to etiological explanation has some striking similarities 
with explanatory uni!cation, spearheaded by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher 
(Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1989).
Friedman’s account begins with setting his task as "nding an objective explication 
of what it means for a scienti"c explanation to produce understanding. He outlines 
and criticizes three traditional accounts of explanation, (1) the D-N model, in which 
the description of one phenomenon can explain another only by entailing it; (2) the 
“familiarity” model, in which unfamiliar phenomena can be explained only by 
references to familiar ones; and (3) the “intellectual fashion” model, in which the overall 
status of scienti"c knowledge of an era de"nes ideals of intelligibility (phenomena 
that are self-explanatory), to which explananda can be related. Friedman considers it 
desirable to “isolate a common, objective sense of explanation which remains constant 
throughout the history of science” (Friedman 1974:13). He calls for a theory that is 
su'ciently general, is objective, provides a plausible connection between explanation 
and understanding, and attempts to isolate a property of scienti"c explanation that 
has all three of these characteristics. His proposed theory is conveniently simple and 
elegant: he proposes that the “essence of scienti"c explanation [is that it] increases our 
understanding of the world by reducing the total number of independent phenomena 
that we have to accept as ultimate or given” (p.$15). Friedman gives further details of 
this proposal and stresses that
scienti"c understanding is a global a!air. We don’t simply replace one phenomenon 
with another. We replace one phenomenon with a more comprehensive phenomenon, 















and thereby e!ect a reduction in the total number of accepted phenomena.  
(Friedman 1974:19)
In essence, Friedman proposes that explanations unify multiple phenomena 
into one. In our context, etiological explanations are various characteristics of the 
etiological process that collectively explain illness occurrence by unifying them into 
a more comprehensive story about how illness comes about, compared to simpler 
stories that refer to only the causes or only the pathomechanism, and so$forth.
Another uni"cationist account is Kitcher’s, which – in a nutshell – purports 
that “science supplies us with explanations whose worth cannot be appreciated by 
considering them one by one but only by seeing how they form part of a systematic 
picture of the order of nature” (Kitcher 1989:430). Kitcher basically agrees with 
Friedman’s account but suggests that science serves the function to “derive 
descriptions of many phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and 
again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduces the type of facts we 
have to accept as ultimate” (p. 432). Future work on etiological explanations may 
attempt to show that this is, indeed, what etiological explanations can do for the 
health sciences.
8.3.4.3 Evidential heterogeneity and error independence
One interesting “value added” that comes with Hill’s list of viewpoints is their 
evidential heterogeneity. It has been suggested that while some of Hill’s viewpoints 
are compatible with a probabilistic regularity view of causality, others seem to be 
in keeping with a generative view of causality (#ygesen, Andersen, and Andersen 
2005). Others have suggested that while some viewpoints involve mechanistic 
considerations, others involve probabilistic considerations (Russo and Williamson 
2007b). #is evidential heterogeneity of Hill’s viewpoints works in our favor because 
it is likely to generate error independence of the individual pieces of evidence 
provided by the individual pi. Hill’s viewpoints represent an explanatory coherentist 
system that slowly accumulates evidence over time for etiological explanations until 
consensus in some pertinent community is reached that action is justi"ed. Claveau 
writes:
If one has good reason to believe that one type of evidence is unreliable […] it is hard 
to see why our belief in the reliability of the other type should be a!ected. When an 
evidential set has this property, we can say that its elements are error independent. 
(Claveau 2012:811)
#us, the more p we have in any explanatory system E, the larger their heterogeneity 
(Claveau prefers evidential variety), and the higher the likelihood that they are error 
independent. Moreover, the more error independent p are in a system, the better is 
that system’s stability,17 and thus, the higher is the likelihood that it can compete 
successfully against alternative explanatory systems.
Hill’s heuristics remain a stronghold in epidemiology textbook chapters on causal 
inference. As mere viewpoints to be considered during a decision-making process, 
they are not considered hard-and-fast criteria for proof of causation. Discussed in 
this chapter is my proposal that Hill’s main goal is to provide a heuristic to justify 









health interventions based on etiological explanation of observed associations from 
epidemiological studies. My suggestion is to interpret Hill’s framework of viewpoints 
as an explanatory coherentist system of statements that can stand alone or serve as 
one element of larger, multidisciplinary systems of scienti"c evidence. I think that 
this view re%ects well what is going on in current epidemiology and the other health 
sciences and that a more elaborate and re"ned version of this proposal might even 
prove to be a useful tool in e!orts to improve individual and population health.
8.4 CONCLUSION
In this book, an analysis of the terms etiology and etiological explanation from the 
epidemiological perspective was o!ered. My point of departure is the claim by 
epidemiologists, re%ected in textbook introductions, that their goal is to "nd causes 
of illness. Although this may certainly be the case, and despite their success in 
doing so, I think that this is a bit of an understatement. At closer examination, it 
becomes obvious that what epidemiologists really do is something like contributing 
evidence for comprehensive etiological explanations. A sole focus on causes and 
causal inference in epidemiology seems to be somewhat beside the point, because 
there is neither an agreed-upon de"nition in epidemiology of what a cause is nor a 
uni"ed method that tells us how to "nd one. #e epidemiological community has 
attempted to clarify these notions, without much success or even consensus. Instead 
of causation, my focus is on etiology, and instead of causal inference, my focus is on 
etiological explanation. In what follows, my discussion, "ndings, and proposal are 
summarized (Section 8.4.1) and the chapter concludes by defending my proposal 
against some “big picture” objections, and by brie%y sketching two areas of further 
study.
8.4.1 Summary of proposal
#e term etiology is used, in the health sciences, as broadly referring to “the causal 
history of illness.” However, there is no uni"ed de"nition in the literature as to what 
exactly such a story entails. Similarly, the terms cause and causation are used rather 
loosely, without generally agreed-upon de"nitions. My goal in this book is to o!er 
an account of etiology and to provide an initial outline for a theory of etiological 
explanation in epidemiology. Modern epidemiology has grown out of attempts 
to use population statistics to improve population health. One main branch of 
epidemiology, analytical or risk factor epidemiology, collects information about 
potential risk factors and information about health outcomes from large groups 
of individuals and calculates estimates of the association between risk factors and 
outcomes. #e classic view in epidemiology is that in some situations, the leap from 
association to causation is justi"ed. One framework for such inference includes Hill’s 
heuristics, a set of nine qualitative viewpoints about epidemiological evidence that, 
taken together, provide such justi"cation. Still, many agree that these heuristics 
are by no means criteria in the sense of being necessary and su'cient for causal 
inference. #us, many epidemiologists hesitate to talk about causation,18 while their 















explicit textbook goal is to identify causes of illness. #e focus should be shi&ed 
from causation to etiology, the causal origin of illness. In this term, causal origin is 
equivalent with natural history, the overarching sequence of events that precede and 
play a role in illness occurrence. In particular, etiology is the overarching relationship 
between candidate causes (risk factors for illness), the pathogenetic mechanism they 
induce (pathogenesis), and the clinical disease that emerges.
In epidemiology, two classic frameworks for causal inference and analysis are Hill’s 
heuristics and Rothman’s su'cient-component cause model, respectively. Hill does 
not say what causation is but o!ers help for causal inference. Hill’s are nine viewpoints 
(rooted in Mill’s philosophy) that, when su'ciently covered by epidemiological 
evidence, support a causal interpretation of that evidence. Rothman’s model 
(rooted in Mackie’s philosophy) allows for the organization of component causes 
into su'cient causal constellations and, thereby, says what causation looks like, but 
it does not o!er much help with causal inference. A third approach, the potential 
outcomes approach, holds that causation can be extracted$from epidemiological data 
if they come from randomized or quasi-randomized studies.
My suggestion to move from causal inference to etiological explanation is a 
direct response to Alex Broadbent’s invitation to do just this. In keeping with my 
interpretation of the term etiology, I propose to de"ne an etiological explanation as 
a plausible description of a process of causes, pathogenetic mechanisms, and other 
contributors in the presence of which illness occurs more frequently than in their 
absence. I also provide circumstances under which an etiological explanation is good 
(if it is a plausible candidate for being the underpinning for intervention design) and 
useful (when it actually yields improved population health).
In his book Philosophy of Epidemiology, Broadbent discusses stability and 
good prediction as two candidate characteristics of useful epidemiological data. 
Intervention should be added to the mix in the sense of experimental manipulation, a 
crucial ingredient in both laboratory and epidemiological experiments (randomized 
controlled trials). Human intervention adds to the explanatory bene"ts of randomized 
experiments, usually attributed to the minimization of bias (including confounding) 
via randomization and blinding. Explanation by intervention comes with the 
bene"t of delivering evidence of e'cacy, suggesting potential e!ectiveness in real-
life situations in medicine and public health, thereby improving upon explanations 
based on stability and good prediction only.
#e proposal by Illari and Russo to look at causation in the sciences from a pluralist 
mosaicist perspective is most welcome in the setting of etiological explanations. 
Since etiological explanations require at least some causal and some pathogenetic 
evidence, etiological pluralism would entail pluralism of both causes and causation. 
Such etiological pluralism has been alluded to by one of the pioneers of causal 
thinking in the health sciences, Mervyn Susser. #e heterogeneity of what Susser 
called forms of determination is discussed, drawing on examples from my own work 
in developmental neuro-epidemiology.
#e Russo-Williamson thesis (RWT) holds that causal claims in the health 
sciences need to be supported by evidence of di!erence-making (associations) 
and evidence of mechanism. Going beyond previous points of criticism, my own 
discussion of the RWT, developed in collaboration with Alex Fiorentino, results in 
the proposal to (a) think of di!erence-making as exposure-outcome evidence and 









(b) rethink mechanistic evidence in the health sciences to include entity-based, 
association-based, and activity-based mechanistic evidence. Here, it becomes clear 
that the di!erence-making claim of the RWT can be nested in the mechanistic claim 
in the form of association-based mechanistic evidence. In essence, both exposure-
outcome evidence and mechanistic evidence require the observation of di!erences. 
In one way or another, evidence of mechanism and evidence of di!erence-making 
always coexist in causal explanations, thus rendering the RWT true, but only trivially 
so. In etiological explanations, causal hypotheses explain observed associations 
that qualify as exposure-outcome evidence, while "ner-grained associations and 
knowledge of entities ultimately explain a causal hypothesis.
Despite its explanatory advantages, mechanistic explanation of health phenomena 
might place too much emphasis on entities and activities, their organization, and 
the changes they produce, and pay too little attention to the fact that all etiology 
is a process. #is process perspective is of crucial importance in the health sciences, 
because the sequence in which entities are involved in the activities of a mechanism 
is of greatest interest for the design of interventions. Autism is traditionally 
considered an all-or-nothing disorder, a disease state that, once it is there, 
remains there and does not change. Recent evidence from neonatal epidemiology, 
neuroscience, and immunology suggests that this might not be the whole story. An 
example from my own work with Carmina Erdei illustrates that many individuals 
with autism are born preterm (cause) and appear to exhibit an in%ammatory 
response (pathomechanism) that begins at around birth and continues throughout 
childhood, which is a process that might be a good target for intervention. #us, an 
etiological explanation of autism from the process perspective might rescue autistic 
children from the traditional assumption of being untreatable. Placing these aspects 
of autism etiology into the Mackie-Rothman framework of su'cient-component 
causation, and reinterpreting it as a framework for etiological explanations might 
be particularly useful.
Etiological explanations should not be restricted to causal and pathogenetic 
components. In what is called comprehensive etiological explanations, the concept 
of combined contribution plays an important role as “comprehensi"er.” Michael 
Kelly, Rachel Kelly, and Federica Russo have proposed that "nding a way to integrate 
behavioral, social, and biological mechanisms into what they call mixed mechanisms 
would be "nding a way to provide better pathogenetic models. In response to their 
proposal, (1) the biological and social mechanisms are integrated in illness occurrence 
models more frequently than they appear to think, (2) what they call pathogenesis is 
actually etiology, and (3) what is called the etiological stance would entail looking at 
the combined contribution to illness etiology by di!erent kinds of contributors, such 
as initiators, modi"ers, and mediators, and perhaps even background conditions. 
Etiological contributor is de"ned as any factor that is part of and plays a functional 
role in an etiological process. #is etiological stance would maximize the number of 
entities, associations, and activities that may be considered targets for intervention.
Finally, in order to be explanatorily relevant, etiological explanations would 
bene"t from being put together according to the framework of explanatory 
coherentism. When reading Ted Poston’s book Reason and Explanation, I was struck 
by how well my vision of etiological explanations resonates with his explanationist 
theory of justi"cation (Ex-J), which states that one is justi"ed to believe a claim if 















and only if the claim is part of a su'ciently virtuous explanatory system that beats 
competitors. In Ex-J lingo, one is justi"ed to believe in a causal or mechanistic claim 
about aspects of illness occurrence if and only if such a claim is part of a su'ciently 
virtuous etiological explanation that beats competitors. Hill’s list of viewpoints can 
be joined with Poston’s Ex-J such that they provide an explanatory coherentist grid 
for etiological explanations. More exploratory work will include, for example, a 
rebuttal of Poston’s primitiveness argument (which states that explanation cannot 
be further reduced but is a fundamental concept), a discussion of whether etiological 
explanations qualify as uni"cationist explanations, and an analysis of evidential 
variety as an explanatory virtue of Hill’s heuristics.
In conclusion, I hope to have o!ered a broad, rigorous, and comprehensive, albeit 
not necessarily exhaustive, analysis and discussion in support of the argument that 
it is possible and perhaps even useful to move from causal inference to etiological 
explanation in epidemiology (Chapter 3). I have also shown how to do this and have 
o!ered one way to "t this move into a coherentist approach to explanation. I have 
argued that etiological pluralism of causes and of causation (Chapter 4) requires the 
consideration of di!erent kinds of mechanistic evidence (Chapter 5), that a process 
perspective will be helpful (Chapter 6) when looking at the combined contribution 
of etiological factors (Chapter 7), and that explanatory coherentism seems to be a 
viable framework for comprehensive etiological explanations (Chapter 8). I hope that 
all this will somehow turn out to be helpful for the generation of better interventions 
designed to improve population health.
A few issues remain to be addressed. In what follows I, "rst, explain why and how I 
think the approach of this book sustains its overarching argument. Second, I outline 
some “big picture” objections and why I think they do not invalidate my work. #ird, 
I brie%y sketch two areas into which the arguments I have developed in this book 
could be expanded.
8.4.2  Defense against some “big picture” 
objections
First, a “big picture” critic might reject coherentism in toto. #is objection holds that 
coherentist explanations do not work because coherence is not anchored in anything. 
In other words, my proposal to design etiological explanations as explanations of 
the coherentist kind will fail because coherentism fails. Such an anticoherentist 
critic would need to o!er an alternative to coherentism, for example, some sort of 
foundationalism, which holds that there must be an absolute, irrefutable basis for 
an explanation to be valid. To my knowledge, however, no such foundationalist 
view has ever been successfully o!ered in the philosophy of science. To this, the 
anticoherentist could argue that she does not need to provide an alternative view, 
because providing alternative views is not a necessary component of a rejection. 
My response would be that I would accept the anticoherentist argument if the 
critic could convince me that the explanatory coherentist view is fatally %awed. 
In epidemiological practice, the justi"cation of beliefs in details of etiological 
explanations depends very much on background knowledge, which means that most 
of our beliefs about new data depend on our beliefs in background data. I am not 









aware of any piece of etiological knowledge that goes back to a piece of a priori 
knowledge. However, even if foundationalism were true, this does not necessarily 
mean that coherentism is wrong. If there is some truth to either one, perhaps hybrid 
approaches such as Susan Haack’s foundherentism and her associated crossword-
puzzle analogy might be a good "t for etiological explanations (Haack 1993). 
Unfortunately, this interesting topic is far beyond the scope of this book and will 
have to wait for another day.
Second, causal skeptics might argue that causation has no place in etiological 
explanations because the very concept of causation is blurred. #is stance goes back 
to Russell’s o&-cited position according to which there are no such things as causes 
and that, therefore, the concept should be done away with (Russell 1913). Etiological 
explanations are causal-mechanical explanations. If one doubts the very existence 
of causes, then one should also doubt the existence of etiology, which would render 
etiological explanations meaningless. If that were true, the skeptic would need to 
clarify how medicine and public health could have been as successful as they were 
over the past centuries if not with the help of causal inference and prediction. #at 
success is just too good to be the result of sheer dumb luck. Another kind of causal 
skepticism does not reject the idea of causation but only holds that “one may doubt 
that we have any clear and univocal notion” of causation (Healey 2009). As discussed 
in Chapter 4, I suggest that etiological pluralism is causal and pathogenetic pluralism, 
which makes it immune to the potential downsides of the absence of such uni"ed 
notion. In the health sciences, the kinds of etiological stories we tell range from 
stories about accidents via stories about accidents to stories about tumorigenesis, 
and to stories about psychodynamics. Not having a clear and univocal account of 
causation might rather be helpful with the design of etiological explanations under 
all these various etiological circumstances.
#ird, someone might say that we cannot move from causal inference to 
etiological explanation because causal inference and causal explanation are the same. 
I disagree, mainly because causal inference is giving an answer to a simple “yes” 
or “no” question, such as: does excessive sun exposure cause skin cancer? A causal 
explanation, on the other hand, answers a “why” question by not just stating that 
excessive sun exposure might cause skin cancer, but also by providing information 
about the causal mechanism of how the sun does this. Etiological explanations are a 
certain kind of causal explanation, as outlined by Salmon: “Etiological explanations 
are, of course, thoroughly causal; they explain a given fact by showing how it came 
to be as a result of antecedent events, processes, and conditions” (Salmon 1984:269). 
In keeping with this view, I think of causal inference and causal explanation as two 
very di!erent things.
Fourth, another objection could come from the angle of the potential outcomes 
approach (POE). #e POE defender could state that we do not need etiological 
explanations since we can have suitable causal inference using the POE. My 
response is to assure that the POE cannot replace etiological explanations because 
these go beyond causal inference, by integrating causal with mechanistic facts into 
comprehensive explanations, and by including information about contributors such 
as mediators, modi"ers, and so forth. From this perspective, it may well be fruitful 
to consider integrating the POA as one technique to generate data for etiological 
explanations (see later), but not to replace it with the POA, because at least part of the 















story will be lost. For the same reason, another POA defender could say that while 
both the Hill heuristics and the POA are valid and have their place in epidemiology, 
the POA is the more recent (modern) approach and Hill’s approach is outdated 
(classic). #is is exactly the view put forward by Glass and coauthors (Glass et$al. 
2013) but without supporting evidence that justi"es the conclusion that it is invalid 
or even just less e!ective than the POA, just because it is the older concept. #e POA 
builds on work by Donald Rubin that dates back to the early 1970s, less than a decade 
a&er Hill published his seminal paper, so it is not much more recent (Hill 1965; 
Rubin 1974). As an aside, the main concept behind the POA, the generation of quasi-
randomized data from observational studies for the purpose of causal inference, 
was considered by the same Sir Austin Bradford Hill much earlier (in 1953) when 
he asked, “can observations be made in such a way as to ful"ll, as far as possible, 
experimental requirements?” (Hill 1953:995). Experiment is also one of the nine Hill 
viewpoints, and nothing in Hill’s paper indicates that he was referring to laboratory 
experiments exclusively. #us, one important, if not the most important foundation 
of the POA was considered essential for causal inference almost two decades before 
the POA was born.
What’s next? In fact, to integrate etiological explanations with the POA would 
be one interesting way to move forward. I have not discussed the POA in detail 
in this book, because it deals mainly with causal inference, which I suggest 
leaving behind (or at least put aside for a while). Others have recently o!ered a 
cogent critique elsewhere.19 What might be worthwhile would be an attempt to 
bring quantitative aspects from the POA into the predominantly qualitative way of 
constructing etiological explanations. As mentioned earlier, Hill has experiment as 
one of his viewpoints. #is clearly refers back to the idea that a randomized study 
design carries epistemic value when it comes to causal inference. I have begun, 
with Ryan Flanagan, to explore this idea of epistemological weight of randomized 
trials as consisting of epistemological value (methodological quality), function 
(relationship to other kinds of evidence), and utility (extrapolation of results, 
increased understanding, clinical usefulness) (Flanagan and Dammann 2018). In 
this scenario, some concepts from POE might come in handy as a tool to establish 
epistemological value.
Another interesting topic to explore will be to see whether a coherentist framework 
can not only be applied to etiological explanations in epidemiology but also to the 
prediction of interventional success in population health. If a collection of error-
independent pieces of evidence arranged as a series of coherent responses to Hill’s 
checkpoints can provide a comprehensive etiological explanation, could a collection of 
error-independent predictions about interventional success provide a justi"cation for 
such intervention at the population level? In other words, can one conceive of predictive 
coherence as the basis for the justi"cation of action in population health? #is brings up 
multiple interesting questions. One is the question of how explanation and prediction 
are related. Hempel, for example, held that explanations, predictions, and post-dictions 
share the same logical structure (his symmetry thesis), an argument that does not 
stand unchallenged (Fetzer 2017). Another question is whether good explanations are 
necessarily a good basis for good predictions. If so, what exactly is it that makes good 
explanations a basis for good predictions, and what is the reason that some predictions 
fail even if they are based on good predictions?20 A third question would be what makes 









a prediction good. Not much has been written about prediction in philosophy of science, 
so a lot remains to be explored.
Both of these possibilities, exploring the integration of the POE and predictive 
coherentism in population health, would be attractive topics for future research. At 
the time of this writing, I tend toward the second, predictive coherentism, as the topic 
of my next project in philosophy of epidemiology. I look forward to many interesting 
discussions with my colleagues at the interdisciplinary intersection of philosophy 
and epidemiology.
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 9. !is point has been o#ered to me by Alex Broadbent.
 10. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of micro- and macro-etiology.
 11. Note that this account of causality in the health sciences is di#erent from that 
proposed by Russo and Williamson (2007b), although the accounts may look 
almost identical. While Russo and Williamson think we need evidence of both 
di#erence-making and mechanism, I suggest that we need both macrolevel and 
microlevel etiological evidence, and that di#erence-making and mechanistic 
aspects play a role at both levels. I have started working on this proposal 
with Alex Fiorentino (Fiorentino and Dammann 2015), but a comprehensive 
discussion has to wait for another day.
 12. In some cases, epidemiological research can help mount the evidence in support 
of both causal and causal-mechanical explanation. Molecular epidemiology 
is usually seen as being capable of going beyond mere exposure-outcome 
relationships by shedding some light on the molecular mechanisms at work 
between exposure and outcome; see Schulte and Perera (1993).
 13. !is macro-etiological evidence is what Alex Fiorentino and I have come to call 
exposure-outcome evidence; see Fiorentino and Dammann (2015).
 14. See, for example, Dammann and Leviton (1997, 2004).
 15. Fleck 1935 (2012) (translation from German mine).
 16. !is is not to be confused with evidence needed to justify public health 
intervention. Smoking cessation programs are fully justi"ed despite the glaring 
lack of knowledge about a causal mechanism.
 17. One has to be mindful that in order to justify activities targeted at the design of 
medical or public health interventions, GEEs are su%cient. Strictly speaking, 
the label UEE can be given only to explanations that have stood the test of time.
 18. Useful etiological explanations as de"ned earlier will be particularly useful 
if they help achieve the goals of public health and medicine. !is notion 
resonates with Woodward, who takes usefulness to be “the only standard that 
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matters” when he describes what he calls his “functional project” as the “idea 
that causal information and reasoning are sometimes useful or functional in 
the sense of serving various goals and purposes” (Woodward$2014).
 19. See, for example, Rubin (2007).
 20. One particularly interesting facet of the RCT concept worthy of discussion is 
the epistemological status of computer simulations of RCTs. Unfortunately, this 
goes far beyond the scope of this book.
 21. Of course, there are many other limitations of the manipulationist approach 
in the health sciences. For example, no one would seriously suggest using 
manipulation to study adverse health e#ects of, say, smoking or asbestos 
without violating ethical boundaries.
 22. I use “observational studies” in quotation marks as synonymous with 
noninterventional epidemiological studies such as cohort, case-control, and 
cross-sectional studies.
 23. In Sections 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2, respectively.
 24. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 8.
 25. See, for example, VanderWeele (2015:4–5).
 26. Some early pioneers of evidence-based medicine went as far as suggesting 
ignoring observational data if data from randomized trials are available.
 27. With Ryan Flanagan, I have started developing this theme toward the idea that 
the epistemological weight of RCTs depends on their results (see Flanagan and 
Dammann 2018).
 28. Some would call this evidence of di#erence-making. In RCTs, this di#erence is 
mainly due to modi"cation by the drug of a pathogenetic pathway.
 29. !is is why some have come to use the term e#ect-measure modi$cation 
(Rothman and Mahon 2004).
 30. !e arguably “classic” debate about this issue was initiated by Howson and 
Urbach (1993), Urbach (1993), and Worrall (2007), who cogently criticized the 
perceived epistemological superiority of RCTs. Among the defenders of RCTs 
are Papineau (1994) and La Caze (2013).
 31. But not usually to the elucidation of pathogenetic mechanisms, which is the 
turf of the laboratory sciences. Molecular and genetic epidemiological studies 
might be exceptions.
 32. It needs to be further explored whether the suggestion to transition from 
causal inference to causal explanation (Broadbent 2013) can and/or should be 
integrated that causal claims in the biomedical sciences need support from both 
mechanistic and di#erence-making evidence (Russo and Williamson 2007b).
 33. !anks to Alex Broadbent for bringing this point to my attention.
 34. Per Broadbent’s framework, RCTs also need to be stable and yield good 
predictions to be able to o#er this kind of information. !us, ideally, multiple 
clinical trials are needed to arrive at a solid causal explanation from$RCTs.
 35. !is line of reasoning has come to be called the “Russo-Williamson thesis” 
(Russo and Williamson 2007b) Brie'y, it states that causal claims in the health 
sciences need to gather support from both di#erence-making and mechanistic 
evidence. For a comprehensive discussion, see Chapter 5.








 1. Illari and Russo use the “mosaic” metaphor for their proposed causal pluralist 
perspective (see later and Chapter 23 of Causality: Philosophical !eory Meets 
Scienti$c Practice).
 2. See Rothman (1976) and Section 2.4.1.
 3. Craver was not the "rst to use the “mosaic” metaphor (Charlton 1996; Lewis 
1986:ix).
 4. If this is indeed what those who do exposomics research think they do, the term 
exposomics is a misnomer and should be replaced with the term exposology. 
If instead exposomics is what the term denotes, it is the idea to consider all 
lifetime exposures and their individual and joint health e#ects. (See Coughlin, 
2014, for a concise discussion of exposomics in light of multiple other -omics 
approaches.)
 5. See, for example, Figure 1.2 in Schulte and Perera (1993:6).
 6. Or at least, as they say in parts of the United States, “’til the cows come home.”
 7. Godfrey-Smith laments that many do not explicitly distinguish between these 
two kinds of pluralism (Godfrey-Smith 2009:327–8).
 8. He calls the other two kinds of pluralism noted earlier, metaphysical and 
conceptual pluralism, respectively.
 9. For a comprehensive defense of evidential pluralism in epidemiology, see 
Broadbent, Vandenbroucke, and Pearce (2016) and Vandenbroucke, Broadbent, 
and Pearce (2016).
 10. In Dammann (2017) and in Chapter 7 of this book.
 11. Mayo Clinic. Cancer. Retrieved from https://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/cancer/symptoms-causes/syc-20370588
 12. !ose later causes of gene mutations (smoking, radiation, and viruses, among 
many others) are also plural in two ways: (1) in what they are and (2) in how 
they come about. With regard to (1), smoke is a cloud of particulate matter 
in air resulting from tobacco combustion, radiation is energy (or particles) 
moving through space (or matter) in waveform, and viruses are clumps of 
genetic code wrapped in protein. With regard to (2), exposure to tobacco smoke 
is mainly the result of a behavior, radiation can come from either natural (sun) 
or nonnatural sources (tanning beds), and both kinds of exposure can o&en 
be modi"ed by choice; viruses are ubiquitous$in$the$human environment and 
are transferred in multiple ways between organisms.
 13. !is is how we distinguish di#erent kinds of prevention: primary (eliminate 
illness), secondary (ameliorate illness), and tertiary (prevent consequences of 
illness). Not coincidentally, these activities de"ne di#erent kinds of health care 
as performed in public health, medicine, and rehabilitation, respectively.
 14. Later in this book, the same concept is applied to the etiology of autism (in 
Chapter 6). My version of what Susser called multiple causality is also developed, 
called combined contribution (in Chapter 7).
 15. See Section 2.4.1. It is also re'ected in my discussion of combined contributions 
discussed in Chapter 7.
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 16. See Susser (1973:68). !is causal dyad, early brain damage and subsequent 
development, has been proposed and discussed by Malaeb and Dammann 
(2009) and by Volpe (2009) as two separate causal factors in neurodevelopmental 
disability.
CHAPTER 5
 1. For example, Broadbent (2011), Claveau (2012), Gillies (2011), and Illari (2011).
 2. F. Russo, personal communication, November 27, 2015.
 3. See, for example, Broadbent (2011), Claveau (2012), Fiorentino and Dammann 
(2015), Gillies (2011), Illari (2011), and Jo#e (2013).
 4. See Chapter 9 in Williamson (2005) and Williamson (2006).
 5. I have yet to identify the point in either author’s writings that tells us in a 
straightforward manner how to distinguish between causal and noncausal 
associations based on data alone.
 6. Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordlearners 
dictionaries.com/us/de"nition/english/account-for; accessed July 22, 2016.
 7. See, for example, (Giere 1997)
 8. See Section 2.5.2.2 for a brief introduction to the concept.
 9. Ignaz Semmelweis (1818–65) was a Hungarian physician who introduced 
antiseptic handwashing to prevent puerperal fever without any knowledge 
about the disease mechanism. See Csoka (2016) for an interesting discussion of 
the fact that Semmelweis was ridiculed for his helpful idea, while a generation 
later, Egas Moniz (1874–1955) received the Nobel prize for introducing 
lobotomy, which in some cases turned out to be harmful rather than helpful 
(Lerner 2005).
 10. Although some appear to think that a pathomechanism is not really a 
mechanism, but an irregularity of normal body function (Garson 2013).
 11. !is view is expanded in Chapter 8 of this book, which deals with coherence in 
etiological explanations.
CHAPTER 6
 1. While the etiology of most diseases may be explained by an outline of the 
biological process, at least some might be better explained by a more inclusive 
approach, such as the biopsychosocial model of disease (see Engel 1980; Fava 
and Sonino 2008).
 2. See Figures 4.1 and 7.1.
 3. In the spirit of full disclosure, I should mention that I am currently a member 
of the editorial board of that journal.
 4. !is section builds on a previous publication (Erdei and Dammann 2014). I am 
grateful to Carmina Erdei for her permission to use this coauthored material 
here.







 5. See Bechtel (2008); Bechtel (2011); Craver (2007); Garson (2013); Glennan 
(2002); Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000); and Williamson (2011a, 
2011b). Two sub-foci of this discourse are directly relevant to biomedicine, i.e., 
the role of mechanisms in biology (Bechtel 2011; Chao 2013; Nicholson$2012) 
and in epidemiology (Broadbent 2011; Clarke et$al. 2013a, 2013b; Fiorentino 
and Dammann 2015; Kincaid 2011; Russo 2009; Severinsen 2001).
 6. See Section 7.3 for a discussion of contributors to the etiological process.
 7. An interesting overview of DNA methylation can be found in Schubeler (2015).
 8. !e mammalian target of rapamycin pathway is a crucial component of cell 
growth regulation.
 9. See Kleinberg and Hripcsak (2011) on biomedical informatics, Braunstein 
and Ingrosso (2016) on computational epidemiology, and Mercuri and Baigrie 
(2016) on medical malpractice litigation.
 10. Consider, for example this explanation for the lay audience: “Exposure to 
UV radiation is the main factor that causes skin cells to become cancer cells. 
Almost all skin cancers (approximately 99% of non-melanoma skin cancers 
and 95% of melanoma) are caused by too much UV radiation from the sun 
or other sources” (Cancer Council NSW. How ultraviolet (UV) radiation 
causes skin cancer. Retrieved from http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/63295/
cancer-prevention/sun-protection/sun-protection-sport-and-recreation/sun-
protection-information-for-sporting-groups/how-ultraviolet-uv-radiation-
causes-skin-cancer/; accessed May 8, 2016.)
 11. “UV radiation is made up of UVA and UVB rays which are able to penetrate the 
skin and cause permanent damage to the cells below […] If the body is unable 
to repair this damage the cell can begin to divide and grow in an uncontrolled 
way. !is growth can eventually form a tumour” (ibid.).
 12. Phil Dowe summarized his view in a personal communication thus: “A 
process is an actual concrete thing, whereas a mechanism is a system of actual 
and possible processes” (email, January 26, 2015). !is driver driving$this car 
to work today is the concrete thing (process), and the driver and car together 
represent the system of actual or possible drivings (mechanism).
 13. Rube Goldberg machines are a good example, e.g., https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qybUFnY7Y8w
 14. Gene Ontology Consortium. Gene ontology overview. Retrieved from http://
geneontology.org/page/biological-process-ontology-guidelines
 15. Gene Ontology Consortium. Gene ontology overview. Retrieved from http://
geneontology.org/page/ontology-documentation
 16. Aronson refers to Collingwood (1972) and Gasking (1955).
 17. See Section 4.4.3 for a discussion of causes versus conditions.
CHAPTER 7
 1. What they probably mean is association, not correlation.
 2. !is is obviously a change in name only, not in meaning. At most, it is a 
restriction of meaning to epidemiological contexts.







 3. See Vinten-Johansen (2003) for a comprehensive and well-researched biography 
of John Snow.
 4. See, for example, Emmert-Streib and Dehmer (2010).
 5. “If E1 is the cause of E2, then a small variation (a mark) in E1 is associated with 
a small variation in E2, whereas small variations in E2 are not associated with 
variations in E1” (italics in original).
 6. !e quote is from Mill’s System of Logic, Book III, Chapter 5, Section 3, as 
quoted by Mackie (1974).
 7. A “taxonomy of causal explanations” as suggested by Räisänen et$al. might be 
a helpful step in this direction (Räisänen et$al. 2006).
 8. In some areas of health care, especially in e#orts to improve patient safety, 
the idea of a “root-cause analysis” is that rigorous analysis of adverse event 
scenarios in health-care settings such as hospitals may help prevent such 
unforeseen incidents (Vincent 2003). Although this seems to be a perfectly 
reasonable and laudable attempt to improve health care, it has been emphasized 
that “root-cause analysis” is a misnomer, because it oversimpli"es the idea of 
causation in health care by reducing it to the idea that adverse events have 
single causes, and because analyses that focus on incidents are likely to ignore 
the big picture, the insu%ciencies of the$“system” that have given rise to the 
error that led to the event (Vincent$2004).
 9. In philosophy, causal power theories capture this phenomenon rather well. See, 
for example, Cartwright (1989), Mumford (2009), and Mumford and Anjum 
(2011a).
 10. Figure 7.3 is based on Figure 2.3.1 in Woodward (2003:49).
 11. Woodward adds that “[d]irect causes will thus always be contributing causes, 
but there may be contributing causes that are not direct” (Woodward 2003:50).
 12. Mediator analysis is an important component of epidemiological data analysis. 
See, for example, Richiardi, Bellocco, and Zugna (2013) and VanderWeele 
(2015). Unfortunately, even a brief discussion of its intricacies is far beyond the 
scope of this book.
CHAPTER 8
 1. See pages iv–v in Ross (1965).
 2. Quoted verbatim from !agard (2006).
 3. !is section is based on a manuscript that has in the meantime evolved into a 
chapter coauthored with Paul !agard and Ted Poston; see Dammann, Poston, 
and !agard (2019). !e section is, however, authored solely by myself and thus 
re'ects my thoughts, not theirs.
 4. See Section 2.5.2.1 for a brief overview.
 5. See earlier, aspect 7 in list in Section 2.5.2.1.
 6. !anks to Alex Broadbent for pointing this out to me.
 7. See Deemter (2010) for a popular account of inexactitude subtitled “in praise 
of vagueness.”
 8. !is notion resonates with Cartwright’s focus on usage in causal inference; see 
Cartwright (2007).







 9. From this angle, Hill’s proposal looks like a response given half a century before 
Broadbent made his recent suggestion that “causation and causal inference 
are overemphasized in epidemiology and epidemiological methodology, and 
explanation and prediction deserve greater emphasis” (Broadbent 2013:8).
 10. !is is Broadbent’s wording, not mine.
 11. All nine of Hill’s viewpoints are listed in Section 2.5.2.1.
 12. Cross-sectional studies collect information about exposure (sun) and outcome 
(skin cancer) at the same time; there is no time lag in between the two 
information collection exercises.
 13. Cohort studies assess exposure "rst, then wait for longer periods of time (years) 
for the outcome to develop. !us, the cohort study asserts that the sun exposure 
came before the skin cancer, hence ful"lling Hill’s viewpoint #4 (temporality), 
while the cross-sectional studies cannot.
 14. !ere may certainly be further criteria that help decide whether E or E! wins the 
competition. A complete discussion of such possibility is far beyond the scope 
of this book.
 15. For one example, see Dammann, Poston, and !agard (2019).
 16. Poston (2014:72), citing Williamson (2000).
 17. By referring to stability here, I am tipping my hat to Alex Broadbent’s discussion 
of stability as one central requirement for epidemiological results in order to 
justify their application in decisions about population health interventions; see 
Broadbent (2013:59–65) and all of his Chapter 5.
 18. !e American Journal of Public Health has a section of articles on the C-Word 
in their May 2018 issue. Several authors get very serious about the question of 
whether or not to articulate causal claims in their work. Part of my motivation 
for this book is my position that such discussions are slightly beside the point, 
because a narrow focus on causal inference is, I think, less helpful than a 
broader one, on etiological explanation.
 19. See Broadbent, Vandenbroucke, and Pearce (2016) and Vandenbroucke, 
Broadbent, and Pearce (2016).
 20. Some power theorists of causation suggest that power-based predictions can 
fail due to the in'uence of extra powers (Mumford and Anjum 2011a).
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